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In philosophy, physicalism is the
metaphysical Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental nature of reality, the first principles of being, identity and change, space and time, causality, necessity, and possibility. It includes questions about the nature of conscio ...
thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. Physicalism is a form of ontological
monism Monism attributes oneness or singleness (Greek: μόνος) to a concept e.g., existence. Various kinds of monism can be distinguished: * Priority monism states that all existing things go back to a source that is distinct from them; e.g., i ...
—a "one substance" view of the nature of
reality Reality is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent within a system, as opposed to that which is only imaginary. The term is also used to refer to the ontological status of things, indicating their existence. In physical terms, r ...
as opposed to a "two-substance" ( dualism) or "many-substance" ( pluralism) view. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated. Physicalism is closely related to materialism. Physicalism grew out of materialism with advancements of the
physical science Physical science is a branch of natural science that studies non-living systems, in contrast to life science. It in turn has many branches, each referred to as a "physical science", together called the "physical sciences". Definition Phy ...
s in explaining observed phenomena. The terms are often used interchangeably, although they are sometimes distinguished, for example on the basis of physics describing more than just matter (including energy and physical law). According to a 2009 survey, physicalism is the majority view among philosophers, but there remains significant opposition to physicalism.
Neuroplasticity Neuroplasticity, also known as neural plasticity, or brain plasticity, is the ability of neural networks in the brain to change through growth and reorganization. It is when the brain is rewired to function in some way that differs from how it p ...
has been used as an argument in support of a non-physicalist view. The
philosophical zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a hypothetical being that is physically identical to and indistinguishable from a normal person but does not have conscious experience, qual ...
argument is another attempt to challenge physicalism. Alternatively, outside of philosophy, physicalism could also refer to the preference or viewpoint that
physics Physics is the natural science that studies matter, its fundamental constituents, its motion and behavior through space and time, and the related entities of energy and force. "Physical science is that department of knowledge which r ...
should be considered the best and only way to render truth about the world or
reality Reality is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent within a system, as opposed to that which is only imaginary. The term is also used to refer to the ontological status of things, indicating their existence. In physical terms, r ...
.


