Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent

Al-Qaeda (; , ) is an Islamic extremist organization composed of Salafist jihadists. Its members are mostly composed of Arabs, but also include other peoples. Al-Qaeda has mounted attacks on civilian and military targets in various countries, including the 1998 United States embassy bombings, the September 11 attacks, and the 2002 Bali bombings; it has been designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, India, and various other countries.

The organization was founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden and other volunteers during the Soviet–Afghan War. Following the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, bin Laden offered ''mujahideen'' support to Saudi Arabia in the Gulf War in 1990–1991. His offer was rebuffed by the Saudi authorities, which instead sought the aid of the United States. The stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia prompted bin Laden to subsequently wage ''jihad'' against the United States. During 1992–1996, al-Qaeda established its headquarters in Sudan until their banishment from the region in May 1996. They shifted their base to the Afghanistan in the same year during the regime of the Taliban. Afterward, al-Qaeda expanded to other parts of the world, setting up bases primarily in Middle East and South Asia. Bin Laden issued two '' fatawas'' calling for U.S. troops to leave Saudi Arabia. Lack of response from the U.S. resulted in al-Qaeda conducting the 1998 United States embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which resulted in deaths of more than 200 people. American forces retaliated by launching the Operation Infinite Reach, killing around 50 people. The operation was a tactical failure for the United States and boosted al-Qaeda's morale.

In 2001, al-Qaeda carried out the September 11 attacks, resulting in nearly 3,000 fatalities, substantial long-term health consequences and damaging global economic market. The United States immediately instigated the war on terror and invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban and terminate al-Qaeda. In 2003, the United States erroneously accused Iraq of having ties with al-Qaeda and invaded Iraq. In response to the United States war crimes in Iraq, al-Qaeda launched its Iraqi regional branch in 2004. After evading manhunt for almost a decade, the U.S. military killed bin Laden in May 2011. Bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri formally succeeded him and vowed to avenge the killing. After nearly a year of the conclusion of the War in Afghanistan, al-Zawahiri was killed by a U.S. drone strike in July 2022. Since the death of key leaders, al-Qaeda's operations shifted from top-down organization and planning of attacks, to the planning of attacks carried out by a loose network of associated groups and lone-wolf operators.

Al-Qaeda members believe a Christian-Jewish alliance (led by the United States) is conspiring to be at war against Islam and destroy Islam. As Salafist jihadists, members of Al-Qaeda believe that killing non-combatants is religiously sanctioned. Al-Qaeda also opposes what it regards as man-made laws, and wants to replace them exclusively with a strict form of '' sharīʿa'' ( Islamic religious law, which is perceived as divine law). It is also responsible for instigating sectarian violence among Muslims. Al-Qaeda regards liberal Muslims, Shias, Sufis, and other Islamic sects as heretical and its members and sympathizers have attacked their mosques, shrines, and gatherings. Examples of sectarian attacks include the 2004 Ashoura massacre, the 2006 Sadr City bombings, the April 2007 Baghdad bombings, and the 2007 Yazidi community bombings. Al-Qaeda characteristically organizes attacks including suicide attacks and simultaneous bombing of several targets. Al-Qaeda ideologues envision the violent removal of all foreign and secular influences in Muslim countries, which it perceives as corrupt deviations. Following the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, the group was led by Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri until his death in 2022. As of 2021, it has reportedly suffered from a deterioration of central command over its regional operations.

Organization

Al-Qaeda only indirectly controls its day-to-day operations. Its philosophy calls for the centralization of decision making, while allowing for the decentralization of execution. The top leaders of Al-Qaeda have defined the organization's ideology and guiding strategy, and they have also articulated simple and easy-to-receive messages. At the same time, mid-level organizations were given autonomy, but they had to consult with top management before large-scale attacks and assassinations. Top management included the shura council as well as committees on military operations, finance, and information sharing. Through the information committees of Al-Qaeda, he placed special emphasis on communicating with his groups. However, after the War on Terror, Al-Qaeda's leadership has become isolated. As a result, the leadership has become decentralized, and the organization has become regionalized into several Al-Qaeda groups.

Many terrorism experts do not believe that the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by Al-Qaeda's leadership. However, bin Laden held considerable ideological sway over some Muslim extremists before his death. Experts argue that Al-Qaeda has fragmented into a number of disparate regional movements, and that these groups bear little connection with one another.

