Yogacara

Yogachara ( sa, योगाचार, IAST: '; literally "yoga practice"; "one whose practice is yoga") is an influential tradition of Buddhist philosophy and psychology emphasizing the study of cognition, perception, and consciousness through the interior lens of meditative and yogic practices. It is also variously termed ''Vijñānavāda'' (the doctrine of consciousness), ''Vijñaptivāda'' (the doctrine of ideas or percepts) or ''Vijñaptimātratā-vāda'' (the doctrine of 'mere representation'), which is also the name given to its major epistemic theory. There are several interpretations of this main theory; while often regarded as a kind of Idealism, critical scholars argue that it is closer to a kind of phenomenology or representationalism, aimed at deconstructing the reification of our perceptions.

According to Dan Lusthaus, this tradition developed "an elaborate psychological therapeutic system that mapped out the problems in cognition along with the antidotes to correct them, and an earnest epistemological endeavor that led to some of the most sophisticated work on perception and logic ever engaged in by Buddhists or Indians." The 4th-century Gandharan brothers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, are considered the classic philosophers and systematizers of this school, along with its other founder, Maitreya.Siderits, Mark, ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, p. 146.

It was associated with Indian Mahayana Buddhism in about the fourth century, but also included non-Mahayana practitioners of the Sautrāntika school. Yogācāra continues to be influential in Tibetan Buddhism and East Asian Buddhism. However, the uniformity of a single assumed "Yogācāra school" has been put into question.

Doctrine

Yogācāra philosophy is primarily meant to aid in the practice of yoga and meditation and thus it also sets forth a systematic analysis of the Mahayana path of mental training (see five paths ''pañcamārga''). Yogācārins made use of ideas from previous traditions, such as Prajñāpāramitā and the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, to develop a new schema for spiritual practice.

According to Thomas Kochumuttom, Yogācāra is "meant to be an explanation of experience, rather than a system of ontology". For this reason, Yogācārins developed an Abhidharma literature set within a Mahāyāna framework. In its analysis, Yogācāra works like the '' Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra'' developed various core concepts such as ''vijñapti-mātra'', the ''ālaya-vijñāna'' (store consciousness), the turning of the basis (''āśraya-parāvṛtti),'' the three natures ('' trisvabhāva''), and emptiness. They form a complex system, and each can be taken as a point of departure for understanding Yogācāra.Muller, A. Charles (2005; 2007). ''Wonhyo's Reliance on Huiyuan in his Exposition of the Two Hindrances.'' (Published in Reflecting Mirrors: Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism. Imre Hamar, ed., Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007, p. 281-295.) Source

(accessed: April 7, 2010)

The doctrine of ''Vijñapti-mātra''

One of the main features of Yogācāra philosophy is the concept of ''vijñapti-mātra''. It is often used interchangeably with the term ''citta-mātra'', but they have different meanings. The standard translation of both terms is "consciousness-only" or "mind-only." Several modern researchers object to this translation, and the accompanying label of "absolute idealism" or "idealistic monism". A better translation for ''vijñapti-mātra'' is ''representation-only'', while an alternative translation for ''citta'' (mind, thought) ''mātra'' (only, exclusively) has not been proposed.

Origins

According to Lambert Schmithausen, the earliest surviving appearance of this term is in chapter 8 of the '' Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra,'' which has only survived in Tibetan and Chinese translations that differ in syntax and meaning. The passage is depicted as a response by the Buddha to a question which asks "whether the images or replicas (''*pratibimba'') which are the object (''*gocara'') of meditative concentration (*''samadhi''), are different/separate (''*bhinna'') from the contemplating mind (''*citta'') or not." The Buddha says they are not different, "Because these images are ''vijñapti-mātra."'' The text goes on to affirm that the same is true for objects of ordinary perception.

Regarding existing Sanskrit sources, the term appears in the first verse of Vasubandhu's ''Vimśatikā'', which is a '' locus classicus'' of the idea, it states:Siderits, Mark, ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, p. 149.

