Strategic American victory
British forces succeed in destroying cannon and supplies in Concord
Militia successfully drive British back to Boston
Start of the American Revolutionary War
Commanders and leaders
Isaac Davis †
John Pitcairn (WIA)
End of Battle: 3,960
Departing Boston: 700
End of Battle: 1,500
Casualties and losses
Lexington and Concord
Knox artillery train
Battles of Lexington and Concord
Battles of Lexington and Concord were the first military
engagements of the American Revolutionary War. The battles were
fought on April 19, 1775 in Middlesex County, Province of
Massachusetts Bay, within the towns of Lexington, Concord, Lincoln,
Menotomy (present-day Arlington), and Cambridge. They marked the
outbreak of armed conflict between the
Kingdom of Great Britain
Kingdom of Great Britain and
its thirteen colonies in America.
In late 1774, Colonial leaders adopted the
Suffolk Resolves in
resistance to the alterations made to the
government by the British parliament following the
Boston Tea Party.
The colonial assembly responded by forming a Patriot provisional
government known as the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress
Massachusetts Provincial Congress and calling
for local militias to train for possible hostilities. The Colonial
government exercised effective control of the colony outside of
British-controlled Boston. In response, the British government in
February 1775 declared
Massachusetts to be in a state of rebellion.
About 700 British Army regulars in Boston, under Lieutenant Colonel
Francis Smith, were given secret orders to capture and destroy
Colonial military supplies reportedly stored by the Massachusetts
militia at Concord. Through effective intelligence gathering, Patriot
leaders had received word weeks before the expedition that their
supplies might be at risk and had moved most of them to other
locations. On the night before the battle, warning of the British
expedition had been rapidly sent from
Boston to militias in the area
by several riders, including
Paul Revere and Samuel Prescott, with
information about British plans. The initial mode of the Army's
arrival by water was signaled from the
Old North Church
Old North Church in
Charlestown using lanterns to communicate "one if by land, two if by
The first shots were fired just as the sun was rising at Lexington.
Eight militiamen were killed, including Ensign Robert Munroe, their
ranking officer. The British suffered only one casualty. The militia
were outnumbered and fell back, and the regulars proceeded on to
Concord, where they broke apart into companies to search for the
supplies. At the North Bridge in Concord, approximately 400 militiamen
engaged 100 regulars from three companies of the King's troops at
about 11:00 am, resulting in casualties on both sides. The
outnumbered regulars fell back from the bridge and rejoined the main
body of British forces in Concord.
The British forces began their return march to
Boston after completing
their search for military supplies, and more militiamen continued to
arrive from neighboring towns. Gunfire erupted again between the two
sides and continued throughout the day as the regulars marched back
towards Boston. Upon returning to Lexington, Lt. Col. Smith's
expedition was rescued by reinforcements under
Brigadier General Hugh
Percy, a future duke of Northumberland known as Earl Percy. The
combined force of about 1,700 men marched back to
Boston under heavy
fire in a tactical withdrawal and eventually reached the safety of
Charlestown. The accumulated militias then blockaded the narrow land
accesses to Charlestown and Boston, starting the Siege of Boston.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
Ralph Waldo Emerson describes the first shot fired by the Patriots at
the North Bridge in his "Concord Hymn" as the "shot heard round the
1.1 British government preparations
1.2 American preparations
Militia forces assemble
1.4 British forces advance
2 The Battles
2.1.1 First shot
2.2.1 The search for militia supplies
2.2.2 The North Bridge
2.2.3 After the fight
2.3 Return march
2.3.1 Concord to Lexington
2.3.2 Percy's rescue
2.3.3 Lexington to Menotomy
2.3.4 Menotomy to Charlestown
5.1 Centennial commemoration
5.2 Sesquicentennial commemoration
5.3 Bicentennial commemoration
6 See also
9 External links
The British Army's infantry was nicknamed "redcoats" and sometimes
"devils" by the colonists. They had occupied
Boston since 1768 and had
been augmented by naval forces and marines to enforce what the
colonists called The Intolerable Acts, which had been passed by the
British Parliament to punish the
Province of Massachusetts Bay
Province of Massachusetts Bay for the
Boston Tea Party
Boston Tea Party and other acts of defiance.
Thomas Gage was the military governor of
commander-in-chief of the roughly 3,000 British military forces
garrisoned in Boston. He had no control over
Massachusetts outside of
Boston, however, where implementation of the Acts had increased
tensions between the Patriot Whig majority and the pro-British Tory
minority. Gage's plan was to avoid conflict by removing military
supplies from Whig militias using small, secret, and rapid strikes.
This struggle for supplies led to one British success and several
Patriot successes in a series of nearly bloodless conflicts known as
the Powder Alarms. Gage considered himself to be a friend of liberty
and attempted to separate his duties as governor of the colony and as
general of an occupying force.
Edmund Burke described Gage's
conflicted relationship with
Massachusetts by saying in Parliament,
"An Englishman is the unfittest person on Earth to argue another
Englishman into slavery."
The colonists had been forming militias since the very beginnings of
Colonial settlement for the purpose of defense against Indian attacks.
These forces also saw action in the
French and Indian War
French and Indian War between 1754
and 1763 when they fought alongside British regulars. Under the laws
of each New England colony, all towns were obligated to form militia
companies composed of all males 16 years of age and older (there were
exemptions for some categories), and to ensure that the members were
properly armed. The
Massachusetts militias were formally under the
jurisdiction of the provincial government, but militia companies
throughout New England elected their own officers. Gage
effectively dissolved the provincial government under the terms of the
Massachusetts Government Act, and these existing connections were
employed by the colonists under the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress
for the purpose of resistance to the military threat from Britain.
British government preparations
A February 1775 address to King George III, by both houses of
Parliament, declared that a state of rebellion existed:
We ... find that a part of your Majesty' s subjects, in the Province
Massachusetts Bay, have proceeded so far to resist the
authority of the supreme Legislature, that a rebellion at this time
actually exists within the said Province; and we see, with the utmost
concern, that they have been countenanced and encouraged by unlawful
combinations and engagements entered into by your Majesty's subjects
in several of the other Colonies, to the injury and oppression of many
of their innocent fellow-subjects, resident within the Kingdom of
Great Britain, and the rest of your Majesty' s Dominions ....
We ... shall ... pay attention and regard to any real grievances ...
laid before us; and whenever any of the Colonies shall make a proper
application to us, we shall be ready to afford them every just and
reasonable indulgence. At the same time we ... beseech your Majesty
that you will ... enforce due obedience to the laws and authority of
the supreme Legislature; and ... it is our fixed resolution, at the
hazard of our lives and properties, to stand by your Majesty against
all rebellious attempts in the maintenance of the just rights of your
Majesty, and the two Houses of Parliament.
On April 14, 1775, Gage received instructions from Secretary of State
William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth, to disarm the rebels and to imprison
the rebellion's leaders, but Dartmouth gave Gage considerable
discretion in his commands. Gage's decision to act promptly may
have been influenced by information he received on April 15, from a
spy within the Provincial Congress, telling him that although the
Congress was still divided on the need for armed resistance, delegates
were being sent to the other New England colonies to see if they would
cooperate in raising a New England army of 18,000 colonial
Francis Smith, commander of the military expedition, in a 1763
On the morning of April 18, Gage ordered a mounted patrol of about 20
men under the command of Major Mitchell of the 5th Regiment of Foot
into the surrounding country to intercept messengers who might be out
on horseback. This patrol behaved differently from patrols sent
Boston in the past, staying out after dark and asking
travelers about the location of
Samuel Adams and John Hancock. This
had the unintended effect of alarming many residents and increasing
their preparedness. The Lexington militia in particular began to
muster early that evening, hours before receiving any word from
Boston. A well-known story alleges that after nightfall one farmer,
Josiah Nelson, mistook the British patrol for the colonists and asked
them, "Have you heard anything about when the regulars are coming
out?" upon which he was slashed on his scalp with a sword. However,
the story of this incident was not published until over a century
later, which suggests that it may be little more than a family
Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith received orders from Gage on the
afternoon of April 18 with instructions that he was not to read them
until his troops were underway. He was to proceed from
utmost expedition and secrecy to Concord, where you will seize and
destroy ... all Military stores ... But you will take care
that the soldiers do not plunder the inhabitants or hurt private
property." Gage used his discretion and did not issue written orders
for the arrest of rebel leaders, as he feared doing so might spark an
Margaret Kemble Gage
Margaret Kemble Gage may have given military intelligence to the
On March 30, 1775, the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress
Massachusetts Provincial Congress issued the
Whenever the army under command of General Gage, or any part thereof
to the number of five hundred, shall march out of the town of Boston,
with artillery and baggage, it ought to be deemed a design to carry
into execution by force the late acts of Parliament, the attempting of
which, by the resolve of the late honourable Continental Congress,
ought to be opposed; and therefore the military force of the Province
ought to be assembled, and an army of observation immediately formed,
to act solely on the defensive so long as it can be justified on the
principles of reason and self-preservation.