This view mirrors the account given by Osama bin Laden in his October 2001 interview with Tayseer Allouni:

however, Bruce Hoffman saw Al-Qaeda as a cohesive network that was strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas.

Affiliates

Al-Qaeda has the following direct affiliates:

* Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
* Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
* Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
* al-Shabaab
* Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
* Al-Qaeda in Bosnia and Herzegovina
* Al-Qaeda in Caucasus and Russia
* Al-Qaeda in Gaza
* Al-Qaeda in Kurdistan
* Al-Qaeda in Lebanon
* Al Qaeda in Spain
* Al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago
* Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula
* Guardians of Religion Organization
*Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles (AQTN).

The following are presently believed to be indirect affiliates of Al-Qaeda:

* Caucasus Emirate (factions)
* Fatah al-Islam
* Islamic Jihad Union
* Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
* Jaish-e-Mohammed
* Jemaah Islamiyah
* Lashkar-e-Taiba
* Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group

Al-Qaeda's former affiliates include the following:

* Abu Sayyaf (pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2014)
* Al-Mourabitoun (joined JNIM in 2017)
* Al-Qaeda in Iraq (became the Islamic State of Iraq, which later seceded from al-Qaeda and became ISIL)
* Al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel (inactive since 2015)
* Ansar al-Islam (majority merged with ISIL in 2014)
* Ansar Dine (joined JNIM in 2017)
* Islamic Jihad of Yemen (became AQAP)
* Jund al-Aqsa (pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2017)
* Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (merged with Al-Mulathameen to form Al-Mourabitoun in 2013)
* Rajah Sulaiman movement (became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and split ties in 2017, disputed)
* Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (pledged alliance to ISIL and adopted the name Sinai Province)

Leadership

Osama bin Laden (1988–May 2011)

Osama bin Laden served as the emir of Al-Qaeda from the organization's founding in 1988 until his assassination by US forces on May 1, 2011. Atiyah Abd al-Rahman was alleged to be second in command prior to his death on August 22, 2011.

Bin Laden was advised by a Shura Council, which consists of senior Al-Qaeda members. The group was estimated to consist of 20–30 people.

After May 2011

Ayman al-Zawahiri had been Al-Qaeda's deputy emir and assumed the role of emir following bin Laden's death. Al-Zawahiri replaced Saif al-Adel, had been killed in Pakistan.

Nasir al-Wuhayshi was alleged to have become Al-Qaeda's overall second in command and general manager in 2013. He was concurrently the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) until he was killed by a US airstrike in Yemen in June 2015. Abu Khayr al-Masri, Wuhayshi's alleged successor as the deputy to Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in February 2017. Al Qaeda's next alleged number two leader, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, was killed by Israeli agents. His pseudonym was Abu Muhammad al-Masri, who was killed in November 2020 in Iran. He was involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Al-Qaeda's network was built from scratch as a conspiratorial network which drew upon the leadership of a number of regional nodes. The organization divided itself into several committees, which include:
* The Military Committee, which is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
* The Money/Business Committee, which funds the recruitment and training of operatives through the '' hawala'' banking system. US-led efforts to eradicate the sources of "terrorist financing" were most successful in the year immediately following the September 11 attacks. Al-Qaeda continues to operate through unregulated banks, such as the 1,000 or so ''hawaladars'' in Pakistan, some of which can handle deals of up to million. The committee also procures false passports, pays Al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses. In the ''9/11 Commission Report'', it was estimated that Al-Qaeda required $30million per year to conduct its operations.
* The Law Committee reviews Sharia law, and decides upon courses of action conform to it.
* The Islamic Study/'' Fatwah'' Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
* The Media Committee ran the now-defunct newspaper ''Nashrat al Akhbar'' ( en, Newscast) and handled public relations.
* In 2005, Al-Qaeda formed As-Sahab, a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials.

Command structure

Most of Al Qaeda's top leaders and operational directors were veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were the leaders who were considered the operational commanders of the organization. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda is not operationally managed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Several operational groups exist, which consult with the leadership in situations where attacks are in preparation.