''Vijñaptimātram evaitad asad arthāvabhāsanāt yathā taimirikasyāsat keśa candrādi darśanam.''

"This orldis ''vijñaptimātra'', since it manifests itself as an unreal object (''artha''), just like the case of those with cataracts seeing unreal hairs in the moon and the like."

According to Mark Siderits, what Vasubandhu means here is that we are only ever aware of mental images or impressions which manifest themselves as external objects, but "there is actually no such thing outside the mind."

The term also appears in Asaṅga's classic Yogācāra work, the '' Mahāyānasaṃgraha'' (no Sanskrit original, trans. from Tibetan)'':''

These representations (''vijñapti'') are mere representations (''vijñapti-mātra''), because there is no orrespondingthing/object (''artha'')...Just as in a dream there appear, even without a thing/object (''artha''), just in the mind alone, forms/images of all kinds of things/objects like visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, houses, forests, land, and mountains, and yet there are no uchthings/objects at all in that lace ''MSg II.6''

The term is sometimes used as a synonym with ''citta-mātra'' (mere ''citta''), which is also used as a name for the school that suggests Idealism. Schmithausen writes that the first appearance of this term is in the ''Pratyupanna samadhi sutra'', which states:

This (or: whatever belongs to this) triple world (*''traidhātuka'') is nothing but mind (or thought: *''cittamatra''). Why? Because however I imagine things, that is how they appear.

Interpretations of ''vijñapti-mātra''

=Idealism

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According to Bruce Cameron Hall, the interpretation of this doctrine as a form of subjective or absolute idealism has been "the most common "outside" interpretation of ''Vijñānavāda'', not only by modern writers, but by its ancient opponents, both Hindu and Buddhist."Cameron Hall, Bruce, ''The Meaning of Vijnapti in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind,'' JIABS Vol 9, 1986, Number 1, p. 7.

Scholars such as Saam Trivedi argue that Yogācāra is similar to Idealism (closer to a Kantian epistemic idealism), though they note that it is its own unique form and that it might be confusing to categorize it as such. Paul Williams, citing Griffiths, writes that it could be termed "dynamic idealism". Sean Butler argues for the idealistic nature of Yogācāra, noting that there are numerous similarities between Yogācāra and the systems of Kant and Berkeley. Jay Garfield also argues that Yogācāra is "akin to the idealisms defended by such Western philosophers as Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer."

Jonathan Gold writes that the Yogācāra thinker Vasubandhu can be said to be an idealist (similar to Kant), in the sense that for him, everything in experience as well as its causal support is mental, and thus he gives causal priority to the mental. At the same time however, this is only in the conventional realm, since "mind" is just another concept and true reality for Vasubandhu is ineffable, "an inconceivable 'thusness' ('' tathatā'')." Indeed, the ''Vimśatikā'' states that the very idea of ''vijñapti-mātra'' must ''also'' be understood to be itself a self-less construction and thus ''vijñapti-mātra'' is not the ultimate truth ('' paramārtha-satya'') in Yogācāra. Thus according to Gold, while Vasubandhu's ''vijñapti-mātra'' can be said to be a “conventionalist idealism”, it is to be seen as unique and different from Western forms, especially Hegelian Absolute Idealism.

=Mere representation

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Other scholars note that it is a mistake to conflate the two terms ''vijñapti-mātra'' and ''citta-mātra''. While the standard translations for both ''vijñapti-mātra'' and ''citta-matra'' are often "consciousness only" and "mind-only" (signifying an Idealistic doctrine), objections are raised to this conflation, as well as to Idealistic interpretation. Different alternative translations for ''vijñapti-mātra'' have been proposed, such as ''representation-only, ideation-only, impressions-only'' and ''perception-only''.Wayman, Alex, ''A Defense of Yogācāra Buddhism'', Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 447-476.

