Etymology
The Greek word grc, νοούμενoν, nooúmenon, label=none (plural grc, νοούμενα, nooúmena, label=none) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of grc, νοεῖν, noeîn, to think, to mean, label=none, which in turn originates from the word grc, νοῦς, noûs, label=none, an Attic contracted form of grc, νόος, nóos, perception, understanding, mind, label=none. A rough equivalent in English would be "something that is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".Historical predecessors
Regarding the equivalent concepts inKantian noumena
Overview
As expressed in Kant's '' Critique of Pure Reason,'' human understanding is structured by "concepts of the understanding" or pure categories of understanding, found prior to experience in the mind and which make outer experiences possible as counterpart to the rational faculties of the mind. By Kant's account, when one employs a concept to describe or categorize ''noumena'' (the objects of inquiry, investigation or analysis of the workings of the world), one is also employing a way of describing or categorizing ''phenomena'' (the observable manifestations of those objects of inquiry, investigation or analysis). Kant posited methods by which human understanding makes sense of and thus intuits phenomena that appear to the mind: the concepts of the '' transcendental aesthetic'', as well as that of the ''transcendental analytic'', '' transcendental logic'' and ''transcendental deduction''.''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Macmillan, 1967, 1996) Volume 4, "Kant, Immanuel", section on "Critique of Pure Reason: Theme and Preliminaries", p. 308 ''ff''.''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Macmillan, 1967, 1996) Volume 4, "Kant, Immanuel", section on "Transcendental Aesthetic", p. 310 ''ff''.''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Macmillan, 1967, 1996) Volume 4, "Kant, Immanuel", section on "Pure Concepts of the Understanding", p. 311 ''ff''. Taken together, Kant's "categories of understanding" are the principles of the human mind which necessarily are brought to bear in attempting to understand the world in which weNoumenon and the thing-in-itself
Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous, and there is textual evidence for this relationship. However, Stephen Palmquist holds that "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only ''loosely'' synonymous, inasmuch as they represent the same concept viewed from two different perspectives, and other scholars also argue that they are not identical. Schopenhauer criticised Kant for changing the meaning of "noumenon". However, this opinion is far from unanimous. Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.He is much more doubtful about noumena:
But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special ind ofobject, namely, an intelligible object; the ort ofunderstanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim a kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing-in-itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But Stephen Palmquist explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing-in-itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.
Positive and negative noumena
Kant also makes a distinction between ''positive'' and ''negative'' noumena:If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the ''negative'' sense of the term.
But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in the ''positive'' sense of the term.The positive noumena, if they existed, would be immaterial entities that can only be apprehended by a special, non-sensory faculty: "intellectual intuition" (''nicht sinnliche Anschauung''). Kant doubts that we have such a faculty, because for him intellectual intuition would mean that thinking of an entity, and its being represented, would be the same. He argues that humans have no way to apprehend positive noumena:
Since, however, such a type of intuition, intellectual intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge, it follows that the employment of the categories can never extend further than to the objects of experience. Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities; there may also be intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatsoever; but our concepts of understanding, being mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, could not in the least apply to them. That, therefore, which we entitle 'noumenon' must be understood as being such only in a negative sense.
The noumenon as a limiting concept
Even if noumena are unknowable, they are still needed as a ''limiting concept'', Kant tells us. Without them, there would be only phenomena, and since potentially we have complete knowledge of our phenomena, we would in a sense know everything. In his own words:Further, the concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge.
What our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumenon, is a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something.Furthermore, for Kant, the existence of a noumenal world limits reason to what he perceives to be its proper bounds, making many questions of traditional metaphysics, such as the existence of God, the soul, and free will unanswerable by reason. Kant derives this from his definition of knowledge as "the determination of given representations to an object". As there are no appearances of these entities in the phenomenal, Kant is able to make the claim that they cannot be known to a mind that works upon "such knowledge that has to do only with appearances". These questions are ultimately the "proper object of faith, but not of reason".
The dual-object and dual-aspect interpretations
Kantian scholars have long debated two contrasting interpretations of the thing-in-itself. One is the ''dual object'' view, according to which the thing-in-itself is an entity distinct from the phenomena to which it gives rise. The other is the ''dual aspect'' view, according to which the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it-appears are two "sides" of the same thing. This view is supported by the textual fact that "Most occurrences of the phrase 'things-in-themselves' are shorthand for the phrase, 'things considered in themselves' (Dinge an sich selbst betrachtet)." Although we cannot ''see'' things apart from the way we do in fact perceive them via the physical senses, we can ''think'' them apart from our mode of sensibility (physical perception); thus making the thing-in-itself a kind of noumenon or object of thought.Criticisms of Kant's noumenon
Pre-Kantian critique
Though the term ''noumenon'' did not come into common usage until Kant, the idea that undergirds it, that matter has an absolute existence which causes it to emanate certain phenomena, had historically been subjected to criticism. George Berkeley, who pre-dated Kant, asserted that matter, independent of an observant mind, is metaphysically impossible. Qualities associated with matter, such as shape, color, smell, texture, weight, temperature, and sound are all dependent on minds, which allow only for relative perception, not absolute perception. The complete absence of such minds (and more importantly an omnipotent mind) would render those same qualities unobservable and even unimaginable. Berkeley called this philosophySchopenhauer's critique
The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as φαινόμενα 'phainomena''and νοούμενα 'nooumena'' the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, inThe noumenon's original meaning of "that which is thought" is not compatible with the " thing-in-itself," the latter being Kant's term for things as they exist apart from their existence as images in the mind of an observer. In a footnote to this passage, Schopenhauer provides the following passage from the ''Outlines of Pyrrhonism'' (Bk. I, ch. 13) ofPlato Plato ( ; grc-gre, Πλάτων ; 428/427 or 424/423 – 348/347 BC) was a Greek philosopher born in Athens during the Classical period in Ancient Greece. He founded the Platonist school of thought and the Academy, the first institution ...'s doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict betweennominalism In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. There are at least two main versions of nominalism. One version denies the existence of universalsthings ...andrealism Realism, Realistic, or Realists may refer to: In the arts *Realism (arts), the general attempt to depict subjects truthfully in different forms of the arts Arts movements related to realism include: * Classical Realism *Literary realism, a mov .... This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato andAristotle Aristotle (; grc-gre, Ἀριστοτέλης ''Aristotélēs'', ; 384–322 BC) was a Greek philosopher and polymath during the Classical period in Ancient Greece. Taught by Plato, he was the founder of the Peripatetic school of .... But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances.
See also
* Always already * Anatta *Notes
References
Bibliography
*External links