2002 Venezuelan coup d%27%C3%A9tat attempt

A failed coup d'état on 11 April 2002 saw the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, ousted from office for 47 hours before being restored to power. Chávez was aided in his return to power by popular support and mobilization against the coup by loyal ranks in the military.Venezuela: por qué fracasó el golpe
/ref> Those who opposed Chávez claimed that his government was becoming undemocratic. By early 2002, Chávez's approval rating dropped to around 30%. The growing dissatisfaction with Chávez among those in the military due to his aggressive manner, and alliances with Cuba and paramilitaries also led multiple officers to call on Chávez to resign.

The situation began on 9 April, when a general strike was called by the trade union organization National Federation of Trade Unions (''Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela'', CTV). The proposed strike was in response to Chávez's appointments to prominent posts in Venezuela's national oil company, PDVSA. Two days later in Caracas, up to one million Venezuelans marched in opposition to Chávez. At one point during the march, opposition leaders redirected the protestors to the presidential palace, Miraflores, where government supporters and Bolivarian Circles were holding their own rally. Upon the opposition's arrival, the two sides confronted each other. A shootout started at the Llaguno Overpass, near the Miraflores Palace, and by that evening 19 people were dead, including both supporters and opponents of the government. The military high command refused Chávez's order to implement the '' Plan Ávila'', a plan first used by Carlos Andrés Pérez during the '' Caracazo'' that resulted in the killings of hundreds of Venezuelans, as a response to the protests and demanded him to resign. President Chávez was subsequently arrested by the military.Rey, J. C. (2002)
"Consideraciones políticas sobre un insólito golpe de Estado"
, pp. 1–16; cited in Cannon (2004:296); "In 2002, Venezuela's military and some of its business leaders ousted President Chavez from power and held him hostage." (N. Scott Cole (2007), "Hugo Chavez and President Bush's credibility gap: The struggle against US democracy promotion", ''International Political Science Review'', 28(4), p498) Chávez's request for asylum in Cuba was denied, and he was ordered to be tried in a Venezuelan court.

Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (''Fedecámaras'') president Pedro Carmona and the Supreme Court were both dissolved and the country's 1999 Constitution was declared void, pledged a return to the pre-1999 bicameral parliamentary system, parliamentary elections by December, presidential elections where he would not stand.Interim Venezuelan president sworn in.
BBC News. (13 April 2002). URL. Retrieved 30 May 2007 By the 13th, the coup was on the verge of collapse, as Carmona's attempts to entirely undo Chávez's reforms angered much of the public and key sectors of the military, while parts of the opposition movement also refused to back Carmona. In Caracas, Chávez supporters surrounded the presidential palace, seized television stations and demanded his return. Carmona resigned the same night. The pro-Chávez Presidential Guard retook Miraflores without firing a shot, leading to the removal of the Carmona government and the re-installation of Chávez as president.

Chávez initially denied allegations that the United States government sought to overthrow his government. It was later revealed that the US had prior knowledge of the coup attempt.Forero, Juan (3 December 2004)
"Documents Show C.I.A. Knew of a Coup Plot in Venezuela".
''The New York Times''. Retrieved 15 May 2014. However, the United States repeatedly informed the Venezuelan opposition that they would not be supported if there were a coup and warned the Chávez government of the plot. The private media was accused of biased reporting in support of the opposition protests and coup, with coverage being described as "lopsided", as well as "suppress dand manipulate .Maurice Lemoine, ''Le Monde Diplomatique'', 10 August 2002
"Venezuela's press power"
(Archived by WebCite at) Allegations that owners of media organizations actively participated in the coup have not been proven.

Background

Chávez was first elected president in 1998. One of his campaign promises was to convene a new constitutional convention, and on 15 December 1999 he put the new Constitution of Venezuela to the voters in a referendum, which passed with 71.78% of the popular vote. Following the 1999 constitutional referendum, Chávez was reelected in 2000 under the terms of the new constitution. Following these elections, Chávez had gained control of all formerly independent institutions of the Venezuelan government. The popularity of Chávez then dropped due to his clashes with multiple social groups he had alienated and his close ties with controversial world leaders such as Mohammad Khatami, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and especially Fidel Castro.