The rebellion's leaders—with the exception of
Paul Revere and Joseph
Warren—had all left
Boston by April 8. They had received word of
Dartmouth's secret instructions to General Gage from sources in London
well before they reached Gage himself. Adams and Hancock had fled
Boston to the home of one of Hancock's relatives in Lexington, where
they thought they would be safe from the immediate threat of
Massachusetts militias had indeed been gathering a stock of
weapons, powder, and supplies at Concord and much further west in
Worcester. An expedition from
Boston to Concord was widely
anticipated. After a large contingent of regulars alarmed the
countryside by an expedition from
Boston to Watertown on March 30, The
Pennsylvania Journal, a newspaper in Philadelphia, reported, "It was
supposed they were going to Concord, where the Provincial Congress is
now sitting. A quantity of provisions and warlike stores are lodged
there .... It is ... said they are intending to go out again
On April 18,
Paul Revere began the "midnight ride" to Concord to warn
the inhabitants that the British appeared to be planning an
expedition. The ride was finished by Samuel Prescott. Upon hearing
Prescott's news, the townspeople decided to remove the stores and
distribute them among other towns nearby.
The colonists were also aware that April 19 would be the date of the
expedition, despite Gage's efforts to keep the details hidden from all
the British rank and file and even from the officers who would command
the mission. There is reasonable speculation, although not proven,
that the confidential source of this intelligence was Margaret Gage,
General Gage's New Jersey-born wife, who had sympathies with the
Colonial cause and a friendly relationship with Warren.
Between 9 and 10 pm on the night of April 18, 1775,
Joseph Warren told
William Dawes that the British troops were about to embark
in boats from
Boston bound for Cambridge and the road to Lexington and
Concord. Warren's intelligence suggested that the most likely
objectives of the regulars' movements later that night would be the
capture of Adams and Hancock. They did not worry about the possibility
of regulars marching to Concord, since the supplies at Concord were
safe, but they did think their leaders in Lexington were unaware of
the potential danger that night. Revere and Dawes were sent out to
warn them and to alert colonial militias in nearby towns.
Militia forces assemble
Further information: Minutemen
Dawes covered the southern land route by horseback across
and over the Great Bridge to Lexington. Revere first gave
instructions to send a signal to Charlestown using lanterns hung in
the steeple of Boston's Old North Church. He then traveled the
northern water route, crossing the mouth of the
Charles River by
rowboat, slipping past the British warship HMS Somerset at anchor.
Crossings were banned at that hour, but Revere safely landed in
Charlestown and rode west to Lexington, warning almost every house
along the route. Additional riders were sent north from
Paul Revere and several other messengers on horseback
sounded the alarm that the regulars were leaving Boston.
After they arrived in Lexington, Revere, Dawes, Hancock, and Adams
discussed the situation with the militia assembling there. They
believed that the forces leaving the city were too large for the sole
task of arresting two men and that Concord was the main target. The
Lexington men dispatched riders to the surrounding towns, and Revere
and Dawes continued along the road to Concord accompanied by Samuel
Prescott. In Lincoln, they ran into the British patrol led by Major
Mitchell. Revere was captured, Dawes was thrown from his horse, and
only Prescott escaped to reach Concord. Additional riders were
sent out from Concord.
The ride of Revere, Dawes, and Prescott triggered a flexible system of
"alarm and muster" that had been carefully developed months before, in
reaction to the colonists' impotent response to the Powder Alarm. This
system was an improved version of an old notification network for use
in times of emergency. The colonists had periodically used it during
the early years of Indian wars in the colony, before it fell into
disuse in the French and Indian War. In addition to other express
riders delivering messages, bells, drums, alarm guns, bonfires and a
trumpet were used for rapid communication from town to town, notifying
the rebels in dozens of eastern
Massachusetts villages that they
should muster their militias because over 500 regulars were leaving
Boston. This system was so effective that people in towns 25 miles
(40 km) from
Boston were aware of the army's movements while they
were still unloading boats in Cambridge. These early warnings
played a crucial role in assembling a sufficient number of colonial
militia to inflict heavy damage on the British regulars later in the
day. Adams and Hancock were eventually moved to safety, first to what
is now Burlington and later to Billerica.
National Park Service
National Park Service map showing the routes of the initial Patriot
messengers and of the British expedition
British forces advance
Around dusk, General Gage called a meeting of his senior officers at
the Province House. He informed them that instructions from Lord
Dartmouth had arrived, ordering him to take action against the
colonials. He also told them that the senior colonel of his regiments,
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, would command, with Major
John Pitcairn as
his executive officer. The meeting adjourned around 8:30 pm, after
which Earl Percy mingled with town folk on
Boston Common. According to
one account, the discussion among people there turned to the unusual
movement of the British soldiers in the town. When Percy questioned
one man further, the man replied, "Well, the regulars will miss their
"What aim?" asked Percy. "Why, the cannon at Concord" was the
reply. Upon hearing this, Percy quickly returned to Province House
and relayed this information to General Gage. Stunned, Gage issued
orders to prevent messengers from getting out of Boston, but these
were too late to prevent Dawes and Revere from leaving.
1775 map of the battles and of the Siege of Boston
The British regulars, around 700 infantry, were drawn from 11 of
Gage's 13 occupying infantry regiments. Major Pitcairn commanded ten
elite light infantry companies, and
Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin
Bernard commanded 11 grenadier companies, under the overall command of
Lieutenant Colonel Smith.
Of the troops assigned to the expedition, 350 were from grenadier
companies drawn from the 4th (King's Own), 5th, 10th, 18th (Royal
Irish), 23rd, 38th, 43rd, 47th, 52nd and 59th Regiments of Foot, and
the 1st Battalion of His Majesty's Marine Forces. Protecting the
grenadier companies were about 320 light infantry from the 4th, 5th,
10th, 23rd, 38th, 43rd, 47th, 52nd, and 59th Regiments, and the 1st
Battalion of the Marines. Each company had its own lieutenant, but the
majority of the captains commanding them were volunteers attached to
them at the last minute, drawn from all the regiments stationed in
Boston. This lack of familiarity between commander and company would
cause problems during the battle.
The British began to awaken their troops at 9 pm on the night of April
18 and assembled them on the water's edge on the western end of Boston
Common by 10 pm. Colonel Smith was late in arriving, and there was no
organized boat-loading operation, resulting in confusion at the
staging area. The boats used were naval barges that were packed so
tightly that there was no room to sit down. When they disembarked near
Phipps Farm in Cambridge, it was into waist-deep water at midnight.
After a lengthy halt to unload their gear, the regulars began their 17
miles (27 km) march to Concord at about 2 am. During the wait
they were provided with extra ammunition, cold salt pork, and hard sea
biscuits. They did not carry knapsacks, since they would not be
encamped. They carried their haversacks (food bags), canteens,
muskets, and accoutrements, and marched off in wet, muddy shoes and
soggy uniforms. As they marched through Menotomy, sounds of the
colonial alarms throughout the countryside caused the few officers who
were aware of their mission to realize they had lost the element of
At about 3 am, Colonel Smith sent Major Pitcairn ahead with six
companies of light infantry under orders to quick march to Concord. At
about 4 am Smith made the wise but belated decision to send a
messenger back to
Boston asking for reinforcements.
BEP engraved vignette Battle of Lexington which appeared on the $20
National Bank Note
Battle of Lexington, April 19, 1775, New York Public Library
Though often styled a battle, in reality the engagement at Lexington
was a minor brush or skirmish. As the regulars' advance guard
under Pitcairn entered Lexington at sunrise on April 19, 1775, about
80 Lexington militiamen emerged from
Buckman Tavern and stood in ranks
on the village common watching them, and between 40 and 100 spectators
watched from along the side of the road. Their leader was
Captain John Parker, a veteran of the French and Indian War, who was
suffering from tuberculosis and was at times difficult to hear. Of the
militiamen who lined up, nine had the surname Harrington, seven Munroe
(including the company's orderly sergeant, William Munroe), four
Parker, three Tidd, three Locke, and three Reed; fully one quarter of
them were related to Captain Parker in some way. This group of
militiamen was part of Lexington's "training band", a way of
organizing local militias dating back to the Puritans, and not what
was styled a minuteman company.
After having waited most of the night with no sign of any British
troops (and wondering if Paul Revere's warning was true), at about
4:15 a.m., Parker got his confirmation. Thaddeus Bowman, the last
scout that Parker had sent out, rode up at a gallop and told him that
they were not only coming, but coming in force and they were
close. Captain Parker was clearly aware that he was outmatched in
the confrontation and was not prepared to sacrifice his men for no
purpose. He knew that most of the colonists' powder and military
supplies at Concord had already been hidden. No war had been declared.
(The Declaration of Independence was a year in the future.) He also
knew the British had gone on such expeditions before in Massachusetts,
found nothing, and marched back to Boston.
Parker had every reason to expect that to occur again. The Regulars
would march to Concord, find nothing, and return to Boston, tired but
empty-handed. He positioned his company carefully. He placed them in
parade-ground formation, on Lexington Common. They were in plain sight
(not hiding behind walls), but not blocking the road to Concord. They
made a show of political and military determination, but no effort to
prevent the march of the Regulars. Many years later, one of the
participants recalled Parker's words as being what is now engraved in
stone at the site of the battle: "Stand your ground; don't fire unless
fired upon, but if they mean to have a war, let it begin here."
According to Parker's sworn deposition taken after the battle:
I ... ordered our
Militia to meet on the Common in said Lexington
to consult what to do, and concluded not to be discovered, nor meddle
or make with said Regular Troops (if they should approach) unless they
should insult or molest us; and, upon their sudden Approach, I
immediately ordered our
Militia to disperse, and not to
fire:—Immediately said Troops made their appearance and rushed
furiously, fired upon, and killed eight of our Party without receiving
any Provocation therefor from us.
