The Raft and the Pyramid
The development of virtue epistemology was partly inspired by a recent renewal of interest in virtue concepts among moral philosophers, and partly as a response to the intractability of competing analyses of knowledge in response to Edmund Gettier. Ernest Sosa introduced the notion of an intellectual virtue into contemporary epistemological discussion in a 1980 paper called "The Raft and the Pyramid".Sosa, Ernest. "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge." ''Midwest Studies in Philosophy'' 5, (1980): 3–25. Sosa argued that an appeal to intellectual virtue could resolve the conflict between foundationalists and coherentists over the structure of epistemic justification. Sosa sought to bridge the gap and create a unity between these two different epistemological theories.Theory
Virtue epistemology replaces formulaic expressions for apprehending knowledge, such as "S knows that p", by amending these formulas with virtue theory applied to intellect, where virtue then becomes the fulcrum for assessing potential candidates of "knowledge". This substitution raises problems of its own, however. If the same uncertainty about accuracy in creating a formula for testing knowledge equally applies to the authenticity of virtue, then one cannot know if the target virtue is credible. Some virtue epistemologists use reliabilism as a basis for belief justification, stressing reliable functioning of the intellect.Greco, J. "Agent Reliabilism." J. Tomberlin (ed.) ''Philosophical Perspectives'' 13,(1999): 273–96.Greco, J. ''Putting Skeptics in their Place'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. The ideas put forth in the area of virtue epistemology are consistent with some of the ideas present inVarieties
Virtue epistemologists differ in the role they believe virtue to play: eliminative virtue epistemology uses the concepts of intellectual virtue and intellectual vice to do away with epistemic concepts like knowledge and justification, while non-eliminative virtue epistemology gives a role for such traditional concepts and uses virtue to provide substantive explanation of those concepts. Virtue epistemologists differ in what they believe epistemic virtues to be. Some accounts are Aristotelian, drawing a relationship between intellectual virtue and character in a similar way to the way moral virtue is related to character, while "weak" virtue epistemology have an account that doesn't require any particular commitment or cultivation of intellectual virtue. Abrol Fairweather argues that these "weak" virtue epistemologists "merely sevirtue theory as a novel lexicon for expressing an independent epistemic theory". Another way of describing the differences in virtue epistemology is to say that there are two concurrent modes of thought in contemporary virtue epistemology, with one side favoring the "virtue reliabilist" account of virtues as reliably functioning cognitive faculties, and one favoring a "virtue responsibilist" account in which the responsible epistemic conduct of the agent plays a key role.Virtue reliabilism
The virtue reliabilist takes the approach that the process wherebyVirtue responsibilism
In virtue responsibilism, the emphasis is not on faculties such as perception and memory. Instead, certain intellectual character traits are valued as more virtuous than others. These can be creativity, inquisitiveness, rational rigor, honesty, or a number of other possibilities. Generally, these theories are normative in nature. A few different approaches are taken. Some, such as Lorraine Code, think that intellectual virtues involve having the correct cognitive character and epistemic relation to the world rooted in a social context. She sees the acquisition of correct knowledge about the world as the primary "good", and the end towards which our intellectual efforts should be oriented, with the desire for truth as the primary motivating factor for our epistemological virtues.Code, Lorraine. ''Epistemic Responsibility'', Hanover, NH: University Press of New England for Brown University Press, 1987. James Montmarquet's theory of intellectual virtue is similar to Code's, but specifically defines additional intellectual virtues in order to defuse the potential dogmatism or fanaticism that is compatible with Code's desire for truth. The primary virtue is conscientiousness, which focuses on the correct end of intellectual living. In order to obtain conscientiousness, it is important to maintain impartiality, sobriety, and courage.Montmarquet, J.A. ''Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility'', Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski has proposed a neo-Aristotelian model of virtue epistemology, emphasizing the role of ''phronesis'' (practical wisdom) as an architectonic virtue unifying moral and intellectual virtues even more radically than Aristotle proposed.Zagzebski, Linda. "Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth.", in ''Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology''. eds. M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski, 135–54, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. As delineated in her model, the virtues are "a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end." As she sees it, the "characteristic motivation" of an intellectual virtue is the desire for truth, understanding, and other species of cognitive contact with reality. The notion of "reliable success" is invoked in order to avoid issues of well-intentioned but unsuccessful agents who desire truth but use poorly suited methods to pursue it.Plantinga's theory of warrant
Jonathan Kvanvig's understanding and assertion
In Jonathan Kvanvig's essay, ''Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?: Meno Problems and Epistemological Axiology'' he asserts that epistemology has no place in philosophical study. The value of knowledge originates from the Socratic dialogue written by Plato calledPotential advantages
Some varieties of virtue epistemology that contain normative elements, such as virtue responsibilism, can provide a unified framework of normativity and value. Others, such as Sosa's account, can circumvent Cartesian skepticism with the necessity of externalism interacting with internalism. In this same vein, and because of the inherent flexibility and social nature of some of types of virtue epistemology, social conditioning and influence can be understood within an epistemological framework and explored. This flexibility and connection between internal and external makes virtue epistemology more accessible.Zagzebski, Linda (1998, 2005). Virtue epistemology. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved May 01, 2008, from http://0-www.rep.routledge.com.csulib.ctstateu.edu:80/article/P057SECT3 (requires member login)Prominent criticism