David Kalupahana argues that ''citta-mātra'' signifies a metaphysical reification of mind into an absolute, while ''vijñapti-mātra'' refers to a certain epistemological approach. According to Kalupahana, the term ''vijñapti-mātra'' replaced the "more metaphysical" term ''citta-mātra'' used in the ''Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra''. The ''Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra'' "appears to be one of the earliest attempts to provide a philosophical justification for the Absolutism that emerged in Mahayana in relation to the concept of Buddha". It uses the term ''citta-mātra'', which means properly "thought-only". By using this term it develops an ''ontology'', in contrast to the ''epistemology'' of the term vijñapti-mātra. The ''Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra'' equates ''citta'' and the absolute. According to Kochumuttom, this is not the way Yogacara uses the term vijñapti: According to Kochumuttom, "the absolute state is defined simply as emptiness, namely the emptiness of subject-object distinction. Once thus defined as emptiness (''sunyata''), it receives a number of synonyms, none of which betray idealism."

According to Thomas Kochumuttom, Yogācāra is a ''realistic pluralism''. It does not deny the existence of individual beings; what it does deny is:

''Vijñapti-mātra'' then means "mere representation of consciousness":

Alex Wayman notes that one's interpretation of Yogācāra will depend on how the qualifier ''mātra'' is to be understood in this context, and he objects to interpretations which claim that Yogācāra rejects the external world altogether, preferring translations such as "amounting to mind" or "mirroring mind" for ''citta-mātra''. For Wayman, what this doctrine means is that "the mind has only a report or representation of what the sense organ had sensed." The representationalist interpretation is also supported by Stefan Anacker and Thomas A. Kochumuttom, modern translators of Vasubandhu's works.

=Soterological phenomenology

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According to Dan Lusthaus, the ''vijñapti-mātra'' theory is closer in some ways to Western Phenomenological theories and Epistemological Idealism or Transcendental idealism, but it is not an ontological idealism because Yogācāra rejects the construction of metaphysical or ontological theories.Lusthaus, Dan, What is and isn't Yogacara, http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro.html Moreover, Western idealism lacks any counterpart to karma, samsara or awakening, which are central for Yogācāra. Regarding ''vijñapti-mātra,'' Lusthaus translates it as "nothing but conscious construction" and states it is:

Lusthaus further explains that this reification of cognitions aids in constructing the notion of a solid self, which can appropriate external 'things'. Yogacara then offers the analysis and meditative means to negate this reification, thereby also negating the notion of a solid self:

Therefore, when Yogācāra discusses cognitive objects (''viṣaya''), they are analyzing cognition, and its constructions. While Yogācāra posits that cognitive objects are real, it denies "''arthas''" (objects of intentionality or "a telos toward which an act of consciousness intends") which are "outside the cognitive act in which it is that which is intended." So according to Lusthaus, "Yogacarins don't claim that nothing whatsoever exists outside the mind" and "Consciousness enjoys no transcendent status, nor does it serve as a metaphysical foundation. Consciousness is real by virtue of its facticity -- the fact that sentient beings experience cognitions -- and not because of an ontological primacy." In this way, instead of offering an ontological theory, Yogācāra focuses on understanding and eliminating the underlying tendencies (''anuśaya'') that lead to clinging to ontological constructions, which are just cognitive projections (''pratibimba'', ''parikalpita'').

Arguments in defense of ''vijñapti-mātra''

Yogācāra philosophers were aware of the objections that could be brought against their doctrine. Vasubandhu's ''Vimśatikā'' mentions three and refutes them:

# The problem of spatio-temporal determination or non-arbitrariness in regard to place and time. There must be some external basis for our experiences since experiences of any particular object are not occurrent everywhere and at every time. Vasubandhu explains this by using the dream argument, which shows how a world created by mind can still ''seem'' to have spatio-temporal localization.
# The problem of multiple minds experiencing the same object or inter-subjective agreement. Vasubandhu counters that mass hallucinations (such as those said to occur to hungry ghosts) caused by the fact they share similar karma, show that inter-subjective agreement is possible without positing real external objects.
# Hallucinations have no pragmatic results, efficacy or causal functions and thus can be determined to be unreal, but entities we generally accept as being "real" have actual causal results that cannot be of the same class as hallucinations. Against this claim, Vasubandhu argues that waking life is the same as in a dream, where objects have pragmatic results within the very rules of the dream. He also uses the example of a wet dream to show that mental content can have causal efficacy outside of a dream.