— John Parker
Rather than turn left towards Concord, Marine Lieutenant Jesse Adair,
at the head of the advance guard, decided on his own to protect the
flank of the British column by first turning right and then leading
the companies onto the Common itself, in a confused effort to surround
and disarm the militia. Major Pitcairn arrived from the rear of the
advance force and led his three companies to the left and halted them.
The remaining companies under Colonel Smith lay further down the road
A British officer (probably Pitcairn, but accounts are uncertain, as
it may also have been Lieutenant William Sutherland) then rode
forward, waving his sword, and called out for the assembled militia to
disperse, and may also have ordered them to "lay down your arms, you
damned rebels!" Captain Parker told his men instead to disperse
and go home, but, because of the confusion, the yelling all around,
and due to the raspiness of Parker's tubercular voice, some did not
hear him, some left very slowly, and none laid down their arms. Both
Parker and Pitcairn ordered their men to hold fire, but a shot was
fired from an unknown source.
The first of four engravings by
Amos Doolittle from 1775. Doolittle
visited the battle sites and interviewed soldiers and witnesses.
Contains controversial elements, possibly inaccuracies. Fire from the
militia may have occurred but is not depicted.
[A]t 5 o’clock we arrived [in Lexington], and saw a number of
people, I believe between 200 and 300, formed in a common in the
middle of town; we still continued advancing, keeping prepared against
an attack though without intending to attack them; but on our coming
near them they fired on us two shots, upon which our men without any
orders, rushed upon them, fired and put them to flight; several of
them were killed, we could not tell how many, because they were behind
walls and into the woods. We had a man of the 10th light Infantry
wounded, nobody else was hurt. We then formed on the Common, but with
some difficulty, the men were so wild they could hear no orders; we
waited a considerable time there, and at length proceeded our way to
— Lieutenant John Barker, 4th Regiment of Foot
According to one member of Parker's militia, none of the Americans had
discharged their muskets as they faced the oncoming British troops.
The British did suffer one casualty, a slight wound, the particulars
of which were corroborated by a deposition made by Corporal John
Munroe. Munroe stated that:
After the first fire of the regulars, I thought, and so stated to
Ebenezer Munroe ...who stood next to me on the left, that they had
fired nothing but powder; but on the second firing, Munroe stated they
had fired something more than powder, for he had received a wound in
his arm; and now, said he, to use his own words, 'I'll give them the
guts of my gun.' We then both took aim at the main body of British
troops the smoke preventing our seeing anything but the heads of some
of their horses and discharged our pieces.
Some witnesses among the regulars reported the first shot was fired by
a colonial onlooker from behind a hedge or around the corner of a
tavern. Some observers reported a mounted British officer firing
first. Both sides generally agreed that the initial shot did not come
from the men on the ground immediately facing each other.
Speculation arose later in Lexington that a man named Solomon Brown
fired the first shot from inside the tavern or from behind a wall, but
this has been discredited. Some witnesses (on each side) claimed
that someone on the other side fired first; however, many more
witnesses claimed to not know. Yet another theory is that the first
shot was one fired by the British, that killed Asahel Porter, their
prisoner who was running away (he had been told to walk away and he
would be let go, though he panicked and began to run). Historian David
Hackett Fischer has proposed that there may actually have been
multiple near-simultaneous shots. Historian Mark Urban claims the
British surged forward with bayonets ready in an undisciplined way,
provoking a few scattered shots from the militia. In response the
British troops, without orders, fired a devastating volley. This lack
of discipline among the British troops had a key role in the
escalation of violence.
Witnesses at the scene described several intermittent shots fired from
both sides before the lines of regulars began to fire volleys without
receiving orders to do so. A few of the militiamen believed at first
that the regulars were only firing powder with no ball, but when they
realized the truth, few if any of the militia managed to load and
return fire. The rest ran for their lives.
We Nathaniel Mulliken, Philip Russell, [and 32 other men ...] do
testify and declare, that on the nineteenth in the morning, being
informed that ... a body of regulars were marching from Boston
towards Concord ... About five o’clock in the morning, hearing
our drum beat, we proceeded towards the parade, and soon found that a
large body of troops were marching towards us, some of our company
were coming to the parade, and others had reached it, at which time,
the company began to disperse, whilst our backs were turned on the
troops, we were fired on by them, and a number of our men were
instantly killed and wounded, not a gun was fired by any person in our
company on the regulars to our knowledge before they fired on us, and
continued firing until we had all made our escape.
The regulars then charged forward with bayonets. Captain Parker's
cousin Jonas was run through. Eight Lexington men were killed, and ten
were wounded. The only British casualty was a soldier who was wounded
in the thigh. The eight colonists killed were John Brown, Samuel
Hadley, Caleb Harrington, Jonathon Harrington, Robert Munroe, Isaac
Muzzey, Asahel Porter, and Jonas Parker. Jonathon Harrington, fatally
wounded by a British musket ball, managed to crawl back to his home,
and died on his own doorstep. One wounded man, Prince Estabrook, was a
black slave who was serving in the militia.
The companies under Pitcairn's command got beyond their officers'
control in part because they were unaware of the actual purpose of the
day's mission. They fired in different directions and prepared to
enter private homes. Colonel Smith, who was just arriving with the
remainder of the regulars, heard the musket fire and rode forward from
the grenadier column to see the action. He quickly found a drummer and
ordered him to beat assembly. The grenadiers arrived shortly
thereafter, and once order was restored among the soldiers, the light
infantry were permitted to fire a victory volley, after which the
column was reformed and marched on toward Concord.
The second of four engravings by
Amos Doolittle from 1775, depicting
the British entering Concord
In response to the raised alarm, the militiamen of Concord and Lincoln
had mustered in Concord. They received reports of firing at Lexington,
and were not sure whether to wait until they could be reinforced by
troops from towns nearby, or to stay and defend the town, or to move
east and greet the British Army from superior terrain. A column of
militia marched down the road toward Lexington to meet the British,
traveling about 1.5 miles (2 km) until they met the approaching
column of regulars. As the regulars numbered about 700 and the militia
at this time only numbered about 250, the militia column turned around
and marched back into Concord, preceding the regulars by a distance of
about 500 yards (457 m). The militia retreated to a ridge
overlooking the town, and their officers discussed what to do next.
Caution prevailed, and
Colonel James Barrett
Colonel James Barrett withdrew from the town of
Concord and led the men across the North Bridge to a hill about a mile
north of town, where they could continue to watch the troop movements
of the British and the activities in the center of town. This step
proved fortuitous, as the ranks of the militia continued to grow as
minuteman companies arriving from the western towns joined them
The search for militia supplies
When the British troops arrived in the village of Concord, Lt. Col.
Smith divided them to carry out Gage's orders. The 10th Regiment's
company of grenadiers secured South Bridge under Captain Mundy Pole,
while seven companies of light infantry under Captain Parsons,
numbering about 100, secured the North Bridge, where they were visible
across the cleared fields to the assembling militia companies. Captain
Parsons took four companies from the 5th, 23rd, 38th and 52nd
Regiments up the road 2 miles (3.2 km) beyond the North Bridge to
search Barrett's Farm, where intelligence indicated supplies would be
found. Two companies from the 4th and 10th Regiments were
stationed to guard their return route, and one company from the 43rd
remained guarding the bridge itself. These companies, which were under
the relatively inexperienced command of Captain Walter Laurie, were
aware that they were significantly outnumbered by the 400-plus
militiamen. The concerned Captain Laurie sent a messenger to Lt. Col.
Smith requesting reinforcements.
Using detailed information provided by Loyalist spies, the grenadier
companies searched the small town for military supplies. When they
arrived at Ephraim Jones's tavern, by the jail on the South Bridge
road, they found the door barred shut, and Jones refused them entry.
According to reports provided by local Loyalists, Pitcairn knew cannon
had been buried on the property. Jones was ordered at gunpoint to show
where the guns were buried. These turned out to be three massive
pieces, firing 24-pound shot, that were much too heavy to use
defensively, but very effective against fortifications, with
sufficient range to bombard the city of
Boston from other parts of
nearby mainland. The grenadiers smashed the trunnions of these
three guns so they could not be mounted. They also burned some gun
carriages found in the village meetinghouse, and when the fire spread
to the meetinghouse itself, local resident Martha Moulton persuaded
the soldiers to help in a bucket brigade to save the building.
Nearly a hundred barrels of flour and salted food were thrown into the
millpond, as were 550 pounds of musket balls. Of the damage done, only
that done to the cannon was significant. All of the shot and much of
the food was recovered after the British left. During the search, the
regulars were generally scrupulous in their treatment of the locals,
including paying for food and drink consumed. This excessive
politeness was used to advantage by the locals, who were able to
misdirect searches from several smaller caches of militia
Barrett's Farm had been an arsenal weeks before, but few weapons
remained now, and according to family legend, these were quickly
buried in furrows to look like a crop had been planted. The troops
sent there did not find any supplies of consequence.
The North Bridge
The reconstructed North Bridge in
Minute Man National Historical Park,
Colonel Barrett's troops, upon seeing smoke rising from the village
square as the British burned cannon carriages, and seeing only a few
light infantry companies directly below them, decided to march back
toward the town from their vantage point on
Punkatasset Hill to a
lower, closer flat hilltop about 300 yards (274 m) from the North
Bridge. As the militia advanced, the two British companies from the
4th and 10th Regiments that held the position near the road retreated
to the bridge and yielded the hill to Barrett's men.