Recent criticism of virtue epistemology has focused upon its characterization of human cognition as grounded in stable character dispositions (e.g. the disposition to use reliable faculties, or one's excellent character traits construed as dispositions). As discussed by a parallel criticism leveled at virtue ethics, virtue theories, whether moral or epistemic, typically consider character traits as stable across time, and efficacious as explanatory reasons for persons behaving and thinking as they do. However, this supposition has been challenged by the "situationist critique" in psychology, which argues that human epistemic character changes depending on context, even when that change is epistemically irrelevant. Thus, irrelevant differences in a situation can prompt a drastic change in cognitive behavior. Reliabilists might characterize this as effecting a drop in reliable functioning, whereas responsibilists would see these variations as negating one's excellent cognitive character. It is therefore argued that virtue theorists should either amend their conception of human psychology to accommodate this or explain how the results of situationist psychological research do not contradict their theory.References
Selected bibliography
*Aquino, Frederick D. ''Communities of Informed Judgment: Newman's Illative Sense and Accounts of Rationality.'' Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004. *Axtell, Guy, ed. ''Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Contemporary Virtue.'' Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. *_____. "Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues." In ''Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility,'' ed. *Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, 158-77. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. *Blackburn, Simon. "Reason, Virtue, and Knowledge." In ''Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility,'' ed. Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, 15-29. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. *Bonjour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. ''Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues.'' Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. *Brady, Michael and Duncan Pritchard. "Moral and Epistemic Virtues." In ''Moral and Epistemic Virtues,'' ed. Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard, 1-12. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003. *Dalmiya, Vrinda. "Why Should a Knower Care?" ''Hypatia'' 17, no. 1 (2002): 34-52. *Fairweather, Abrol. "Epistemic Motivation." In ''Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility,'' ed. Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, 63-81. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. *Goldman, Alvin I. "The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues." In ''Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility,'' ed. Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, 30-48. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. *Hibbs, Thomas S. "Aquinas, Virtue, and Recent Epistemology." ''The Review of Metaphysics'' 52, no. 3 (1999): 573-594. *Hookway, Christopher. "How to be a Virtue Epistemologist." In ''Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,'' ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, 183-202. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. *Kawall, Jason. "Other-regarding Epistemic Virtues." ''Ratio'' XV 3 (2002): 257-275. *Lehrer, Keith. "The Virtue of Knowledge." In ''Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility,'' ed. Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, 200-213. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. *McKinnon, Christine. "Knowing Cognitive Selves." In ''Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,'' ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, 227-254. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. *Moros, Enrique R. and Richard J. Umbers. "Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in Virtue Epistemology." ''The Southern Journal of Philosophy'' XLII, (2004): 61-85. *Riggs, Wayne D. "Understanding 'Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding." In ''Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,'' ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, 203-226. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. *Roberts, Robert C. and W. Jay Wood. "Humility and Epistemic Goods." In ''Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology'', ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, 257-279. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. *Sosa, Ernest. "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge." ''Midwest Studies in Philosophy'' 5, (1980): 3-25. *_____. "For the Love of Truth?" In ''Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility,'' ed. Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, 49-62. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. *_____. "The Place of Truth in Epistemology." In ''Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,'' ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, 155-179. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. *Wood, W. Jay. ''Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous.'' Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998. *Zagzebski, Linda. ''Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.'' Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. *_____. "Must Knowers Be Agents?" In ''Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility,'' ed. Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, 142-157. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. *_____. "The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good." In ''Moral and Epistemic Virtues,'' ed. Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard, 13-28. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003. *_____. "Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth." In ''Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,'' ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, 135-154. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. *_____, and Abrol Fairweather. "Introduction." In ''Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility,'' ed. Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, 3-14. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. *_____, and Michael DePaul. "Introduction." In ''Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,'' ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, 1-12. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.External links
* * * * {{Authority control Justification (epistemology) Epistemological theories Virtue ethics Internalism and externalism