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10,000–15,000 killed or wounded [3]
12,000 killed or wounded [4]
Official German data 21–30/08/14:
13,873:[5]
1,726 KIA
7,461 WIA
4,686 MIA
170,000:
78,000 killed or wounded
92,000 POW
350 guns captured[6][7]
v t e East Prussian Campaign Stallupönen Gumbinnen Tannenberg 1st Masurian Lakes Vivat ribbon commemorating Battle of Tannenberg. Shows Wilhelm II and "Hindenburg the victor of Tannenberg". The
Battle of Tannenberg
Contents 1 Background 2 Prelude: 17–22 August 3 Battle 3.1 Consolidation of the German Eighth Army 3.2 Early phases of battle: 23–26 August 3.3 Main battle: 26–30 August 4 Aftermath 5 Post-war legacy 6 Footnotes 7 Further reading Background[edit]
The French army's
Plan XVII
Generalfeldmarschall
However, by the next morning, 21 August, Eighth Army staff realized
that because Samsonov’s II Army was closer to the Vistula crossings
they must relocate most of their forces to join with XX Corps to block
Samsonov before they could withdraw further. Now Moltke was told that
they would only retreat a short way; François protested directly to
the Kaiser about his panicking superiors.[17] That evening Prittwitz
reported that the German 1st Cavalry Division had disappeared. His
next call disclosed that they had ridden in with 500 prisoners.
Probably Moltke had already decided to replace both Prittwitz and his
highly regarded chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Alfred von Waldersee. On the
morning of 22 August their replacements, Col. Gen. Paul von Hindenburg
and Maj. Gen. Erich Ludendorff, were notified of their new
assignments.
The Eighth Army issued orders to move toward Samsonov’s Second Army.
I Corps was closest to the railway, so it would move by train to
support the right of XX Corps, while the other two German corps would
march the shorter distance to XX Corps' left. The First Cavalry
Division with some older garrison troops would remain to screen
Rennenkampf. On the afternoon of 22 August the head of the Eighth Army
field railways was informed by telegraph that new commanders were
coming by special train. The telegram relieving their former
commanders came later. I Corps was moving over more than 150 km
(93 miles) of rail, day and night, one train every 30 minutes, with 25
minutes to unload instead of the customary hour or two.[18]
After the battle at
Gumbinnen
Movements of 23–26 August 1914. Red: Germans, blue: Russians Zhilinskiy had agreed to Samsonov’s proposal to start the Second
Army’s advance further westward than originally planned, separating
them even further from Rennenkampf’s First Army. On 22 August
Samsonov's forces encountered Germans all along their front and pushed
them back in several places. Zhilinskiy ordered him to pursue
vigorously. They already had been advancing for six days in torrid
heat without sufficient rest along primitive roads, averaging
24 km (15 mi) a day and had outrun their supplies[23] On 23
August they attacked the German XX Corps, which retreated to the
Orlau-Frankenau line that night. The Russians followed, and on the
24th they attacked again; the now partially entrenched XX Corps
temporarily stopped their advance before retreating to avoid possible
encirclement. At one stage the chief of staff of the corps directed
artillery fire onto his own dwelling.[24]
Samsonov saw a wonderful opportunity because, as far as he was aware,
both of his flanks were unopposed. He ordered most of his units to the
northwest, toward the Vistula, leaving only his VI Corps to continue
north towards their original objective of Seeburg. He did not have
enough aircraft or skilled cavalry to detect the German buildup on his
left. Rennenkampf mistakenly reported that two of the German Corps had
sheltered in the
Königsberg
German infantry during the battle of Tannenberg On 24 August Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Hoffmann motored along the German lines to meet Scholtz and his principal subordinates, sharing the roads with panic-stricken refugees; in the background were columns of smoke from burning villages ignited by artillery shells. They could keep control of their army because most of the local telephone operators remained at their switchboards, carefully tracking the motorcade. Along the way they drove through the village of Tannenberg, which reminded the two younger men of the defeat of the Teutonic Knights there by the Poles and Lithuanians in 1410; Hindenburg had been thinking about that battle since the evening before when he strolled near the ruins of the castle of the Teutonic Order. (In 1910 Slavs had commemorated their triumph on the old battlefield.)