Five full companies of
Minutemen and five more of militia from Acton,
Concord, Bedford and Lincoln occupied this hill as more groups of men
streamed in, totaling at least 400 against Captain Laurie's light
infantry companies, a force totaling 90–95 men. Barrett ordered the
Massachusetts men to form one long line two abreast on the highway
leading down to the bridge, and then he called for another
consultation. While overlooking North Bridge from the top of the hill,
Lt. Col. John Robinson
Lt. Col. John Robinson of Westford and the other Captains
discussed possible courses of action. Captain Isaac Davis of Acton,
whose troops had arrived late, declared his willingness to defend a
town not their own by saying, "I'm not afraid to go, and I haven't a
man that's afraid to go."
Barrett told the men to load their weapons but not to fire unless
fired upon, and then ordered them to advance. Laurie ordered the
British companies guarding the bridge to retreat across it. One
officer then tried to pull up the loose planks of the bridge to impede
the colonial advance, but Major Buttrick began to yell at the regulars
to stop harming the bridge. The
Minutemen and militia from Concord,
Acton and a handful of Westford Minutemen, advanced in column
formation, two by two, led by Major Buttrick, Lt. Col. Robinson,
then Capt. Davis, on the light infantry, keeping to the road,
since it was surrounded by the spring floodwaters of the Concord
The third of four engravings by
Amos Doolittle from 1775, depicting
the engagement at the North Bridge
Captain Laurie then made a poor tactical decision. Since his summons
for help had not produced any results, he ordered his men to form
positions for "street firing" behind the bridge in a column running
perpendicular to the river. This formation was appropriate for sending
a large volume of fire into a narrow alley between the buildings of a
city, but not for an open path behind a bridge. Confusion reigned as
regulars retreating over the bridge tried to form up in the
street-firing position of the other troops. Lieutenant Sutherland, who
was in the rear of the formation, saw Laurie's mistake and ordered
flankers to be sent out. But as he was from a company different from
the men under his command, only three soldiers obeyed him. The
remainder tried as best they could in the confusion to follow the
orders of the superior officer.
A shot rang out. It was likely a warning shot fired by a panicked,
exhausted British soldier from the 43rd, according to Captain Laurie's
report to his commander after the fight. Two other regulars then fired
immediately after that, shots splashing in the river, and then the
narrow group up front, possibly thinking the order to fire had been
given, fired a ragged volley before Laurie could stop them.
Two of the Acton Minutemen, Private Abner Hosmer and Captain Isaac
Davis, who were at the head of the line marching to the bridge, were
hit and killed instantly. Rev. Dr. Ripley recalled:
The Americans commenced their march in double file… In a minute or
two, the Americans being in quick motion and within ten or fifteen
rods of the bridge, a single gun was fired by a British soldier, which
marked the way, passing under Col. Robinson’s arm and slightly
wounding the side of Luther Blanchard, a fifer, in the Acton
Four more men were wounded. Major Buttrick then yelled to the militia,
"Fire, for God's sake, fellow soldiers, fire!" At this point the
lines were separated by the
Concord River and the bridge, and were
only 50 yards (46 m) apart. The few front rows of colonists,
bound by the road and blocked from forming a line of fire, managed to
fire over each other's heads and shoulders at the regulars massed
across the bridge. Four of the eight British officers and sergeants,
who were leading from the front of their troops, were wounded by the
volley of musket fire. At least three privates (Thomas Smith, Patrick
Gray, and James Hall, all from the 4th) were killed or mortally
wounded, and nine were wounded. In 1824, Reverend and Minuteman
Joseph Thaxter wrote:
I was an eyewitness to the following facts. The people of Westford and
Acton, some few of Concord, were the first who faced the British at
Concord bridge. The British had placed about ninety men as a guard at
the North Bridge; we had then no certain information that any had been
killed at Lexington, we saw the British making destruction in the town
of Concord; it was proposed to advance to the bridge; on this Colonel
Robinson, of Westford, together with Major Buttrick, took the lead;
strict orders were given not to fire, unless the British fired first;
when they advanced about halfway on the causeway the British fired one
gun, a second, a third, and then the whole body; they killed Colonel
Davis, of Acton, and a Mr. Hosmer. Our people then fired over one
another’s heads, being in a long column, two and two; they killed
two and wounded eleven. Lieutenant Hawkstone, said to be the greatest
beauty of the British army, had his cheeks so badly wounded that it
disfigured him much, of which he bitterly complained. On this, the
British fled, and assembled on the hill, the north side of Concord,
and dressed their wounded, and then began their retreat. As they
descended the hill near the road that comes out from Bedford they were
pursued; Colonel Bridge, with a few men from Bedford and Chelmsford,
came up, and killed several men.
The regulars found themselves trapped in a situation where they were
both outnumbered and outmaneuvered. Lacking effective leadership and
terrified at the superior numbers of the enemy, with their spirit
broken, and likely not having experienced combat before, they
abandoned their wounded, and fled to the safety of the approaching
grenadier companies coming from the town center, isolating Captain
Parsons and the companies searching for arms at Barrett's Farm.
After the fight
Statue memorializing the battle at the North Bridge, inscribed with
verse from Emerson's "Concord Hymn"
The colonists were stunned by their success. No one had actually
believed either side would shoot to kill the other. Some advanced;
many more retreated; and some went home to see to the safety of their
homes and families. Colonel Barrett eventually began to recover
control. He moved some of the militia back to the hilltop 300 yards
(274 m) away and sent Major Buttrick with others across the
bridge to a defensive position on a hill behind a stone wall.
Lieutenant Colonel Smith heard the exchange of fire from his position
in the town moments after he received the request for reinforcements
from Laurie. He quickly assembled two companies of grenadiers to lead
toward the North Bridge himself. As these troops marched, they met the
shattered remnants of the three light infantry companies running
towards them. Smith was concerned about the four companies that had
been at Barrett's, since their route to town was now unprotected. When
he saw the
Minutemen in the distance behind their wall, he halted his
two companies and moved forward with only his officers to take a
closer look. One of the
Minutemen behind that wall observed, "If we
had fired, I believe we could have killed almost every officer there
was in the front, but we had no orders to fire and there wasn't a gun
fired." During a tense standoff lasting about 10 minutes, a
mentally ill local man named Elias Brown wandered through both sides
selling hard cider.
At this point, the detachment of regulars sent to Barrett's farm
marched back from their fruitless search of that area. They passed
through the now mostly-deserted battlefield, and saw dead and wounded
comrades lying on the bridge. There was one who looked to them as if
he had been scalped, which angered and shocked the British soldiers.
They crossed the bridge and returned to the town by 11:30 a.m., under
the watchful eyes of the colonists, who continued to maintain
defensive positions. The regulars continued to search for and destroy
colonial military supplies in the town, ate lunch, reassembled for
marching, and left Concord after noon. This delay in departure gave
colonial militiamen from outlying towns additional time to reach the
road back to Boston.
Concord to Lexington
National Park Service
National Park Service map showing the retreat from Concord and
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, concerned about the safety of his men, sent
flankers to follow a ridge and protect his forces from the roughly
1,000 colonials now in the field as the British marched east out of
Concord. This ridge ended near Meriam's Corner, a crossroads about a
mile (2 km) outside the village of Concord, where the main road
came to a bridge across a small stream. To cross the narrow bridge,
the British had to pull the flankers back into the main column and
close ranks to a mere three soldiers abreast. Colonial militia
companies arriving from the north and east had converged at this
point, and presented a clear numerical advantage over the
regulars. The British were now witnessing once again what General
Gage had hoped to avoid by dispatching the expedition in secrecy and
in the dark of night: the ability of the colonial militiamen to rise
and converge by the thousands when British forces ventured out of
Boston. As the last of the British column marched over the narrow
bridge, the British rear guard wheeled and fired a volley at the
colonial militiamen, who had been firing irregularly and ineffectively
from a distance but now had closed to within musket range. The
colonists returned fire, this time with deadly effect. Two regulars
were killed and perhaps six wounded, with no colonial casualties.
Smith sent out his flanking troops again after crossing the small
On Brooks Hill (also known as Hardy's Hill) about 1 mile (1.6 km)
past Meriam's Corner, nearly 500 militiamen had assembled to the south
of the road, awaiting opportunity to fire down upon the British column
on the road below. Smith's leading forces charged up the hill to
drive them off, but the colonists did not withdraw, inflicting
significant casualties on the attackers. Smith withdrew his men from
Brooks Hill, and the column continued on to another small bridge into
Lincoln, at Brooks Tavern, where more militia companies intensified
the attack from the north side of the road.
This statue known as The Lexington Minuteman is commonly believed to
depict Captain John Parker. It is by
Henry Hudson Kitson
Henry Hudson Kitson and stands at
the town green of Lexington, Massachusetts.
The regulars soon reached a point in the road now referred to as the
"Bloody Angle" where the road rises and curves sharply to the left
through a lightly-wooded area. At this place, the militia company
from Woburn had positioned themselves on the southeast side of the
bend in the road in a rocky, lightly-wooded field. Additional militia
flowing parallel to the road from the engagement at Meriam's Corner
positioned themselves on the northwest side of the road, catching the
British in a crossfire, while other militia companies on the road
closed from behind to attack. Some 500 yards (460 m) further
along, the road took another sharp curve, this time to the right, and
again the British column was caught by another large force of
militiamen firing from both sides. In passing through these two sharp
curves, the British force lost thirty soldiers killed or wounded, and
four colonial militia were also killed, including Captain Jonathan
Wilson of Bedford, Captain Nathan Wyman of Billerica, Lt. John Bacon
of Natick, and Daniel Thompson of Woburn. The British soldiers escaped
by breaking into a trot, a pace that the colonials could not maintain
through the woods and swampy terrain. Colonial forces on the road
itself behind the British were too densely packed and disorganized to
mount more than a harassing attack from the rear.