Definition of physicalism in philosophy

The word "physicalism" was introduced into philosophy in the 1930s by
Otto Neurath Otto Karl Wilhelm Neurath (; 10 December 1882 – 22 December 1945) was an Austrian-born philosopher of science, sociologist, and political economist. He was also the inventor of the ISOTYPE method of pictorial statistics and an innovator in mu ...
and Rudolf Carnap. The use of "physical" in physicalism is a philosophical concept and can be distinguished from alternative definitions found in the literature (e.g. Karl Popper defined a physical proposition to be one which can at least in theory be denied by observation). A "physical property", in this context, may be a metaphysical or logical combination of properties which are physical in the ordinary sense. It is common to express the notion of "metaphysical or logical combination of properties" using the notion of
supervenience In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Some examples include: * Whether t ...
: A property ''A'' is said to supervene on a property ''B'' if any change in ''A'' necessarily implies a change in ''B''. Since any change in a combination of properties must consist of a change in at least one component property, we see that the combination does indeed supervene on the individual properties. The point of this extension is that physicalists usually suppose the existence of various abstract concepts which are non-physical in the ordinary sense of the word; so physicalism cannot be defined in a way that denies the existence of these abstractions. Also, physicalism defined in terms of supervenience does not entail that all properties in the actual world are type identical to physical properties. It is, therefore, compatible with
multiple realizability Multiple realizability, in the philosophy of mind, is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. Philosophers of mind have used multiple realizability to argue ...
. From the notion of supervenience, we see that, assuming that mental, social, and biological properties supervene on physical properties, it follows that two hypothetical worlds cannot be identical in their physical properties but differ in their mental, social or biological properties. Two common approaches to defining "physicalism" are the theory-based and object-based approaches. The theory-based conception of physicalism proposes that "a property is physical if and only if it either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about". Likewise, the object-based conception claims that "a property is physical if and only if: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents". Physicalists have traditionally opted for a "theory-based" characterization of the physical either in terms of current physics, or a future (ideal) physics. These two theory-based conceptions of the physical represent both horns of
Hempel's dilemma It has relevance to naturalism and physicalism in philosophy, and to philosophy of mind. Overview Physicalism, in at least one rough sense, is the claim that the entire world may be described and explained using the laws of nature, in other w ...
(named after the late philosopher of science and logical empiricist
Carl Gustav Hempel Carl Gustav "Peter" Hempel (January 8, 1905 – November 9, 1997) was a German writer, philosopher, logician, and epistemologist. He was a major figure in logical empiricism, a 20th-century movement in the philosophy of science. He is esp ...
): an argument against theory-based understandings of the physical. Very roughly, Hempel's dilemma is that if we define the physical by reference to current physics, then physicalism is very likely to be false, as it is very likely (by pessimistic meta-induction) that much of current physics is false. But if we instead define the physical in terms of a future (ideal) or completed physics, then physicalism is hopelessly vague or indeterminate. While the force of Hempel's dilemma against theory-based conceptions of the physical remains contested, alternative "non-theory-based" conceptions of the physical have also been proposed. Frank Jackson (1998) for example, has argued in favour of the aforementioned "object-based" conception of the physical. An objection to this proposal, which Jackson himself noted in 1998, is that if it turns out that panpsychism or
panprotopsychism In the philosophy of mind, panpsychism () is the view that the mind or a mindlike aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. It is also described as a theory that "the mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists thr ...
is true, then such a non-materialist understanding of the physical gives the counterintuitive result that physicalism is, nevertheless, also true since such properties will figure in a complete account of paradigmatic examples of the physical. David Papineau and Barbara Montero have advanced and subsequently defended a "via negativa" characterization of the physical. The gist of the via negativa strategy is to understand the physical in terms of what it is not: the mental. In other words, the via negativa strategy understands the physical as "the non-mental". An objection to the via negativa conception of the physical is that (like the object-based conception) it doesn't have the resources to distinguish
neutral monism Neutral monism is an umbrella term for a class of metaphysical theories in the philosophy of mind. These theories reject the dichotomy of mind and matter, believing the fundamental nature of reality to be neither mental nor physical; in other words ...
(or panprotopsychism) from physicalism. Further, Restrepo (2012) argues that this conception of the physical makes core non-physical entities of non-´physicalist metaphysics, like God, Cartesian souls and abstract numbers, physical and thus either false or trivially true: "God is non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable as the thing that created the universe. Sup- posing emergentism is true, non-physical emergent properties are non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable as non-linear effects of certain arrangements of matter. The immaterial Cartesian soul is non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable as one of the things that interact causally with certain particles (coincident with the pineal gland). The Platonic number eight is non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable as the number of planets orbiting the Sun".