[26] By telephone with headquarters they were reassured that Rennenkampf’s army was moving forward, but slowly—his heavy wagons were sinking into the East Prussian sands. They knew about Samsonov’s proposed movements from a wireless intercept that agreed perfectly with papers found on the body of a Russian officer killed at Gumbinnen. When they met François he was told that Samsonov was moving northwest, to turn what he believed to be the German right flank. I Corps was ordered to attack the Russian left wing at Usdau on the next day, 25 August. François objected vigorously: only part of his corps had arrived and his artillery would not be detrained and ready before 26 August. Ludendorff screeched at him until François finally agreed to attack, but with the proviso that because his ammunition column was still on the road, his men must charge with bayonets. By setting Usdau as the objective, the commanders realized that part of the Russian Second Army would escape the trap. On the way back to headquarters Hoffmann received new radio intercepts. Rennenkampf's most recent orders from Zhilinskiy were to continue due west, not turn southward towards Samsonov, who was instructed to continue his own drive northwest. Based on this information Scholtz formed a new defensive flank along the Drewenz River, while his main line strengthened their defenses. Back at headquarters Hindenburg told the staff, “Gentlemen. Our preparations are so well in hand that we can sleep soundly tonight."[27] As the battle was beginning OHL telegraphed the Eighth Army that three army corps and a cavalry division would be sent to East Prussia. Ludendorff replied that they would arrive too late for the present battle, but would be welcome if they could be spared. Moltke was optimistic about their progress in France and Belgium and two army corps and the cavalry were sent. Main battle: 26–30 August[edit] This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (August 2017) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Movements of 27–30 August 1914 Samsonov’s cavalry detected the German buildup on their left, so he
ordered reinforcements to extend the Russian line, but it would take
hours or even days for them to arrive. True to his word, on 26 August
François advanced part of his 1st Division toward the Russian
outposts at 08:00, where—despite telephone prodding from the Eighth
Army—they only skirmished at a distance until noon. By then the
railways had brought up the rest of I Corps including their artillery.
Finally they drove the Russian outposts back, but at 15:45 François
halted in order to organize a strong attack on the following day by
men with full stomachs and ammunition pouches. Scholtz followed his
orders, which were to make sure that Russians were not slipping past
his flanks, which would make it difficult to spring the trap. On his
right he attacked to push back the Russian 2nd Division and almost
destroyed it. On his left the German 3rd Reserve Division repelled an
attack by the Russian VI Corps. It was a different story in the thinly
held center, where the Russian XIII Corps advanced toward the road
center of
Allenstein
Burning house during the fight at Usdau on 27 August 1914 Dead Russian soldiers in a trench near Usdau That evening the Eighth Army’s staff was on edge. Little had been achieved during the day, when they had intended to spring the trap. XX Corps had done well on another torrid day, but now was exhausted. On their far left they knew that XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps were coming into action, but headquarters had learned little about their progress. In fact, XVII Corps had defeated the Russian VI Corps, which fled back along the roads. XVII Corps had endured long marches in sweltering weather, but some men still had the energy to pursue on bicycles requisitioned from civilians.[29] To add to their worries, German aerial scouts reported that still more of Samsonov’s army was detraining at his railhead. Another aviator mistakenly reported that Rennenkampf’s infantry was now heading towards them. The Eighth Army might be the one in the trap. Hoffmann, who had been an observer with the Japanese in Manchuria, tried to ease their nerves by telling how Samsonov and Rennenkampf had quarreled during that war, so they would do nothing to help one another. It was a good story that Hoffmann treasured and retold frequently,[30] so it reappears in many histories, but not in either Hindenburg’s or Ludendorff’s memoirs. In Hindenburg’s words “… firm resolution began to yield to vacillation …”[31] At dinner Ludendorff was visibly distraught, toying with his bread, and finally abruptly asked to speak alone with Hindenburg. When Ludendorff emerged from their tête-a-tête he issued the orders to continue the attack on Samsonov. The rest of the German forces coming onto their left wing were swinging into place by forced marches. Samsonov’s II Army was now facing Germans along a 100 km (62 mi) line. François was ready to attack the Russian left decisively on 27 August, hitting I Russian Corps. His artillery barrage was overwhelming, and soon he had taken the key town of Usdau. In the center the Russians continued to strongly attack the German XX Corps and to move northwest from Allenstein. The German XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps pushed the Russian right wing they had bloodied the day before further back. Gen. Basil Gourko, commanding the Russian First Army Cavalry Division (and from 1916–17 chief of the general staff), was told later that Samsonov did not know what was happening on his flanks because he was observing the action from a rise in the ground a distance from his wireless set and reports were not relayed to him.