As militia forces from other towns continued to arrive, the colonial
forces had risen to about 2,000 men. The road now straightened to the
east, with cleared fields and orchards along the sides. Lt. Col. Smith
sent out flankers again, who succeeded in trapping some militia from
behind and inflicting casualties. British casualties were also
mounting from these engagements and from persistent long-range fire
from the militiamen, and the exhausted British were running out of
When the British column neared the boundary between Lincoln and
Lexington, it encountered another ambush from a hill overlooking the
road, set by Captain John Parker's Lexington militiamen, including
some of them bandaged up from the encounter in Lexington earlier in
the day. At this point, Lt. Col. Smith was wounded in the thigh and
knocked from his horse. Major
John Pitcairn assumed effective command
of the column and sent light infantry companies up the hill to clear
the militia forces.
The light infantry cleared two additional hills as the column
continued east—"The Bluff" and "Fiske Hill"— and took still more
casualties from ambushes set by fresh militia companies joining the
battle. In one of the musket volleys from the colonial soldiers, Major
Pitcairn's horse bolted in fright, throwing Pitcairn to the ground and
injuring his arm. Now both principal leaders of the expedition
were injured or unhorsed, and their men were tired, thirsty, and
exhausting their ammunition. A few surrendered or were captured; some
now broke formation and ran forward toward Lexington. In the words of
one British officer, "we began to run rather than retreat in order.
... We attempted to stop the men and form them two deep, but to no
purpose, the confusion increased rather than lessened. ... the
officers got to the front and presented their bayonets, and told the
men if they advanced they should die. Upon this, they began to form up
under heavy fire."
Only one British officer remained uninjured among the three companies
at the head of the British column as it approach Lexington Center. He
understood the column's perilous situation: "There were very few men
had any ammunition left, and so fatigued that we could not keep
flanking parties out, so that we must soon have laid down our arms, or
been picked off by the Rebels at their pleasure—nearer to—and we
were not able to keep them off." He then heard cheering further
ahead. A full brigade, about 1,000 men with artillery under the
command of Earl Percy, had arrived to rescue them. It was about 2:30
p.m., and the British column had now been on the march since 2 o'clock
in the morning. Westford Minuteman, Rev. Joseph Thaxter, wrote of
We pursued them and killed some; when they got to Lexington, they were
so close pursued and fatigued, that they must have soon surrendered,
had not Lord Percy met them with a large reinforcement and two
field-pieces. They fired them, but the balls went high over our heads.
But no cannon ever did more execution, such stories of their effects
had been spread by the tories through our troops, that from this time
more wont back than pursed. We pursued to Charlestown Common, and then
retired to Cambridge. When the army collected at Cambridge, Colonel
Prescott with his regiment of minute men, and John Robinson, his
Lieutenant Colonel, were prompt at being at their post.
In their accounts afterward, British officers and soldiers alike noted
their frustration that the colonial militiamen fired at them from
behind trees and stone walls, rather than confronting them in large,
linear formations in the style of European warfare. This image of
the individual colonial farmer, musket in hand and fighting under his
own command, has also been fostered in American myth: "Chasing the
red-coats down the lane / Then crossing the fields to emerge again /
Under the trees at the turn of the road, / And only pausing to fire
and load." To the contrary, beginning at the North Bridge and
throughout the British retreat, the colonial militias repeatedly
operated as coordinated companies, even when dispersed to take
advantage of cover. Reflecting on the British experience that day,
Earl Percy understood the significance of the American tactics:
During the whole affair the Rebels attacked us in a very scattered,
irregular manner, but with perseverance & resolution, nor did they
ever dare to form into any regular body. Indeed, they knew too well
what was proper, to do so. Whoever looks upon them as an irregular
mob, will find himself much mistaken. They have men amongst them who
know very well what they are about, having been employed as Rangers
against the Indians & Canadians, & this country being much
covered with wood, and hilly, is very advantageous for their method of
The fourth of four engravings by
Amos Doolittle from 1775, showing
Percy's rescue in Lexington
General Gage had anticipated that Lt. Col. Smith's expedition might
require reinforcement, so Gage drafted orders for reinforcing units to
Boston at 4 a.m. But in his obsession for secrecy, Gage
had sent only one copy of the orders to the adjutant of the 1st
Brigade, whose servant then left the envelope on a table. Also at
about 4 a.m., the British column was within three miles of Lexington,
and Lt. Col. Smith now had clear indication that all element of
surprise had been lost and that alarm was spreading throughout the
countryside. So he sent a rider back to
Boston with a request for
reinforcements. At about 5 a.m., the rider reached Boston, and the 1st
Brigade was ordered to assemble: the line infantry companies of the
4th, 23rd, and 47th Regiments, and a battalion of Royal Marines, under
the command of Earl Percy. Unfortunately for the British, once again
only one copy of the orders were sent to each commander, and the order
Royal Marines was delivered to the desk of Major John
Pitcairn, who was already on the Lexington Common with Smith's column
at that hour. After these delays, Percy's brigade, about 1,000 strong,
Boston at about 8:45 a.m., headed toward Lexington. Along the
way, the story is told, they marched to the tune of "Yankee Doodle" to
taunt the inhabitants of the area. By the Battle of Bunker Hill
less than two months later, the song would become a popular anthem for
the colonial forces.
Percy took the land route across
Boston Neck and over the Great
Bridge, which some quick-thinking colonists had stripped of its
planking to delay the British. His men then came upon an
absent-minded tutor at Harvard College and asked him which road would
take them to Lexington. The Harvard man, apparently oblivious to the
reality of what was happening around him, showed him the proper road
without thinking. (He was later compelled to leave the country for
inadvertently supporting the enemy.) Percy's troops arrived in
Lexington at about 2:00 p.m. They could hear gunfire in the distance
as they set up their cannon and deployed lines of regulars on high
ground with commanding views of the town. Colonel Smith's men
approached like a fleeing mob with the full complement of colonial
militia in close formation pursuing them. Percy ordered his artillery
to open fire at extreme range, dispersing the colonial militiamen.
Smith's men collapsed with exhaustion once they reached the safety of
Against the advice of his Master of Ordnance, Percy had left Boston
without spare ammunition for his men or for the two artillery pieces
they brought with them, thinking the extra wagons would slow him down.
Each man in Percy's brigade had only 36 rounds, and each artillery
piece was supplied with only a few rounds carried in side-boxes.
After Percy had left the city, Gage directed two ammunition wagons
guarded by one officer and thirteen men to follow. This convoy was
intercepted by a small party of older, veteran militiamen still on the
"alarm list," who could not join their militia companies because they
were well over 60 years of age. These men rose up in ambush and
demanded the surrender of the wagons, but the regulars ignored them
and drove their horses on. The old men opened fire, shot the lead
horses, killed two sergeants, and wounded the officer. The British
survivors ran, and six of them threw their weapons into a pond before
Lexington to Menotomy
Percy's return to Charlestown (detail from 1775 map of the battle)
Percy assumed control of the combined forces of about 1,700 men and
let them rest, eat, drink, and have their wounds tended at field
headquarters (Munroe Tavern) before resuming the march. They set out
from Lexington at about 3:30 p.m., in a formation that emphasized
defense along the sides and rear of the column. Wounded regulars
rode on the cannon and were forced to hop off when they were fired at
by gatherings of militia. Percy's men were often surrounded, but they
had the tactical advantage of interior lines. Percy could shift his
units more easily to where they were needed, while the colonial
militia were required to move around the outside of his formation.
Percy placed Smith's men in the middle of the column, while the 23rd
Regiment's line companies made up the column's rear guard. Because of
information provided by Smith and Pitcairn about how the Americans
were attacking, Percy ordered the rear guard to be rotated every mile
or so, to allow some of his troops to rest briefly. Flanking companies
were sent to both sides of the road, and a powerful force of Marines
acted as the vanguard to clear the road ahead.
During the respite at Lexington,
Brigadier General William Heath
arrived and took command of the militia. Earlier in the day, he had
traveled first to Watertown to discuss tactics with Joseph Warren, who
Boston that morning, and other members of the Massachusetts
Committee of Safety. Heath and Warren reacted to Percy's artillery and
flankers by ordering the militiamen to avoid close formations that
would attract cannon fire. Instead, they surrounded Percy's marching
square with a moving ring of skirmishers at a distance to inflict
maximum casualties at minimum risk.
A few mounted militiamen on the road would dismount, fire muskets at
the approaching regulars, then remount and gallop ahead to repeat the
tactic. Unmounted militia would often fire from long range, in the
hope of hitting somebody in the main column of soldiers on the road
and surviving, since both British and colonials used muskets with an
effective combat range of about 50 yards (46 m). Infantry units
would apply pressure to the sides of the British column. When it moved
out of range, those units would move around and forward to re-engage
the column further down the road. Heath sent messengers out to
intercept arriving militia units, directing them to appropriate places
along the road to engage the regulars. Some towns sent supply wagons
to assist in feeding and rearming the militia. Heath and Warren did
lead skirmishers in small actions into battle themselves, but it was
the presence of effective leadership that probably had the greatest
impact on the success of these tactics. Percy wrote of the
colonial tactics, "The rebels attacked us in a very scattered,
irregular manner, but with perseverance and resolution, nor did they
ever dare to form into any regular body. Indeed, they knew too well
what was proper, to do so. Whoever looks upon them as an irregular
mob, will find himself very much mistaken."