Chávez used a strategy of polarization in Venezuela, a them against us situation, in order to single out those who stood in the way of his progress. He would insult and use name calling against original supporters that would question him; the media, business leaders, the Catholic Church and the middle class. Such "words spawned hatred and polarization" with Chávez, "a master of language and communication", creating his own reality among Venezuelans. Nelson says that what hurt Chávez's popularity the most was his relationship with Fidel Castro and Cuba, with Chávez attempting to make Venezuela in Cuba's image. Venezuela became Cuba's largest trade partner while Chávez, following Castro's example, consolidated the country's bicameral legislature into a single National Assembly that gave him more power and created community groups of loyal supporters allegedly trained as paramilitaries. Such actions created great fear among Venezuelans who felt like they were tricked and that Chávez had dictatorial goals. This feeling of being tricked especially affected the media since they originally supported Chávez and his promises.

Opposition to the Chávez government was then particularly strong, with some of those who were previously in the government before the election of Chávez. The independent media became the primary check on Chávez after he had taken control of most of the Venezuelan government, with the Venezuelan media acting like other forms of media in Latin America at the time that demanded accountability for governmental abuses and exposing corruption. The opposition was worried with Chávez because they believed his rewriting Venezuela's constitution were signs that Chávez was trying to maintain power through authoritarianism. In early 2002, there were also increasing signs of discontent in the military; in February four military officials, including a general and a rear admiral, publicly called on Chávez to resign. On 7 February 2002 Venezuela Air Force Colonel Pedro Vicente Soto and National Reserve Captain Pedro Flores Rivero led a rally protesting the Chávez government's practices denounced as undemocratic and authoritarian. Rear Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo said on television that if Chávez did not resign, he should be impeached.

Social and business tension

Chávez's opposition originated from the response to the "cubanization" of Venezuela when mothers realized that the new textbooks in Venezuela were really Cuban books filled with revolutionary propaganda and with different covers causing them to protest. By the summer months of 2001, the opposition groups grew quickly from concerned mothers to labor unions, business interests, church groups, and right and leftwing political parties, who felt that they were being isolated.The Miami Herald, 20 April 2002 Saturday BR EDITION, Venezuelan defends his brief presidency; Denies conspiring against Chavez, BYLINE: FRANCES ROBLES [e-mail], SECTION: A; Pg. 1 At the same time, groups supporting Chávez became organized, especially among the poor, with their passion for Chávez bordering idolatry since he gave them hope and feeling of being valuable.

Enabling Law

In 2000, the pro-Chávez National Assembly granted President Chávez emergency powers and the ability to rule by decree through an enabling act to tend to the poor state of the economy. On 13 November 2001, Chávez passed a package of 49 laws, using the enabling act which was set to expire the following day such as rearranging public ministries while also changing major laws in the government, oil businesses and land usage without approval of the National Assembly. The laws "marked a turning point in public sentiment toward the president" with both Chávez supporters and critics outraged at the changes. The two decrees in particular sparked protest: a law aimed at strengthening government control over the oil company PDVSA and a more controversial land reform law, which included provisions for the expropriation of "idle" lands. Though the government stated that it would provide the previous owners with compensation at the going market rates, the land laws introduced by Chávez were so vaguely worded that the government could legally expropriate any property it wished to take. While some of the land was genuinely given to the vulnerable, much of it was used in a system of patronage for party members loyal to Chávez.

McCaughan described the 49 laws as the "''plus ultra non''", the "point of no return for Chávez's troubled relations with business, church and media leaders". For the opposition, such dramatic changes to the government proved to them that Chávez was a "dictator-in-training". Phil Gunson, ''Newsweek'', 11 November 2001
"Is Hugo Chávez Insane?"
/ref> On 10 December 2001, a national strike shut down 90% of the economy and was the largest strike in Venezuela's history, bigger than the strike that assisted with ending the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958. By January 2002, protests involving hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans opposing Chávez became common in Venezuela.

Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)

In March 2002, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company that acted autonomously and accounted for 70% of Venezuela's foreign revenue, was targeted by Chávez out of fear of the oppositions ability to call national strikes and was to receive strict control from the government. Chávez's attempts to end the functional independence of PDVSA were met with strong resistance from PDVSA officials and managers.