[32] It was late in the day before he realized that his army was in frightful danger. On the morning of 28 August the German commanders were motoring along the front when they were shown a report from an aerial observer that Rennenkampf was moving towards their rear. Ludendorff announced that the attack on the Second Army must be broken off. Hindenburg led him behind a nearby hedge, when they emerged Hindenburg calmly said that operations would continue as planned.[33] Before long they learned that the report of Rennenkampf’s movement was mistaken. Samsonov’s I Corps on the left and VI Corps on the right were both retreating. His center had received so little food and ammunition that they were unable to keep attacking. They were ordered to retreat southeast to obtain what they needed to fight. Samsonov asked that Rennenkampf be ordered to help. It was too late. François by this time had advanced due east, moving further than his orders specified, to form a line south of the Russians between Neidenburg and Willenberg, and XVII German Corps had swung southwest to meet him. The noose was in place. The Russians who had been attacking were surrounded. On 29 August the troops from the Russian Second Army’s center who were retreating south ran into a German defensive line. Those Russians who tried break through by dashing across open fields heavy with crops were mown down. They were in a cauldron centered at Frogenau, east of Tannenberg, and throughout the day were relentlessly pounded by artillery. Many surrendered—long columns of prisoners jammed the roads away from the battleground. Hindenburg and Ludendorff watched from a hilltop, with only a single field telephone line; thereafter they stayed closer to the telephone network. Hindenburg met one captured Russian corps commander that day, another on the day following. On 30 August the Russians remaining outside of the cauldron tried unsuccessfully to break open the snare. Rather than report the loss of his army to Tsar Nicholas II, Samsonov disappeared in the woods that night and committed suicide. His body was found in the following year and returned to Russia by the Red Cross.[34] On 31 August Hindenburg formally reported to the kaiser that three Russian army corps (XIII, XV and XXIII) had been destroyed. The two corps (I and VI) that had not been caught in the cauldron had been severely bloodied and were retreating back to Poland. He requested that the battle be named Tannenberg (an imaginative touch that both Ludendorff and Hoffmann claimed as their own).[35][36] Russian prisoners of war at Tilsit railway station Samsonov's Second Army had been almost annihilated: 92,000 captured, 78,000 killed or wounded and only 10,000 (mostly from the retreating flanks) escaping. The Russians had lost 350 big guns. The Germans suffered just 12,000 casualties out of the 150,000 men committed to the battle.[37] Sixty trains were required to take captured Russian equipment to Germany. Other historians give smaller numbers for Russian killed and wounded, which were never properly recorded.[38] For instance, 30,000 Russian killed or wounded, with 13 generals and 500 guns captured.[39] The Russian First Army had been so slowed by the combative German cavalry screen that by the time the battle was over their closest unit was still perhaps as much as 70 km (43 mi) from the trapped Second Army. Other Russian units were scattered back along the line to Königsberg, leaving the First Army itself in a dangerously spread-out position. Aftermath[edit] 1998 photo of the foundations of the Tannenberg Memorial, which later served as the burial site of Paul von Hindenburg To David Stevenson it was "a major victory but far from decisive",[40]
because the Russian First Army was still in East Prussia. It set the
stage for the
First Battle of the Masurian Lakes
The reverse of a
World War I
Hindenburg was hailed as an epic hero, Ludendorff was praised, but
Hoffmann was generally ignored by the press. Apparently not pleased by
this, he later gave tours of the area, noting, "This is where the
Field Marshal slept before the battle, this is where he slept after
the battle, and this is where he slept during the battle." However,
Hindenburg countered by saying, "If the battle had gone badly, the
name 'Hindenburg' would have been reviled from one end of Germany to
the other." Hoffmann is not mentioned in Hindenburg’s memoirs. In
his memoirs Ludendorff takes credit for the encirclement[43] and most
historians give him full responsibility for conducting the battle.
Hindenburg wrote and spoke of “we”, and when questioned about the
crucial tête-á-tête with Ludendorff after dinner on 26 August
resolutely maintained that they had calmly discussed their options and
resolved to continue with the encirclement. Military historian Walter
Elze wrote that a few months before his death Hindenburg finally
acknowledged that Ludendorff had been in a funk that evening.[44]
Hindenburg would also remark, “After all, I know something about the
business, I was the instructor in tactics at the War Academy for six
years”.[45]
Post-war legacy[edit]
A German monument was completed in 1927. However, it was blown up by
the Germans during the retreat in January 1945.[46]
German film director
Heinz Paul made a film, Tannenberg, about the
battle, shot in
East Prussia
^ Hastings, Max., 2013; p. 281.
^ Hastings, Max. Catastrophe: Europe goes to war 1914 London: William
Collins, 2013; p. 281.
^ Spencer Tucker, The Great War: 1914–1920, 2002, p. 43
^ Hastings, Max., 2013; p. 281.