When asked in 2005 about the possibility of Al-Qaeda's connection to the July 7, 2005 London bombings, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair said: "Al-Qaeda is not an organization. Al-Qaeda is a way of working... but this has the hallmark of that approach... Al-Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training... to provide expertise... and I think that is what has occurred here." On August 13, 2005, ''The Independent'' newspaper, reported that the July7 bombers had acted independently of an Al-Qaeda mastermind.

Nasser al-Bahri, who was Osama bin Laden's bodyguard for four years in the run-up to 9/11 wrote in his memoir a highly detailed description of how the group functioned at that time. Al-Bahri described Al-Qaeda's formal administrative structure and vast arsenal. However, the author Adam Curtis argued that the idea of Al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contended the name "Al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of bin Laden and the four men accused of the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa. Curtis wrote:

During the 2001 trial, the US Department of Justice needed to show that bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge him ''in absentia'' under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, who said he was a founding member of the group and a former employee of bin Laden. Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl's testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty, and because he was delivering it as part of a plea bargain agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack US military establishments.. Sam Schmidt, a defense attorney who defended al-Fadl said:

Field operatives

The number of individuals in the group who have undergone proper military training, and are capable of commanding insurgent forces, is largely unknown. Documents captured in the raid on bin Laden's compound in 2011 show that the core Al-Qaeda membership in 2002 was 170. In 2006, it was estimated that Al-Qaeda had several thousand commanders embedded in 40 countries.. , it was believed that no more than 200–300 members were still active commanders.

According to the 2004 BBC documentary ''The Power of Nightmares'', Al-Qaeda was so weakly linked together that it was hard to say it existed apart from bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. The lack of any significant numbers of convicted Al-Qaeda members, despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges, was cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that met the description of Al-Qaeda existed. Al-Qaeda's commanders, as well as its sleeping agents, are hiding in different parts of the world to this day. They are mainly hunted by the American and Israeli secret services.

Insurgent forces

According to author Robert Cassidy, Al-Qaeda maintains two separate forces which are deployed alongside insurgents in Iraq and Pakistan. The first, numbering in the tens of thousands, was "organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces" in the Soviet–Afghan war. The force was composed primarily of foreign ''mujahideen'' from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Many of these fighters went on to fight in Bosnia and Somalia for global ''jihad''. Another group, which numbered 10,000 in 2006, live in the West and have received rudimentary combat training.

Other analysts have described Al-Qaeda's rank and file as being "predominantly Arab" in its first years of operation, but that the organization also includes "other peoples" . It has been estimated that 62 percent of Al-Qaeda members have a university education. In 2011 and the following year, the Americans successfully settled accounts with Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, the organization's chief propagandist, and Abu Yahya al-Libi's deputy commander. The optimistic voices were already saying it was over for Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, it was around this time that the Arab Spring greeted the region, the turmoil of which came great to Al-Qaeda's regional forces. Seven years later, Ayman al-Zawahiri became arguably the number one leader in the organization, implementing his strategy with systematic consistency. Tens of thousands loyal to Al-Qaeda and related organizations were able to challenge local and regional stability and ruthlessly attack their enemies in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe and Russia alike. In fact, from Northwest Africa to South Asia, Al-Qaeda had more than two dozen "franchise-based" allies. The number of Al-Qaeda militants was set at 20,000 in Syria alone, and they had 4,000 members in Yemen and about 7,000 in Somalia. The war was not over.

Financing

Al-Qaeda usually does not disburse funds for attacks, and very rarely makes wire transfers. In the 1990s, financing came partly from the personal wealth of Osama bin Laden.Who is Bin Laden?
Retrieved May 5, 2011 Other sources of income included the heroin trade and donations from supporters in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic Gulf states. A WikiLeaks-released 2009 internal US government cable stated that "terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern."

Among the first pieces of evidence regarding Saudi Arabia's support for Al-Qaeda was the so-called " Golden Chain", a list of early Al-Qaeda funders seized during a 2002 raid in Sarajevo by Bosnian police. The hand-written list was validated by Al-Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, and included the names of both donors and beneficiaries.United States of America v. Usama bin Laden
Wikisource. Retrieved June 10, 2016. Osama bin-Laden's name appeared seven times among the beneficiaries, while 20 Saudi and Gulf-based businessmen and politicians were listed among the donors. Notable donors included Adel Batterjee, and Wael Hamza Julaidan. Batterjee was designated as a terror financier by the US Department of the Treasury in 2004, and Julaidan is recognized as one of Al-Qaeda's founders.