On 7 April, Chávez fired the President of PDVSA, Brigadier-General Guaicaipuro Lameda Montero and replaced him with a former Communist Party militant, in addition to firing another 5 of the 7 members of the PDVSA board of directors on his Aló Presidente program, mocking each worker by name and used a referee whistle, as if to expel them from a soccer match. Such actions by Chávez caused further opposition developments with a series of walkouts and work slowdowns followed.Margarita López Maya, "Venezuela 2002–2003: Polarization, Confrontation, and Violence", in Olivia Burlingame Goumbri, ''The Venezuela Reader'', Washington D.C., U.S.A., 2005, p. 14.

''The Washington Times'' then noted that Chávez had "choked off foreign investment by doubling the royalty payments oil companies must pay to the government and by restricting corporate ownership on some oil projects to 49 percent", and had "alienated workers at his country's state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, by replacing long-serving professionals with his supporters".''The Washington Times'', 25 April 2002, Thursday, Final Edition,
The fall and rise of Hugo Chavez
, SECTION: EDITORIALS; p. A18 By early 2002, Chávez's approval rating dropped to around 30%. This action, according to ''The Los Angeles Times'', "united all the anti-Chávez forces", bringing together union leader Carlos Ortega, head of the Confederation of Workers of Venezuela (''Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela,'' CTV for short in Spanish), with Pedro Carmona Estanga, head of Venezuela's main business federation, Fedecámaras, in a call for an "indefinite general strike" in support of oil workers.

Military

The existing military grew wary of Chávez due to his relationship with Fidel Castro and the Colombian guerrilla group FARC that they were previously taught "were the greatest threat to their country". The military felt that after fighting against Castro's influence, guerilla groups and attempts to overthrow previous Venezuelan governments to expand his revolutionary presence since the 1960s, that they had finally lost when Chávez came to power. Chávez promoted guerilla fighters into the Venezuelan military and forced the wary existing military servicemen to assist them. One of the more controversial actions that created discontent within the military was when Chávez forced them to assist the FARC with setting up camps in Venezuelan territories, providing ammunition to fight the Colombian government, supplying ID cards so they could move freely through Venezuela and sending members of Bolivarian Circles to their camps to receive guerilla training. The most controversial steps taken by Chávez was ordering the existing military to work with the Cuban military, with the Venezuelan military and intelligence agencies forced to open their bases, files and hard drives for their Cuban counterparts creating a sense of being betrayed by Chávez.

The "long-simmering resentment in the military" was articulated publicly by four high-level officers, including Air Force Gen. Roman Gomez Ruiz, who called on Chávez to "resign peacefully and take responsibility for your failure". Chávez responded by declaring these officers traitors, ordering their arrest, and forcing their resignations. ''The Chicago Tribune'' later reported that although the Venezuelan general public was unaware of it, the country's oil industry was approaching the end of a six-week work slowdown and Chávez's government and oil executives had agreed that members of an oil board picked by Chávez would resign. "But labor and business leaders, who had joined in secret with dissident military officers in an effort to oust Chávez, decided that the moment had come to press on", the newspaper maintained. "The middle-class intellectuals and professionals who had at first delighted in Chávez's talk of restoring 'national honor, Sandra Hernandez later observed in ''The Los Angeles Times'', "watched in dismay as Chávez's supporters formed 'Bolivarian circles', muscle groups that intimidated government opponents with threats of physical harm". During the year or so preceding the coup, Chávez "essentially thumbed his nose" at his opponents, claimed a political consultant.''Los Angeles Times'' 22 April 2002 Monday, "Rapid-Fire Coup Caught Chavez Foes Off Guard", BYLINE: HECTOR TOBAR, PATRICK J. McDONNELL, PAUL RICHTER, TIMES STAFF WRITERS, SECTION: PART A; Part 1; Foreign Desk; p. 1 Many opponents of Chávez felt that his behavior was self-destructive and that he would end up "los ngpower through constitutional means via the Supreme Court or the parliament".''The Washington Times'' 19 April 2002, Friday, Final Edition, BYLINE: By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, Section: Nation; Inside the Ring; p. A09 Nonetheless, according to ''The New York Times'', "discontented military officers had been meeting among themselves and with business leaders for almost a year to discuss ways to oust Mr. Chávez".The New York Times 20 April 2002 Saturday, Venezuela's 2 Fateful Days: Leader Is Out, and in Again, BYLINE: By LARRY ROHTER, SECTION: Section A; Column 3; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1 These military officers "said they would pick the leader", one officer said, because "They did not want to be called a military junta, but they wanted to make sure that at least one military person was on the transitional board."''