^ Sanitätsbericht über das deutsche Heer im Weltkriege 1914/1918,
III. Band, Berlin 1934, S. 36
^ Sweetman 2004, p. 158
^ Ian F. W. Beckett, The Great War: 1914–1918, 2014, p. 76
^ Strachan, H. (2001) The First World War. Volume I. To Arms. Oxford
University Press, p. 298.
^ Strachan (2001) p.312.
^ Herwig, H. L. (1997). The First World War, Germany and
Austria-Hungary
Further reading[edit] Wikimedia Commons has media related to
Battle of Tannenberg
World War I
Clark, Christopher (2006), Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of Prussia, 1600—1947, Cambridge, ISBN 978-0-674-02385-7 Durschmied, Erik (2000), "10", The hinge factor: how chance and stupidity have changed history, Arcade, ISBN 978-1-55970-515-8 Harrison, Richard W. (1991), "Samsonow and the Battle of Tannenberg, 1914", in Bond, Brian, Fallen Stars. Eleven Studies of Twentieth Century Military Disaster, London: Brassey's, pp. 13–31, ISBN 0-08-040717-X Haufler, Hervie (2003), Codebreakers' Victory: How the Allied Cryptographers Won World War II, New York: New American Library, p. 10, ISBN 978-0-451-20979-5 Jaques, Tony (2007), Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: A–E, Greenwood, ISBN 978-0-313-33537-2 Showalter, Dennis E (1991), Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, 1914 (2004 ed.), Brassey's, ISBN 978-1-57488-781-5 Stevenson, David (2004), 1914—1918: The History of the First World War, Penguin Books Ltd, ISBN 978-0-14-026817-1 Stone, David (2015). The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 9780700620951. Strachan, Hew (2001), The First World War, Oxford: Oxford, ISBN 0-19-926191-1 Sweetman, John (2004), Tannenberg 1914 (1st ed.), London: Cassell, ISBN 978-0-304-35635-5 Tuchman, Barbara Wertheim (1994), The Guns of August, New York: Ballantine Books, ISBN 978-0-345-47609-8 Hastings, Max(2013), Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War. London, Knopf Press, Release Date 24 September 2013, ISBN 978-0307597052 Martin van Creveld(2004), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton,Cambridge University Press,ISBN 978-0521837446 v t e World War I Home fronts Theatres European Balkans Western Front Eastern Front Italian Front Middle Eastern Gallipoli Sinai and Palestine Caucasus Persia Mesopotamia South Arabia African South West East Kamerun Togoland North Asian and Pacific Tsingtao German New Guinea and Samoa At sea North Atlantic U-boat campaign Mediterranean North Sea Baltic Indian, Pacific and South Atlantic Oceans Papeete Madras Penang Cocos Coronel Falkland Islands Más a Tierra Principal participants (people) Entente powers Belgium Brazil China France French Empire Greece Italy Japan Montenegro Portuguese Empire Romania Russia Russian Empire Russian Republic Serbia United Kingdom British Empire United States Central Powers Germany Austria-Hungary Ottoman Empire Bulgaria Timeline Pre-War conflicts
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Prelude Origins Sarajevo assassination Anti-Serb riots in Sarajevo July Crisis Autumn 1914 Battle of the Frontiers Battle of Cer First Battle of the Marne Siege of Tsingtao Battle of Tannenberg Battle of Galicia Battle of the Masurian Lakes Battle of Kolubara Battle of Sarikamish Race to the Sea First Battle of Ypres 1915 Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes Second Battle of Ypres Battle of Gallipoli Second Battle of Artois Battles of the Isonzo Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive Great Retreat Second Battle of Champagne Kosovo Offensive Siege of Kut Battle of Loos 1916 Erzurum Offensive Battle of Verdun Lake Naroch Offensive Battle of Asiago Battle of Jutland Battle of the Somme first day Brusilov Offensive Baranovichi Offensive Battle of Romani Monastir Offensive Battle of Transylvania 1917 Capture of Baghdad First Battle of Gaza Zimmermann Telegram Second Battle of Arras Second Battle of the Aisne Kerensky Offensive Third Battle of Ypres (Passchendaele) Battle of Mărășești Battle of Caporetto Southern Palestine Offensive Battle of Cambrai Armistice of Erzincan 1918 Operation Faustschlag Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Spring Offensive Second Battle of the Marne Battle of Baku Hundred Days Offensive Vardar Offensive Battle of Megiddo Third Transjordan attack Meuse-Argonne Offensive Battle of Vittorio Veneto Battle of Aleppo Armistice of Salonica Armistice of Mudros Armistice of Villa Giusti Armistice with Germany Other conflicts
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