Jason Russell House
Jason Russell House in Arlington
The fighting grew more intense as Percy's forces crossed from
Lexington into Menotomy. Fresh militia poured gunfire into the British
ranks from a distance, and individual homeowners began to fight from
their own property. Some homes were also used as sniper positions,
turning the situation into a soldier's nightmare: house-to-house
fighting. Jason Russell pleaded for his friends to fight alongside him
to defend his house by saying, "An Englishman's home is his
castle." He stayed and was killed in his doorway. His friends,
depending on which account is to be believed, either hid in the
cellar, or died in the house from bullets and bayonets after shooting
at the soldiers who followed them in. The
Jason Russell House
Jason Russell House still
stands and contains bullet holes from this fight. A militia unit that
attempted an ambush from Russell's orchard was caught by flankers, and
eleven men were killed, some allegedly after they had
Percy lost control of his men, and British soldiers began to commit
atrocities to repay for the supposed scalping at the North Bridge and
for their own casualties at the hands of a distant, often unseen
enemy. Based on the word of Pitcairn and other wounded officers from
Smith's command, Percy had learned that the
Minutemen were using stone
walls, trees and buildings in these more thickly settled towns closer
Boston to hide behind and shoot at the column. He ordered the flank
companies to clear the colonial militiamen out of such places.
Many of the junior officers in the flank parties had difficulty
stopping their exhausted, enraged men from killing everyone they found
inside these buildings. For example, two innocent drunks who refused
to hide in the basement of a tavern in Menotomy were killed only
because they were suspected of being involved with the day's
events. Although many of the accounts of ransacking and burnings
were exaggerated later by the colonists for propaganda value (and to
get financial compensation from the colonial government), it is
certainly true that taverns along the road were ransacked and the
liquor stolen by the troops, who in some cases became drunk
themselves. One church's communion silver was stolen but was later
recovered after it was sold in Boston. Aged Menotomy resident
Samuel Whittemore killed three regulars before he was attacked by a
British contingent and left for dead. (He recovered from his wounds
and later died in 1793 at age 98.) All told, far more blood was
shed in Menotomy and Cambridge than elsewhere that day. The colonists
lost 25 men killed and nine wounded there, and the British lost 40
killed and 80 wounded, with the 47th Foot and the Marines suffering
the highest casualties. Each was about half the day's fatalities.
Menotomy to Charlestown
The British troops crossed the Menotomy River (today known as Alewife
Brook) into Cambridge, and the fight grew more intense. Fresh militia
arrived in close array instead of in a scattered formation, and Percy
used his two artillery pieces and flankers at a crossroads called
Watson's Corner to inflict heavy damage on them.
Earlier in the day, Heath had ordered the Great Bridge to be
dismantled. Percy's brigade was about to approach the broken-down
bridge and a riverbank filled with militia when Percy directed his
troops down a narrow track (now Beech Street, near present-day Porter
Square) and onto the road to Charlestown. The militia (now numbering
about 4,000) were unprepared for this movement, and the circle of fire
was broken. An American force moved to occupy Prospect Hill (in
modern-day Somerville), which dominated the road, but Percy moved his
cannon to the front and dispersed them with his last rounds of
A large militia force arrived from Salem and Marblehead. They might
have cut off Percy's route to Charlestown, but these men halted on
nearby Winter Hill and allowed the British to escape. Some accused the
commander of this force, Colonel Timothy Pickering, of permitting the
troops to pass because he still hoped to avoid war by preventing a
total defeat of the regulars. Pickering later claimed that he had
stopped on Heath's orders, but Heath denied this. It was nearly
dark when Pitcairn's Marines defended a final attack on Percy's rear
as they entered Charlestown. The regulars took up strong positions on
the hills of Charlestown. Some of them had been without sleep for two
days and had marched 40 miles (64 km) in 21 hours, eight hours of
which had been spent under fire. But now they held high ground
protected by heavy guns from HMS Somerset. Gage quickly sent over line
companies of two fresh regiments—the 10th and 64th—to occupy the
high ground in Charlestown and build fortifications. Although they
were begun, the fortifications were never completed and would later be
a starting point for the militia works built two months later in June
before the Battle of Bunker Hill. General Heath studied the position
of the British Army and decided to withdraw the militia to
Siege of Boston
Siege of Boston 1775–1776
In the morning,
Boston was surrounded by a huge militia army,
numbering over 15,000, which had marched from throughout New
England. Unlike the Powder Alarm, the rumors of spilled blood
were true, and the Revolutionary War had begun. Now under the
leadership of General Artemas Ward, who arrived on the 20th and
Brigadier General William Heath, they formed a siege
line extending from Chelsea, around the peninsulas of
Charlestown, to Roxbury, effectively surrounding
Boston on three
sides. In the days immediately following, the size of the colonial
forces grew, as militias from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut arrived on the scene. The Second Continental Congress
adopted these men into the beginnings of the Continental Army. Even
now, after open warfare had started, Gage still refused to impose
martial law in Boston. He persuaded the town's selectmen to surrender
all private weapons in return for promising that any inhabitant could
The battle was not a major one in terms of tactics or casualties.
However, in terms of supporting the British political strategy behind
Intolerable Acts and the military strategy behind the Powder
Alarms, the battle was a significant failure because the expedition
contributed to the fighting it was intended to prevent, and because
few weapons were actually seized.
The battle was followed by a war for British political opinion. Within
four days of the battle, the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress
Massachusetts Provincial Congress had
collected scores of sworn testimonies from militiamen and from British
prisoners. When word leaked out a week after the battle that Gage was
sending his official description of events to London, the Provincial
Congress sent a packet of these detailed depositions, signed by over
100 participants in the events, on a faster ship. The documents were
presented to a sympathetic official and printed by the London
newspapers two weeks before Gage's report arrived. Gage's
official report was too vague on particulars to influence anyone's
opinion. George Germain, no friend of the colonists, wrote, "the
Bostonians are in the right to make the King's troops the aggressors
and claim a victory." Politicians in
London tended to blame Gage
for the conflict instead of their own policies and instructions. The
British troops in
Boston variously blamed General Gage and Colonel
Smith for the failures at Lexington and Concord.
The day after the battle,
John Adams left his home in Braintree to
ride along the battlefields. He became convinced that "the Die was
cast, the Rubicon crossed."
Thomas Paine in Philadelphia had
previously thought of the argument between the colonies and the Home
Country as "a kind of law-suit", but after news of the battle reached
him, he "rejected the hardened, sullen-tempered
Pharaoh of England
George Washington received the news at Mount Vernon and
wrote to a friend, "the once-happy and peaceful plains of America are
either to be drenched in blood or inhabited by slaves. Sad
alternative! But can a virtuous man hesitate in his choice?" A
group of hunters on the frontier named their campsite Lexington when
they heard news of the battle in June. It eventually became the city
of Lexington, Kentucky.
Gravemarkers along Battle Road in Lexington are maintained with
Britain's 1775 version of the Union Flag.
It was important to the early American government that an image of
British fault and American innocence be maintained for this first
battle of the war. The history of Patriot preparations, intelligence,
warning signals, and uncertainty about the first shot was rarely
discussed in the public sphere for decades. The story of the wounded
British soldier at the North Bridge, hors de combat, struck down on
the head by a Minuteman using a hatchet, the purported "scalping", was
strongly suppressed. Depositions mentioning some of these activities
were not published and were returned to the participants (this notably
happened to Paul Revere). Paintings portrayed the Lexington fight
as an unjustified slaughter.
The issue of which side was to blame grew during the early nineteenth
century. For example, older participants' testimony in later life
about Lexington and Concord differed greatly from their depositions
taken under oath in 1775. All now said the British fired first at
Lexington, whereas fifty or so years before, they weren't sure. All
now said they fired back, but in 1775, they said few were able to. The
"Battle" took on an almost mythical quality in the American
consciousness. Legend became more important than truth. A complete
shift occurred, and the Patriots were portrayed as actively fighting
for their cause, rather than as suffering innocents. Paintings of the
Lexington skirmish began to portray the militia standing and fighting
back in defiance.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
Ralph Waldo Emerson immortalized the events at the North Bridge in his
1837 "Concord Hymn". The "Concord Hymn" became important because it
commemorated the beginning of the American Revolution, and that for
much of the 19th century it was a means by which Americans learned
about the Revolution, helping to forge the identity of the
After 1860, several generations of schoolchildren memorized Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow's poem "Paul Revere's Ride". Historically it is
inaccurate (for example,
Paul Revere never made it to Concord), but it
captures the idea that an individual can change the course of
By the rude bridge that arched the flood
Their flag to April's breeze unfurled
Here once the embattled farmers stood
And fired the shot heard round the world.
— First verse of Emerson's "Concord Hymn"
In the 20th century, popular and historical opinion varied about the
events of the historic day, often reflecting the political mood of the
time. Isolationist anti-war sentiments before the World Wars bred
skepticism about the nature of Paul Revere's contribution (if any) to
the efforts to rouse the militia. Anglophilia in the United States
after the turn of the twentieth century led to more balanced
approaches to the history of the battle. During World War I, a film
about Paul Revere's ride was seized under the Espionage Act of 1917
for promoting discord between the United States and Britain.