Opposition

Details surrounding a potential coup were openly discussed in the Venezuela for months before the attempted ousting. "The rumors of a coup to oust Chávez", noted ''The Miami Herald'', "were being whispered, if not shouted, for months before the revolt". Writing about the run-up to the coup, Letta Tayler of ''Newsweek'' observed that " e of the few certainties" about it was "that military, business, union and civic leaders had been plotting Chávez's downfall for nearly two years".''Newsday'' (New York) 24 April 2002 Wednesday NASSAU AND SUFFOLK EDITION, "Peace Kept, for Now; In Venezuela, anarchy threatens at any moment", BYLINE: By Letta Tayler; LATIN AMERICA CORRESPONDENT, SECTION: NEWS, p. A06 According to former United States Ambassador to Venezuela, Charles S. Shapiro, the United States had known about a potential coup since late 2001 and that weeks before the coup, he had attempted to dissuade Venezuelan trade union organization from participating, saying the United States would not support such actions and would only accept the change of government by electoral means.

''The Guardian'' reported that as early as 18 March 2002 that "Chávez was saying that he was aware of a plot" to overthrow him, and that in the days before 11 April, "the political temperature was approaching boiling point", with oil workers striking "in protest at Chávez's appointments to their board" and the media accelerating its criticisms of the regime.''The Guardian'' (London), 22 April 2002, G2: "The coup": BYLINE: Duncan Campbell, SECTION: G2; p. 2 ''The Chicago Tribune'' reported that there had been rumors in Caracas "for weeks" about a coup, with military figures like Navy Vice Adm. Carlos Molina and Air Force Col. Pedro Soto "building support ... in the armed forces" for a coup.''Chicago Tribune'', 18 April 2002 Thursday, "Chavez's resolve, foes' mistakes doomed coup", BYLINE: By Patrice M. Jones, Tribune foreign correspondent, SECTION: NEWS; ZONE: N; Pg. 7 Hernandez claimed that in early April, "the coming coup ... was an open secret". On 9 April, retired Gen. Manuel Andara Clavier, one of many retired military officials who opposed Chávez, reportedly told her, "The table is set. ... Everything is set for the military to let the president know he can't push this country to spill blood."''Los Angeles Times'', 21 April 2002 Sunday
"He's In, He's Out, He's In"
BYLINE: SANDRA HERNANDEZ, SECTION: OPINION; Part M; p. 1

Government

On 7 April, the same day that President Chávez fired the PDVSA officials, Chávez met with his cabinet and high level military officials and began the meeting calling the actions by the opposition "treasonous" and asked those gathered how to counteract such actions. Soon discussions arose on how to defend Miraflores Palace. There were recommendations declaring a state of emergency, beginning the censorship of television and declaring martial law. Chávez then began to discuss Plan Ávila with Manuel Rosendo, the head of the Unified Command of the National Armed Forces, and how to implement it, though the military command did not accept it.

The Tactical Command, headed by Cilia Flores, Guillermo García Ponce and Freddy Bernal (mayor of the Libertador Municipality), then shared plans of using the Bolivarian Circles as a paramilitary force to end marches and also defend Chávez by organizing them into brigades. Another plan was to have the National Guard raid the offices of PDVSA in Chuao and occupy the company by force. They also discussed launching a disinformation propaganda campaign on public and private television and having government loyalists fill the highways with their vehicles and then present the images on TV as if people were busy working like any other day. In another plan to end the strike, Gastón Parra, the president of PDVSA, suggested to give bonuses to PDVSA employees who chose not to participate in the strike.

In a 9 April discussion between Finance Minister General Francisco Usón and General Jacinto Pérez, Pérez believed that the Bolivarian Revolution was in a crisis and needed to "rejuvenate itself". Pérez then stated that the Bolivarian Revolution need had to be "purified with blood", which concerned Usón since Pérez "had the president’s ear". Both discussions outraged generals since they believed that the Venezuelan government was proposing violence against the public with General Rosendo stating that it seemed that "Chávez actually wanted a confrontation, that he had picked the fight with PDVSA in order to precipitate a crisis".