Documents seized during the 2002 Bosnia raid showed that Al-Qaeda widely exploited charities to channel financial and material support to its operatives across the globe. Notably, this activity exploited the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League (MWL). The IIRO had ties with Al-Qaeda associates worldwide, including Al-Qaeda's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri's brother worked for the IIRO in Albania and had actively recruited on behalf of Al-Qaeda.Emerson, Steve (2006). ''Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US''. Prometheus Books. p. 382. The MWL was openly identified by Al-Qaeda's leader as one of the three charities Al-Qaeda primarily relied upon for funding sources.

Allegations of Qatari support

Several Qatari citizens have been accused of funding Al-Qaeda. This includes Abd Al-Rahman al-Nuaimi, a Qatari citizen and a human-rights activist who founded the Swiss-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Alkarama. On December 18, 2013, the US Treasury designated Nuaimi as a terrorist for his activities supporting Al-Qaeda. The US Treasury has said Nuaimi "has facilitated significant financial support to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and served as an interlocutor between Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Qatar-based donors".

Nuaimi was accused of overseeing a $2million monthly transfer to Al-Qaeda in Iraq as part of his role as mediator between Iraq-based Al-Qaeda senior officers and Qatari citizens. Nuaimi allegedly entertained relationships with Abu-Khalid al-Suri, Al-Qaeda's top envoy in Syria, who processed a $600,000 transfer to Al-Qaeda in 2013. Nuaimi is also known to be associated with Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani, a Yemeni politician and founding member of Alkarama, who was listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the US Treasury in 2013. The US authorities claimed that Humayqani exploited his role in Alkarama to fundraise on behalf of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). A prominent figure in AQAP, Nuaimi was also reported to have facilitated the flow of funding to AQAP affiliates based in Yemen. Nuaimi was also accused of investing funds in the charity directed by Humayqani to ultimately fund AQAP. About ten months after being sanctioned by the US Treasury, Nuaimi was also restrained from doing business in the UK.

Another Qatari citizen, Kalifa Mohammed Turki Subayi, was sanctioned by the US Treasury on June 5, 2008, for his activities as a "Gulf-based Al-Qaeda financier". Subayi's name was added to the UN Security Council's Sanctions List in 2008 on charges of providing financial and material support to Al-Qaeda senior leadership. Subayi allegedly moved Al-Qaeda recruits to South Asia-based training camps. He also financially supported Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani national and senior Al-Qaeda officer who is believed to be the mastermind behind the September 11 attack according to the September 11 Commission report.

Qataris provided support to Al-Qaeda through the country's largest NGO, the Qatar Charity. Al-Qaeda defector al-Fadl, who was a former member of Qatar Charity, testified in court that Abdullah Mohammed Yusef, who served as Qatar Charity's director, was affiliated to Al-Qaeda and simultaneously to the National Islamic Front, a political group that gave Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden harbor in Sudan in the early 1990s.

It was alleged that in 1993 Bin Laden was using Middle East based Sunni charities to channel financial support to Al-Qaeda operatives overseas. The same documents also report Bin Laden's complaint that the failed assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had compromised the ability of Al-Qaeda to exploit charities to support its operatives to the extent it was capable of before 1995.

Qatar financed Al-Qaeda's enterprises through Al-Qaeda's former affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. The funding was primarily channeled through kidnapping for ransom. The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF) reported that the Gulf country has funded al-Nusra since 2013. In 2017, '' Asharq Al-Awsat'' estimated that Qatar had disbursed $25million in support of al-Nusra through kidnapping for ransom. In addition, Qatar has launched fundraising campaigns on behalf of al-Nusra. Al-Nusra acknowledged a Qatar-sponsored campaign "as one of the preferred conduits for donations intended for the group".

Strategy

In the disagreement over whether Al-Qaeda's objectives are religious or political, Mark Sedgwick describes Al-Qaeda's strategy as political in the immediate term but with ultimate aims that are religious.
On March 11, 2005, '' Al-Quds Al-Arabi'' published extracts from Saif al-Adel