During the Cold War, Revere was used not only as a patriotic symbol,
but also as a capitalist one. In 1961, novelist
Howard Fast published
April Morning, an account of the battle from a fictional 15-year-old's
perspective, and reading of the book has been frequently assigned in
American secondary schools. A film version was produced for television
in 1987, starring
Chad Lowe and Tommy Lee Jones. In the 1990s,
parallels were drawn between American tactics in the
Vietnam War and
those of the British Army at Lexington and Concord.
The site of the battle in Lexington is now known as the Lexington
Battle Green, has been listed on the National Register of Historic
Places, and is a National Historic Landmark. Several memorials
commemorating the battle have been established there.
The lands surrounding the North Bridge in Concord, as well as
approximately 5 miles (8.0 km) of the road along with surrounding
lands and period buildings between Meriam's Corner and western
Lexington are part of Minuteman National Historical Park. There are
walking trails with interpretive displays along routes that the
colonists might have used that skirted the road, and the Park Service
often has personnel (usually dressed in period dress) offering
descriptions of the area and explanations of the events of the
day. A bronze bas relief of Major Buttrick, designed by Daniel
Chester French and executed by
Edmond Thomas Quinn
Edmond Thomas Quinn in 1915, is in the
park, along with French's
Minute Man statue.The Civil War Trust,
its members and partners have saved one acre of the battlefield at the
site of Parker's Revenge through the organization's "Campaign 1776"
project to acquire and preserve battleground land of the Revolutionary
War and War of 1812.
Four current units of the
Massachusetts National Guard units (181st
Infantry, 182nd Infantry, 101st Engineer Battalion, and
125th Quartermaster Company) are derived from American units that
participated in the Battles of Lexington and Concord. There are only
thirty current units of the U.S. Army with colonial roots.[citation
Several ships of the United States Navy, including two World War II
aircraft carriers, were named in honor of the Battle of Lexington.
Daniel Chester French's Minute Man
Patriots' Day is celebrated annually in honor of the battle in
Massachusetts, Maine, and by the
Wisconsin public schools, on the
third Monday in April. Re-enactments of Paul Revere's
ride are staged, as are the battle on the Lexington Green, and
ceremonies and firings are held at the North Bridge.
On April 19, 1875, President
Ulysses S. Grant
Ulysses S. Grant and members of his
cabinet joined 50,000 people to mark the 100th anniversary of the
battles. The sculpture by Daniel Chester French, The Minute Man,
located at the North Bridge, was unveiled on that day. A formal ball
took place in the evening at the Agricultural Hall in Concord.
In April 1925 the
United States Post Office
United States Post Office issued three stamps
commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Battles at Lexington and
Concord. The Lexington—Concord commemorative stamps were the first
of many commemoratives issued to honor the 150th anniversaries of
events that surrounded America's War of Independence. The three stamps
were first placed on sale in Washington, D.C. and in five
Massachusetts cities and towns that played major roles in the
Lexington and Concord story: Lexington, Concord, Boston, Cambridge,
and Concord Junction (as West Concord was then known). This is
not to say that other locations were not involved in the battles.
Washington at Cambridge
Shot heard round the World
Birth of Liberty, by Henry Sandham
The Minute Man
by Daniel Chester French
Issues of 1925
1970 Franklin Mint medallion commemorating Lexington and Concord 1775
The Town of Concord invited 700 prominent U.S. citizens and leaders
from the worlds of government, the military, the diplomatic corps, the
arts, sciences, and humanities to commemorate the 200th anniversary of
the battles. On April 19, 1975, as a crowd estimated at 110,000
gathered to view a parade and celebrate the Bicentennial in Concord,
Gerald Ford delivered a major speech near the North Bridge,
which was televised to the nation.
Freedom was nourished in American soil because the principles of the
Declaration of Independence flourished in our land. These principles,
when enunciated 200 years ago, were a dream, not a reality. Today,
they are real. Equality has matured in America. Our inalienable rights
have become even more sacred. There is no government in our land
without consent of the governed. Many other lands have freely accepted
the principles of liberty and freedom in the Declaration of
Independence and fashioned their own independent republics. It is
these principles, freely taken and freely shared, that have
revolutionized the world. The volley fired here at Concord two
centuries ago, 'the shot heard round the world', still echoes today on
— President Gerald R. Ford
President Ford laid a wreath at the base of The
Minute Man statue and
then respectfully observed as Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the British
Ambassador to the United States, laid a wreath at the grave of British
soldiers killed in the battle.
A citizen of Acton and Members of the Acton Fife and Drum Corps march
to Concord on the
Isaac Davis Trail
Isaac Davis Trail during the 2016 annual Patriots'
American Revolutionary War
American Revolutionary War portal
American Revolutionary War
American Revolutionary War battles
^ a b The exact number of militia on the Lexington common when the
clash occurred is a matter of debate. Coburn, p. 165–67, identifies
77 individuals by name who mustered for the encounter, but he also
notes that no official roll was ever submitted to the Provincial
Congress. Fischer, pp. 400, 183, cites contemporaneous accounts and
those of other historians that put the number between 50 and 70
militia, but notes that Sylvanus Wood, in an account taken 50 years
later, recalled only counting 38 militia.
^ Chidsey, p. 29, estimates the colonial force at 500 by the time the
confrontation occurred at the North Bridge. Coburn, pp. 80–81,
counts about 300 specifically, plus several uncounted companies.
^ The peak strength of militias that massed around the British column
on April 19 is uncertain. Many of the militiamen who joined the battle
at various locations during the day continued to follow the British
column all the way to Charlestown, but some also dropped out and
returned home. Coburn located muster rolls for 79 militia and minute
companies engaged that day, listing 3,960 officers and soldiers in
all. But there are no tallies for six of these companies, and some
units known to be present during the day (such as the Lincoln militia
company) are not included at all.
^ Chidsey, p. 6. This is the total size of Smith's force.
^ Coburn, p. 64. This force is six light infantry companies under
^ Coburn, p. 77 and other sources indicate "three companies". Chidsey,
p. 28 gives a company size "nominally of 28".
^ Coburn, p. 114 gives the size of Percy's force at 1,000. This count
reflects that estimate plus the departing strength, less casualties.
^ a b Chidsey, p. 47, cites all casualty figures except
missing-in-action. Coburn, pp. 156–59, cites by town and name the
American losses, and by company the British losses, including
missing-in-action (from Gage's report). Chidsey, Coburn, and Fischer
disagree on some American counts: Chidsey and Fischer count 39
wounded, Coburn says 42. Fischer, pp. 320–21, also records 50
American killed-in-action, in contrast to Chidsey and Coburn's 49.
^ French, pp. 2, 272-273. A controversial interpretation holds that
Battle of Point Pleasant
Battle of Point Pleasant on October 10, 1774 in what is now West
Virginia was the initial military engagement of the Revolutionary War,
and a 1908 United States Senate resolution designating it as such.
However, few historians subscribe to this interpretation, even in West
^ Emerson's Concord Hymn
^ Fischer, p. 30
^ Fred Anderson, A People's Army, and John Shy, "A New Look at
Colonial Militias," pp. 29–41
^ Fischer, p. 51
^ Journals of the House of Commons, Volume 35, February 6, 1775, p. 99
^ Fischer, pp. 75–76
^ French, pp.23-28.
^ Fischer, p. 89
^ Hafner discusses this incident in detail, noting how the story can
be reconciled with other established facts.
^ Fischer, p. 85
^ Tourtellot, p. 51
^ Tourtellot, pp. 71–72 (colonists have intelligence in late March)
& p. 87 (Gage receives instructions April 16)
^ Tourtellot, p. 70
^ Fischer, pp. 80–85
^ Moore, p. 62.
^ Fischer, p. 87.
^ a b Fischer, p. 96
^ Paul Revere, Letter to Jeremy Belknap, January, 1798, and Paul
Revere, Deposition, April, 1775.
^ Fischer, p. 97
^ Paul Revere, Letter to Jeremy Belknap, January, 1798.
^ Paul Revere, Deposition of April, 1775.
^ Fischer, pp. 138–145
^ Frothingham, p. 60
^ Frothingham, p. 58
^ a b Tourtellot, pp. 105–107
^ Fischer, pp. 70, 121
^ Tourtellot, pp. 109–115
^ Fischer, pp. 127–128
^ The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (1994) p. 122
^ Fischer, p. 400
^ Fischer, p. 158
^ Fischer, p. 153
^ Fischer, p. 151.
^ Tourtellot, A pp. 116-126.
^ Fischer, pp. 43, 75–86.
^ Galvin, pp. 120-124.
^ Coburn, p. 63
^ a b Isaiah Thomas deposition
^ Tourtellot, p. 123
^ Fischer, pp. 189–190
^ Deposition of Elijah Sanderson, April 25, 1775: "I heard one of the
Regulars, whom I took to be an officer, say 'damn them, we will have
them;' and immediately the Regulars shouted aloud, run, and fired on
the Lexington Company, which did not fire a gun before the Regulars
discharged on them." Deposition of Thomas Price Willard, April 23,
1775: "Directly after this an officer rode before the Regulars to the
other side of the body, and hallooed after the militia of said
Lexington, and said 'Lay down your arms, damn you; why don't you lay
down your arms?'" Deposition of John Robbins, April 25, 1775: "... I
being in the front rank, there suddenly appeared a number of the
King's troops ... at a distance of about sixty or seventy yards from
us, huzzaing and on a quick pace toward us, with three officers in
their front on horseback, and on full gallop towards us; the foremost
of which cried, 'Throw down you arms, ye villains, ye rebels;' upon
which said [Lexington] Company dispersing, the foremost of the three
officers ordered their men, saying 'Fire, by God, fire;' at which
moment we received a very heavy and close fire from them;" Journals of
the Continental Congress, May 11, 1775.