Shortly before the coup attempt, Alí Rodríguez Araque, a former guerrilla and Chávez ally then serving in Vienna as the General Secretary of OPEC, allegedly heard of a potential oil embargo against the United States by Iraq and Libya, over US support for Israel. Rodríguez Araque told Chávez that the United States could prod a coup to prevent any threat of an embargo. The advice led Chávez to declare that he would not join such an embargo, and to secretly hide several hundred troops in Miraflores' underground corridors, commanded by José Baduel. Greg Palast, ''The Guardian'', 13 May 2002
Opec chief warned Chavez about coup
/ref>

Strikes

On 10 December, the opposition organised a one-day general strike, which was substantially effective. Newspapers, workplaces, schools and the stock exchange closed, although shops in poorer neighborhoods remained open. On 5 April 2002, the PDVSA opposition to Chávez moved to shut down the company. Thousands of opposition PDVSA employees, and two of the five main export terminals were paralyzed. On 6 April the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) trade union federation announced a 24-hour general strike for 9 April, to support the PDVSA protestors. It was joined the following day by Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce, headed by Pedro Carmona petroleum union. On 7 April, during the transmission of the television program Aló Presidente, started naming the PDVSA executives that announced the strike, mockingly blew a referee whistle, and proceeded to announced their dismissal. He fired seven executives forced another 12 into retirement. Tensions continued to escalate through March and early April.

Days after the firing of PDVSA heads, on 9 April, the general strike was moderately successful and oil production slowed. Newspapers were not published and television stations cancelled regular programming and commercials to run continuous coverage of the strike, including the stations' own opposition ads. The strike organizers declared it a success, which the government disputed, and in an effort to show its version of events, ordered a series of ''cadenas'' (mandatory government broadcasts), showing daily life continuing (over 30 cadenas on 8 and 9 AprilU.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 31 March 200
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002
Retrieved 4 August 2006.). On the evening of 9 April, the strike was extended for another 24 hours.

On 10 April, the strike was less effective, with many schools and businesses re-opening. As with the previous day, television provided continuous coverage, and the government intervened with cadenas – but this time the networks split the screen, showing the cadena on one side and their coverage of the strike on the other. On the evening of 10 April, Fedecámaras and CTV held televised news conference announcing that the strike would be extended indefinitely, unanimously voted for a "coordinating committee for democracy and liberty" in order to "rescue Venezuela's freedom". The opposition then called for a march to the PDVSA headquarters the following day. In the National Assembly, those close to Chávez stated that Chávez wanted "moderation", though if an unlimited general strike were to occur from the opposition, an "unspecified 'violence will occur. Brigadier General Néstor González appeared on television to demand Chávez's resignation and to issue an ultimatum.

11 April march

The crisis that triggered the coup came when "workers and business leaders", infuriated by Chávez's "meddling in the state oil company", as the ''Chicago Tribune'' put it, joined in "calling for a general strike that cut exports" in support of striking oil workers.''Chicago Tribune'', 16 April 2002 Tuesday, "Military played crucial roles in Chavez's ouster, return", BYLINE: By Patrice M. Jones, Tribune Foreign Correspondent, SECTION: NEWS; ZONE: N; p. 3 The strike began, according to ''The Washington Post'', "as a managerial protest at the state-run oil company, but evolved into a broad effort supported by the country's largest business and labor groups to force Chávez from power."''The Washington Post'', 13 April 2002 Saturday, "Leader of Venezuela Is Forced to Resign; Ex-Oil Executive Takes Office as Interim President", BYLINE: Scott Wilson, Washington Post Foreign Service, SECTION: A SECTION; p. A01 After days of general strikes and protests involving thousands of Venezuelans, on 10 April, a speech was held at the CTV headquarters, where CTV and Fedecámaras held speeches that involved a Brigadier General denouncing Chávez's alleged involvement with FARC, and the announcement of a march the next day with the possibility of an indefinite strike. The march on 11 April was to begin at 9:00am, starting at Parque del Este and ending at the PDVSA headquarters.