Supervenience-based definitions of physicalism

Adopting a
supervenience In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Some examples include: * Whether t ...
-based account of the physical, the definition of physicalism as "all properties are physical" can be unraveled to: 1) Physicalism is
true True most commonly refers to truth, the state of being in congruence with fact or reality. True may also refer to: Places * True, West Virginia, an unincorporated community in the United States * True, Wisconsin, a town in the United States * ...
at a possible world ''w'' if and only if any world that is a physical duplicate of ''w'' is also a duplicate of ''w simpliciter''.See Jackson, 1998 Applied to the actual world (our world), statement 1 above is the claim that physicalism is true at the actual world if and only if at ''every possible world'' in which the physical properties and laws of the actual world are instantiated, the non-physical (in the ordinary sense of the word) properties of the actual world are instantiated as well. To borrow a metaphor from
Saul Kripke Saul Aaron Kripke (; November 13, 1940 – September 15, 2022) was an American philosopher and logician in the analytic tradition. He was a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and em ...
(1972), the truth of physicalism at the actual world entails that once God has instantiated or "fixed" the physical properties and laws of our world, then God's work is done; the rest comes "automatically". Unfortunately, statement 1 fails to capture even a necessary condition for physicalism to be true at a world ''w''. To see this, imagine a world in which there are ''only'' physical properties—if physicalism is true at any world it is true at this one. But one can conceive physical duplicates of such a world that are ''not'' also duplicates simpliciter of it: worlds that have the same physical properties as our imagined one, but with some additional property or properties. A world might contain "
epiphenomenal ectoplasm In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Some examples include: * Whether ...
", some additional pure experience that does not interact with the physical components of the world and is not necessitated by them (does not supervene on them). To handle the epiphenomenal ectoplasm problem, statement 1 can be modified to include a "that's-all" or "totality" clause or be restricted to "positive" properties. Adopting the former suggestion here, we can reformulate statement 1 as follows: 2) Physicalism is true at a possible world ''w'' if and only if any world that is a ''minimal'' physical duplicate of ''w'' is a duplicate of ''w simpliciter''. Applied in the same way, statement 2 is the claim that physicalism is true at a possible world ''w'' if and only if any world that is a physical duplicate of ''w'' (without any further changes), is duplicate of ''w'' without qualification. This allows a world in which there are only physical properties to be counted as one at which physicalism is true, since worlds in which there is some extra stuff are ''not'' "minimal" physical duplicates of such a world, nor are they minimal physical duplicates of worlds that contain some non-physical properties that are metaphysically necessitated by the physical. But while statement 2 overcomes the problem of worlds at which there is some extra stuff (sometimes referred to as the "epiphenomenal ectoplasm problem") it faces a different challenge: the so-called "blockers problem". Imagine a world where the relation between the physical and non-physical properties at this world (call the world ''w1'') is slightly weaker than metaphysical necessitation, such that a certain kind of non-physical intervener—"a blocker"—could, were it to exist at ''w1,'' prevent the non-physical properties in ''w1'' from being instantiated by the instantiation of the physical properties at ''w1.'' Since statement 2 rules out worlds which are physical duplicates of ''w1'' that also contain non-physical interveners by virtue of the minimality, or that's-all clause, statement 2 gives the (allegedly) incorrect result that physicalism is true at ''w1.'' One response to this problem is to abandon statement 2 in favour of the alternative possibility mentioned earlier in which supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are restricted to what
David Chalmers David John Chalmers (; born 20 April 1966) is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in the areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He is a professor of philosophy and neural science at New York Univers ...
(1996) calls "positive properties". A positive property is one that "...if instantiated in a world W, is also instantiated by the corresponding individual in all worlds that contain W as a proper part." Following this suggestion, we can then formulate physicalism as follows: 3) Physicalism is true at a possible world ''w'' if and only if any world that is a physical duplicate of ''w'' is a positive duplicate of ''w''. On the face of it, statement 3 seems able to handle both the epiphenomenal ectoplasm problem and the blockers problem. With regard to the former, statement 3 gives the correct result that a purely physical world is one at which physicalism is true, since worlds in which there is some extra stuff are positive duplicates of a purely physical world. With regard to the latter, statement 3 appears to have the consequence that worlds in which there are blockers are worlds where positive non-physical properties of ''w1'' will be absent, hence ''w1'' will not be counted as a world at which physicalism is true. Daniel Stoljar (2010) objects to this response to the blockers problem on the basis that since the non-physical properties of ''w1'' aren't instantiated at a world in which there is a blocker, they are not positive properties in Chalmers' (1996) sense, and so statement 3 will count ''w1'' as a world at which physicalism is true after all. A further problem for supervenience-based formulations of physicalism is the so-called "necessary beings problem". A necessary being in this context is a non-physical being that exists in all possible worlds (for example what theists refer to as
God In monotheistic thought, God is usually viewed as the supreme being, creator, and principal object of faith. Swinburne, R.G. "God" in Honderich, Ted. (ed)''The Oxford Companion to Philosophy'', Oxford University Press, 1995. God is typically ...
). A necessary being is compatible with all the definitions provided, because it is supervenient on everything; yet it is usually taken to contradict the notion that everything is physical. So any supervenience-based formulation of physicalism will at best state a necessary but not sufficient condition for the truth of physicalism. Additional objections have been raised to the above definitions provided for supervenience physicalism: one could imagine an alternate world that differs only by the presence of a single ammonium molecule (or physical property), and yet based on statement 1, such a world might be completely different in terms of its distribution of mental properties. Furthermore, there are differences expressed concerning the modal status of physicalism; whether it is a necessary truth, or is only true in a world which conforms to certain conditions (i.e. those of physicalism).