^ Fischer, pp.190–191
^ John Barker's Diary, p. 32
^ Chronology06. Motherbedford.com. Retrieved on 2013-08-16.
^ Fischer, p. 193
^ Fischer, p. 402
^ Fischer discusses the shot on pp. 193–194, with detailed footnotes
on pp. 399–403, in which he discusses some of the testimony in
^ Urban, pp. 19–20
^ Fischer, pp. 194–195
^ Benjamin Quarles, p. 10.
^ Fischer, pp. 198–200
^ Tourtellot, p. 152
^ Tourtellot, p. 154
^ Frothingham, p. 67
^ Fischer, p. 215
^ Fischer p.207
^ Martha Moulton deposition
^ Tourtellot, pp. 155–158. In his orders to Lt. Col. Smith for the
expedition, General Gage had explicitly instructed that "you will take
care that the soldiers do not plunder the inhabitants, or hurt private
^ French, p. 197
^ Fischer, p. 208
^ Robinson arrived earlier with several Westford
Minutemen after he
was alerted by rider at his home in Westford-David Hackett Fischer,
Paul Revere's Ride, Oxford, page 146. George E. Downey, A History of
the First Parish of Westford, Town of Westford, 1975, page 27. Allen
French, Historic Concord, Cambria, 1942, pages 66 and 68.
^ Fischer, p. 209
^ A. Doolittle print of the Battle indicates this after interviews
with eyewtiness accounts one month after the Battle
^ Rev. Joseph Thaxter from the United States Literary Gazette, Vol 1,
page 264., "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2016-03-05.
Retrieved 2016-02-23. (Letter by Minuteman at the Battle),
Concord resident and Witness of the battle Rev. Dr. Ripley in his
published account of 1827, Hodgman, Rev. Edwin. History of the Town of
Westford, 1659-1883. Lowell: Morning Mail Co.,1883.
^ Fischer, pp. 209–212
^ Fischer, p. 212
^ French, General Gage's Informers, p. 97. Laurie reported, "I imagine
myself that a man of my Company (afterwards killed) did first fire his
piece, tho' Mr. [Lt.] Sutherland has since assured me that the Country
people fired first."
^ Concord resident and Witness of the battle Rev. Dr. Ripley in his
published account of 1827, Hodgman, Rev. Edwin. History of the Town of
Westford, 1659-1883. Lowell: Morning Mail Co.,1883, French, Allen. The
Day of Concord and Lexington. Boston: Little, Brown, 1925.
^ a b Tourtellot, pp. 165–166
^ Fischer, p. 214
^ a b Rev. Joseph Thaxter Letter and news article from the United
States Literary Gazette, Vol 1, page 264 (Rev. Thaxter served as a
Minuteman under Lt. Col. Robinson on the Concord Bridge, April 19,
^ Fischer, pp. 214–215
^ a b Fischer, p. 216
^ Tourtellot, pp. 166–168
^ Muster rolls for the militia and minute companies converging at this
point are included in Coburn, pp. 7-35. However, as Coburn notes,
these rolls are not a complete tally of the militiamen present,
because some muster lists were either not submitted or have not been
found in archives.
^ Both the British and the local militias were armed with smooth-bore
muskets that had an effective range of aimed fire of only 80-100 yards
(75-90 m), although the musket ball could have serious effect at a
greater distance, if it happened by chance to hit a person. There is
no record that any soldiers on either side were armed with
longer-range, more accurate rifles. Dr. Benjamin Church, a member of
Massachusetts Provincial Congress
Massachusetts Provincial Congress and the Committee of Safety,
informed General Gage in March, 1775, that the colonial militiamen
"from their adroitness in the habitual use of the firelock suppose
themselves sure of their mark at a distance of 200 rods." Even if
Church meant yards rather than rods (600 feet versus 3300 feet), it is
unclear whether he was profoundly ignorant of the capabilities of a
musket, was exaggerating in order to mislead Gage (as Church later
claimed when accused of being a spy), or was ridiculing the American
militiamen. See Philbrick, p. 92, and French, p. 57-58. On whether
Church was a spy, see French, Chapter V.
^ French, p. 219, and Lister, Concord Fight, being so much of the
narrative of Ensign Jeremy Lister of the 10th regiment of foot.
^ Fischer, pp. 408–409. Fischer notes conflicting accounts of which
militia companies were engaged at this point, and the number of
^ Fischer notes on p. 409, "This is not correctly called the Bloody
Angle, an error term introduced after the Civil War that is both
inaccurate and anachronistic. It has been used uncritically by many
historians of the battle and is perpetuated by the National Park
Service." The Interim Report of the
Boston National Historic Sites
Commission, submitted to Congress in 1958 in support of legislation
that established the
Minute Man National Historical Park, asserted
that: "Fittingly, this curving section of the road was soon to be
named ‘The Bloody Angle.’" (p. 47; emphasis added). However, there
is no evidence that the term Bloody Angle was ever used by the battle
participants or local residents following April 19, 1775, nor did
historians use the term prior to the mid-20th century. See Boston
National Historic Sites Commission, The Lexington-Concord Battle Road:
Interim Report, June 16, 1958.
^ Fischer, pp. 226–227
^ Fischer, p. 232. According to one British officer, ammunition had
been wasted earlier in the day out of "too great eagerness of the
soldiers in the first action of a war. Most of them were young
soldiers who had never been in action, and had been taught that every
thing was to be effected by a quick firing. This ineffectual fire gave
the rebels more confidence, as they soon found that notwithstanding
there was so much [firing], they suffered but little from it." Lt.
Frederick Mackenzie, 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers, Diary of Frederick
Mackenzie, in Allen French, editor, A British Fusilier in
Revolutionary Boston, Cambridge, 1926.
^ Fischer, pp. 410–411. Fischer notes conflicting accounts about
where this ambush—now sometimes referred to as "Parker's
Revenge"—took place, whether within Lincoln or Lexington.
^ Coburn, pp. 106-107
^ Ensign Henry De Berniere, "Report to General Gage on April 19,
1775," quoted in Fischer, pp. 231-232
^ Lt. John Barker, The King's Own Regiment, "Diary of a British
Soldier," Atlantic Monthly, April 1877, vol. 39
^ Fischer, p. 232.
^ A remark in Lt. Col. Smith's report to General Gage, dated April 22,
1775, is typical: "Notwithstanding the enemy's numbers, they did not
make one gallant attempt during so long an action, though our men were
so very fatigued, but [instead] kept under cover." Henry S. Commager,
editor. Documents of American History, New York, 1948, p. 90
^ Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, ‘’Paul Revere’s Ride,’’ 1861.
^ Lord Percy to General Harvey, April 20, 1775, in Charles Knowles
Bolton, editor, Letters of Hugh Earl Percy, Boston, 1902. p. 52.
^ French, p. 228
^ Frothingham, p. 178
^ Tourtellot, pp. 184–185
^ Tourtellot, p. 185
^ Fischer, pp. 241–242
^ Fischer, pp. 243–244
^ There are several versions of this story. See French, p. 230, and
Samuel Abbot Smith, pp. 27-32.
^ a b Fischer, pp. 245–246
^ a b Fischer, pp. 250–251
^ a b Tourtellot, p. 203
^ a b Fischer, p. 256
^ a b c d Fischer, p. 258
^ Tourtellot, p. 197
^ Fischer, p. 257
^ Hurd, p. 181
^ Fischer, pp. 258–260
^ Fischer, p. 261
^ Brooks, p. 96
^ McCullough, p. 35
^ Frothingham, pp. 100–101
^ Fischer, p. 265
^ Brooks, pp. 96–97
^ Journals of the Continental Congress, pp. 26-44. Images of the
original depositions can be found at
^ Fischer, pp. 275–276
^ Fischer, p. 263
^ Fischer, p. 279
^ a b Fischer, p. 280
^ Fischer, p. 271
^ a b Fischer, pp. 327-328
^ Fischer, p. 329
^ Fischer, pp. 331–333
^ Fischer, pp. 336–338
^ Fischer, pp. 340–342
Minuteman National Historical Park
Minuteman National Historical Park Things To Do
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Civil War Trust
Civil War Trust "Saved Land" webpage. Accessed Jan. 3, 2018.
^ Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors, 181st Infantry.
Reproduced in Sawicki 1981, pp. 354–355.
^ Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors, 182nd Infantry.
Reproduced in Sawicki 1981, pp. 355–357.
^ Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors, 101st Engineer Battalion
^ Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors, 125th Quartermaster
Company Archived 2012-08-19 at the Wayback Machine.
Massachusetts Legal Holidays
Maine Legal Holidays
Wisconsin School Observance Days
^ Concord Centennial Celebration Report
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about Battles of Lexington and Concord.
National Park Service
National Park Service site for
Minute Man National Historical Park
Buckman Tavern - Lexington Historical Society
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Battles of Lexington and Concord
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by Abraham Tomlinson for the Poughkeepsie, NY m