On 11 April, just hours before an operation to take over the PDVSA by force was to begin, General Rosendo, knowing the consequences of such an action, talked Chávez out of the plan. Later that day, hundreds of thousands to millions of Venezuelans marched to the PDVSA headquarters later that day to protest against the recent dismissal of the management board.''Newsweek'', 29 April 2002
Hugo's Close Call
/ref> Once at the headquarters, those present at the rally began to chant "To Miraflores! To Miraflores! To Miraflores!", in reference to the Miraflores Presidential Palace. In response, Carlos Ortega declared: "This human river is now going to Miraflores to ask for your resignation", referring to Chávez. The National Guard would later repress the concentration in Chuao and, equipped with firearms, would confront the demonstrators in the vicinity of the Miraflores Palace.

Llaguno Overpass events

Close to Miraflores, a line of police and National Guard held the marchers for a time, before the marchers pressed. Chavistas belonging to Bolivarian Circles, some with that had military training in Cuba, were also stationed outside of Miraflores. The Circles had been positioned outside of the palace throughout the week during the unrest. Government officials used the hours it took for the march to travel to the palace to call on loyalists to gather at Miraflores. National Assembly Deputy Juan Barreto told loyalists through the media covering the situation "The call is to Miraflores! Everyone to Miraflores to defend your revolution! Don't let them through!" Some government supporters, who began to gather then, were armed with Molotov cocktails, rocks, sticks, chains, baseball bats, and metal pipes, and were ignored by the Venezuelan National Guard stationed to defend Chávez. According to General Rosendo, Defense Minister José Vicente Rangel ordered Freddy Bernal to prepare the Bolivarian Circles to attack the opposition demonstration.

At about 12:00pm, Chávez knew the march was on its way and he called for the implementation of a military plan to occupy key locations in the city, Plan Ávila, the plan first used by Carlos Andrés Pérez during the '' Caracazo'' that resulted in the killings of hundreds and possibly thousands of Venezuelans. Gott, Richard (2005),
Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution
', Verso Books, p225 This caused discomfort among some in the military, since they knew that Chávez was violating the constitution he helped create by ordering High Command to have the military control civilians.

By 12:30 pm, thousands of government supporters were gathered around the palace blocking all routes to Miraflores except for the Llaguno Overpass, which was where the Bolivarian Circles had gathered to overlook the route. As the march turned a corner and began to approach the Miraflores at about 2:00 pm, the National Guard fired about twelve tear gas canisters from behind the palace walls and the protesters fled back down the road. The protesters made it closer to Miraflores and the Presidential Guard responded with more tear gas. About 20 gas canisters caused panic and a dispersion of the demonstrators to areas surrounding the palace.

Since other routes were blocked by the National Guard, many marchers began to head down Baralt Avenue in order to reach Miraflores. On Baralt Avenue, near the Llaguno Overpass as the march inched closer hundreds of Chávez supporters gathered and began throwing large rocks, Molotov cocktails and even tear gas at the demonstrators. As marchers and Chavistas clashed, the Metropolitan Police attempted to separate both sides from further confrontation with two trucks with water cannons.

A few minutes after Chávez's broadcast at 3:45 pm, gunfire erupted again and the march began to disperse slightly. As the demonstrators marched closer to the Llaguno Overpass, they could see Chavistas heavily armed, some with pistols. Police began to disperse the Chavista gunmen returning fire and few demonstrators began to follow behind them with pings of gunfire heard on the police armored vehicles, though the marchers fled shortly after as the violence grew. According to medical staff at the Vargas Hospital, the first to arrive at the hospital were opposition marchers. According to surgeons, the marchers had been shot in the back with handgun fire while fleeing and others were severely injured from 7.62×51mm NATO military rounds from Fal rifles, standard equipment of the National Guard defending Chávez. Later after police responded to pro-Chávez shooting, Chávez supporters then began being seen injured in the hospitals. As a result of the confrontations, 19 were left dead, most killed between 3:20 pm and 3:55 pm, and over 150 injured.