Realisation physicalism

Closely related to supervenience physicalism, is realisation physicalism, the thesis that every instantiated property is either physical or realised by a physical property.


Token physicalism

Token physicalism is the proposition that "for every actual particular (object, event or process) x, there is some physical particular y such that x = y". It is intended to capture the idea of "physical mechanisms". Token physicalism is compatible with
property dualism Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance— the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties ...
, in which all substances are "physical", but physical objects may have mental properties as well as physical properties. Token physicalism is not however equivalent to supervenience physicalism. Firstly, token physicalism does not imply supervenience physicalism because the former does not rule out the possibility of non-supervenient properties (provided that they are associated only with physical particulars). Secondarily, supervenience physicalism does not imply token physicalism, for the former allows supervenient objects (such as a "nation", or "soul") that are not equal to any physical object.


Reductionism and emergentism


Reductionism

There are multiple versions of reductionism. In the context of physicalism, the reductions referred to are of a "linguistic" nature, allowing discussions of, say, mental phenomena to be translated into discussions of physics. In one formulation, every concept is analysed in terms of a physical concept. One counter-argument to this supposes there may be an additional class of expressions which is non-physical but which increases the expressive power of a theory. Another version of reductionism is based on the requirement that one theory (mental or physical) be logically derivable from a second. The combination of reductionism and physicalism is usually called reductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind. The opposite view is non-reductive physicalism. Reductive physicalism is the view that mental states are both nothing over and above physical states and reducible to physical states. One version of reductive physicalism is
type physicalism Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind–brain identity theory and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and ...
or mind-body identity theory. Type physicalism asserts that "for every actually instantiated property F, there is some physical property G such that F=G". Unlike token physicalism, type physicalism entails supervenience physicalism. Reductive versions of physicalism are increasingly unpopular as they do not account for mental lives. The brain on this position as a physical substance has only physical attributes such as a particular volume, a particular mass, a particular density, a particular location, a particular shape, and so on. However, the brain on this position does not have any mental attributes. The brain is not overjoyed or unhappy. The brain is not in pain. When a person's back aches and he or she is in pain, it is not the brain that is suffering even though the brain is associated with the neural circuitry that provides the experience of pain. Reductive physicalism therefore cannot explain mental lives. In the event of fear, for example, doubtlessly there is neural activity that is corresponding with the experience of fear. However, the brain itself is not fearful. Fear cannot be reduced to a physical brain state even though it is corresponding with neural activity in the brain. For this reason, reductive physicalism is argued to be indefensible as it cannot be reconciled with mental experience. Another common argument against type physicalism is
multiple realizability Multiple realizability, in the philosophy of mind, is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or events. Philosophers of mind have used multiple realizability to argue ...
, the possibility that a psychological process (say) could be instantiated by many different neurological processes (even non-neurological processes, in the case of machine or alien intelligence). For in this case, the neurological terms translating a psychological term must be disjunctions over the possible instantiations, and it is argued that no physical law can use these disjunctions as terms. Type physicalism was the original target of the multiple realizability argument, and it is not clear that token physicalism is susceptible to objections from multiple realizability.


Emergentism

There are two versions of emergentism, the strong version and the weak version. Supervenience physicalism has been seen as a strong version of emergentism, in which the subject's psychological experience is considered genuinely novel. Non-reductive physicalism, on the other side, is a weak version of emergentism because it does not need that the subject's psychological experience be novel. The strong version of emergentism is incompatible with physicalism. Since there are novel mental states, mental states are not nothing over and above physical states. However, the weak version of emergentism is compatible with physicalism. We can see that emergentism is actually a very broad view. Some forms of emergentism appear either incompatible with physicalism or equivalent to it (e.g. posteriori physicalism), others appear to merge both dualism and supervenience. Emergentism compatible with dualism claims that mental states and physical states are metaphysically distinct while maintaining the supervenience of mental states on physical states. This proposition however contradicts supervenience physicalism, which asserts a denial of dualism.