Coup

Plan Ávila and military insubordination

Immediately after Chávez finished his broadcast at 5:25pm he changed into his military fatigues and grabbed his rifle and pistol, worrying about rebels entering the palace. Chávez believed that the best way to stay in power was to implement Plan Ávila, a constitutionally banned military contingency plan that was created to maintain public order in Caracas that left hundreds to thousands of Venezuelans dead during the Caracazo. Since General Rosendo would not comply earlier in the day with Chávez's order to implement Plan Ávila, Chávez went directly to General Jorge García Carneiro, one of his most trusted generals and ordered him to go through with it. "The killings at the anti-Chávez demonstration rocked the country", ''The New York Times'' reported on 20 April, "reviving memories of the violent events in 1989, known as the Caracazo, in which hundreds were killed by government forces. Venezuelans across the political spectrum swore that such violence would never take place again."

Shortly after 6:00pm, word spread at Fort Tiuna that Chávez-loyalist General Carneiro was still seeking to implement Plan Ávila. Head of the army General Efraín Vásquez Velasco was meeting at the Army School with other officers concerned about Chávez's use of violence when Chávez ordered General Carneiro, one of Vásquez Velasco's subordinates, to go ahead with Plan Ávila. Vásquez Velasco, who founded the Office of Human Rights of the Venezuelan Army, knew that if the plan were implemented that he would be blamed since he was the head of the army. Soon after, General Vásquez Velasco learned that General Carneiro did not comply with his orders and was sending about 20 tanks to Miraflores to support Chávez. Vásquez Velasco called the tank commander ordering him to return with the commander complying with the general. General Vásquez Velasco then ordered a nationwide military lockdown with military movements requiring written documentation and approval, a move by Vásquez Velasco that was to prevent troops loyal to Chávez from suppressing the march and would also deter rebellious attacks from the military against Chávez. Vásquez Velasco then ordered the Chávez-loyalist General Carneiro be arrested before he could arrest the other officers under Chávez's orders, but Carneiro complied with Vásquez Velasco.

At 6:30, leaders of business and labor pulled their support from Chávez and by 6:45 pm, "Navy Chief of Staff Vice Adm. Hector Ramirez Perez and nine other generals and admirals who had been talking since July about pressuring Chávez into changing his ways decided to rebel and go public", according to ''The Miami Herald''.''The Miami Herald'', 13 April 2002 Saturday F1 EDITION, "Former President Hugo Chavez was under detention in an army...", BYLINE: JUAN O. TAMAYO [e-mail], SECTION: A; Pg. 1 "Even many military officers who were neutral in their feelings about Chávez were persuaded to turn against the president after Thursday's massacre", ''The Chicago Tribune'' later reported. "Soon press conferences flooded the airwaves as dozens of officers, more than 50 in all, denounced the president."

At around 7:30 pm, Venevisión began broadcasting its version of events that afternoon, showing the Chavistas firing from Puente Llaguno, juxtaposed with footage of dead or wounded protesters, saying that the Chavistas planned an ambush and shot unarmed opposition protestors. This showed General Vásquez Velasco and other generals that Chávez had ordered the Bolivarian Circles to attack opposition marchers. The military officers, including General Raúl Baduel, a founder of Chávez's MBR-200, then decided that they had to pull support from Chávez to deter another massacre and shortly after at 8:00 pm, Vásquez Velasco, together with other ranking army officers, declared that Chávez had lost his support. This was followed by heads of the Venezuelan Air Force and Navy, with Chávez then losing power of the military. By 8:30 pm, Luis Miquilena, Chávez's mentor and a respected individual among his government being described as "the most important civilian who supported the Chávez government" pulled his support from Chávez stating, "I solemnly declare that it is very difficult that a government of this nature could ever count on the possibility of help on my part ... (the government) had ended up stained in blood". Following this, Chávez had also lost the support of the legislative and judicials branches who supported Miquilena.

Infuriated by the slaughter but "reluctant to stage an outright coup", according to ''The New York Times'', a group of military officers who called themselves the "Movement for the Integrity and Dignity of the National Armed Forces" demanded on Thursday evening that Chávez resign. In a statement, they declared that they had no longer had "recognition" of Chávez, whom they accused of "betraying the trust of the people" and held responsible for the deaths of peaceful protesters. The statement was read at a press conference by Vice Adm. Hector Ramirez Perez, chief of staff of the Venezuelan Navy and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and signed by a number of other officers, including 10 senior officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force and National Guard,The Miami Herald

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