''A priori'' versus ''a posteriori'' physicalism

Physicalists hold that physicalism is true. A natural question for physicalists, then, is whether the truth of physicalism is deducible
a priori ("from the earlier") and ("from the later") are Latin phrases used in philosophy to distinguish types of knowledge, justification, or argument by their reliance on empirical evidence or experience. knowledge is independent from current ...
from the nature of the physical world (i.e., the inference is justified independently of experience, even though the nature of the physical world can itself only be determined through experience) or can only be deduced a posteriori (i.e., the justification of the inference itself is dependent upon experience). So-called "a priori physicalists" hold that from knowledge of the
conjunction Conjunction may refer to: * Conjunction (grammar), a part of speech * Logical conjunction, a mathematical operator ** Conjunction introduction, a rule of inference of propositional logic * Conjunction (astronomy), in which two astronomical bodies ...
of all physical truths, a totality or that's-all truth (to rule out non-physical epiphenomena, and enforce the closure of the physical world), and some primitive
indexical In semiotics, linguistics, anthropology, and philosophy of language, indexicality is the phenomenon of a ''sign'' pointing to (or ''indexing'') some object in the context in which it occurs. A sign that signifies indexically is called an index or, ...
truths such as "I am A" and "now is B", the truth of physicalism is knowable a priori.See Chalmers and Jackson, 2001 Let "P" stand for the conjunction of all physical truths and laws, "T" for a that's-all truth, "I" for the indexical "centering" truths, and "N" for any resumably non-physicaltruth at the actual world. We can then, using the
material conditional The material conditional (also known as material implication) is an operation commonly used in logic. When the conditional symbol \rightarrow is interpreted as material implication, a formula P \rightarrow Q is true unless P is true and Q i ...
"→", represent a priori physicalism as the thesis that PTI → N is knowable a priori. An important wrinkle here is that the
concept Concepts are defined as abstract ideas. They are understood to be the fundamental building blocks of the concept behind principles, thoughts and beliefs. They play an important role in all aspects of cognition. As such, concepts are studied by ...
s in N must be possessed non-deferentially in order for PTI → N to be knowable a priori. The suggestion, then, is that possession of the concepts in the
consequent A consequent is the second half of a hypothetical proposition. In the standard form of such a proposition, it is the part that follows "then". In an implication, if ''P'' implies ''Q'', then ''P'' is called the antecedent and ''Q'' is called ...
, plus the empirical information in the antecedent is sufficient for the consequent to be knowable a priori. An "a posteriori physicalist", on the other hand, will reject the claim that PTI → N is knowable a priori. Rather, they would hold that the inference from PTI to N is justified by metaphysical considerations that in turn can be derived from experience. So the claim then is that "PTI and not N" is metaphysically impossible. One commonly issued challenge to a priori physicalism and to physicalism in general is the "conceivability argument", or zombie argument. At a rough approximation, the conceivability argument runs as follows: P1) PTI and not Q (where "Q" stands for the conjunction of all truths about consciousness, or some "generic" truth about someone being "phenomenally" conscious .e., there is "something it is like" to be a person x) is conceivable (i.e., it is not knowable a priori that PTI and not Q is false). P2) If PTI and not Q is conceivable, then PTI and not Q is metaphysically possible. P3) If PTI and not Q is metaphysically possible then physicalism is false. C) Physicalism is false. Here proposition P3 is a direct application of the supervenience of consciousness, and hence of any supervenience-based version of physicalism: If PTI and not Q is possible, there is some
possible world A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic. Their me ...
where it is true. This world differs from he relevant indexing onour world, where PTIQ is true. But the other world is a minimal physical duplicate of our world, because PT is true there. So there is a possible world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world, but not a full duplicate; this contradicts the definition of physicalism that we saw above. Since a priori physicalists hold that PTI → N is a priori, they are committed to denying P1) of the conceivability argument. The a priori physicalist, then, must argue that PTI and not Q, on ideal rational reflection, is incoherent or
contradictory In traditional logic, a contradiction occurs when a proposition conflicts either with itself or established fact. It is often used as a tool to detect disingenuous beliefs and bias. Illustrating a general tendency in applied logic, Aristotle ...
. A posteriori physicalists, on the other hand, generally accept P1) but deny P2)--the move from "conceivability to metaphysical possibility". Some a posteriori physicalists think that unlike the possession of most, if not all other empirical concepts, the possession of consciousness has the special property that the presence of PTI and the absence of consciousness will be conceivable—even though, according to them, it is knowable a posteriori that PTI and not Q is not metaphysically possible. These a posteriori physicalists endorse some version of what Daniel Stoljar (2005) has called "the phenomenal concept strategy". Roughly speaking, the phenomenal concept strategy is a label for those a posteriori physicalists who attempt to show that it is only the ''concept'' of consciousness—not the ''property''—that is in some way "special" or sui generis. Other a posteriori physicalists eschew the phenomenal concept strategy, and argue that even ordinary macroscopic truths such as "water covers 60% of the earth's surface" are not knowable a priori from PTI and a non-deferential grasp of the concepts "water" and "earth" ''et cetera''. If this is correct, then we should (arguably) conclude that conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility, and P2) of the conceivability argument against physicalism is false.


Other views


Realistic physicalism

Galen Strawson Galen John Strawson (born 1952) is a British analytic philosopher and literary critic who works primarily on philosophy of mind, metaphysics (including free will, panpsychism, the mind-body problem, and the self), John Locke, David Hume, ...
's realistic physicalism or realistic monism entails panpsychism – or at least micropsychism. Strawson argues that "many—perhaps most—of those who call themselves physicalists or materialists re mistakenlycommitted to the thesis that physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, something wholly and utterly non-experiential... even when they are prepared to admit with Eddington that physical stuff has, in itself, 'a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity', i.e. as experience or consciousness". Because experiential phenomena allegedly cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena, philosophers are driven to substance dualism,
property dualism Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance— the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties ...
,
eliminative materialism Eliminative materialism (also called eliminativism) is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. It is the idea that majority of the mental states in folk psychology do not exist. Some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent ...
and "all other crazy attempts at wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction".


See also

* Canberra Plan * Metaphysical naturalism * Scientism


Notes


References

* Bennett, K., and McLaughlin, B. 2011. "Supervenience." In ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,'' ed. E. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu. * Chalmers, D. 1996. ''The Conscious Mind''. New York: Oxford University Press. * * Chalmers, D. 2009. "The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism." In ''Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind,'' ed. B. McLaughlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 313–335. * * Hempel, C. 1969. "Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets." In ''Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel.'' eds. S. Morgenbesser, et al. New York: St Martin's Press. * * Jackson, F. 1998. ''From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis.'' New York: Oxford University Press. * * Kirk, R. (2013), The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental, Oxford University Press
Review
* Kripke, S. 1972. ''Naming and Necessity.'' In ''Semantics of Natural Language,'' eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman. Dordrecht: Reidel: 253-355, 763-769. * Lewis, D. 1994. "Reduction of Mind." In ''A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind,'' ed. S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 412–431. * Lycan, W. 2003. "Chomsky on the Mind-body Problem." In ''Chomsky and His Critics,'' eds. L. Anthony and N. Hornstein. Oxford: Blackwell * * * * * Papineau, D. 2002. ''Thinking About Consciousness.'' Oxford: Oxford University Press. * Poland, J. 1994. ''Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations.'' Oxford: Clarendon. * Putnam, H. 1967. "Psychological Predicates." In ''Art, Mind, and Religion,'' eds. W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 37–48. * Smart, J.J.C. 1959. "Sensations and Brain Processes." Reprinted in ''Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem,'' ed. D. Rosenthal. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. * * * Stoljar, D. 2009. "Physicalism." in ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,'' ed. E. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu. * Stoljar, D. 2010. ''Physicalism.'' New York: Routledge. * Tye, M. 2009. ''Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.''Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. * *


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