According to Mark Siderits, after disposing of these objections, Vasubandhu believes he has shown that ''vijñapti-mātra'' is just as good at explaining and predicting the relevant phenomena of experience as any theory of realism that posits external objects. Therefore, he then applies the Indian philosophical principle termed the "Principle of Lightness" (which is similar to Occam's Razor) to rule out realism since ''vijñapti-mātra'' is the simpler and "lighter" theory, "that is, the theory that posits the least number of unobservable entities."

Another objection that Vasubandhu answers is that of how one person can influence another's experiences, if everything arises from mental karmic seeds in one's mind stream. Vasubandhu argues that "impressions can also be caused in a mental stream by the occurrence of a distinct impression in another suitably linked mental stream."Siderits, Mark, ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, p. 170. As Siderits notes, this account can explain how it is possible to influence or even totally disrupt (murder) another mind, even if there is no physical medium or object in existence, since a suitably strong enough intention in one mind stream can have effects on another mind stream. From the ''vijñapti-mātra'' position, it is easier to posit a mind to mind causation than to have to explain mind to body causation, which the realist must do. However, Siderits then goes on to question whether Vasubandhu's position is indeed "lighter" since he must make use of multiple interactions between different minds to take into account an intentionally created artifact, like a pot. Since we can be aware of a pot even when we are not "linked" to the potter's intentions (even after the potter is dead), a more complex series of mental interactions must be posited.

In disproving the possibility of external objects, Vasubandhu's ''Vimśatikā'' also attacks Indian theories of atomism and property particulars as incoherent on mereological grounds.Gold, Jonathan C., "Vasubandhu", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vasubandhu/ Vasubandhu also explains why it is soteriologically important to get rid of the idea of really existing external objects. According to Siderits, this is because:

When we wrongly imagine there to be external objects we are led to think in terms of the duality of 'grasped and grasper', of what is 'out there' and what is ' in here' - in short, of external world and self. Coming to see that there is no external world is a means, Vasubandhu thinks, of overcoming a very subtle way of believing in an 'I'... once we see why physical objects can't exist we will lose all temptation to think there is a true ' me' within. There are really just impressions, but we superimpose on these the false constructions of object and subject. Seeing this will free us from the false conception of an 'I'.Siderits, Mark, ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, p. 175.

Siderits notes how Kant had a similar notion, that is, without the idea of an objective mind independent world, one cannot derive the concept of a subjective "I". But Kant drew the opposite conclusion to Vasubandhu, since he held that we must believe in an enduring subject, and thus, also believe in external objects.

Analysis of Consciousness

Yogācāra gives a detailed explanation of the workings of the mind and the way it constructs the reality we experience.

Eight consciousnesses

According to Lusthaus, "the most famous innovation of the Yogācāra school was the doctrine of eight consciousnesses." These "eight bodies of consciousnesses" (''aṣṭa vijñānakāyāḥ'') are: the five sense-consciousnesses, ''citta'' (mentality), ''manas'' (self-consciousness), and the storehouse or substratum consciousness ( Skt: ''ālayavijñāna'').Williams, Paul (2008). ''Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations'', Routledge, p. 97. Traditional Buddhist descriptions of consciousness taught just the first six '' vijñānas'', each corresponding to a sense base ('' ayatana'') and having their own sense objects. Standard Buddhist doctrine held that these eighteen ''"dhatus"'' or components of experience, "exhaust the full extent of everything in the universe, or more accurately, the sensorium." These six consciousnesses are also not substantial entities, but a series of events, arising and vanishing, stretching back from beginningless (''anadi'') time.

Buddhist Abhidharma expanded and developed this basic model and Yogācāra responded by rearranging these into their own schema which had three novel forms of consciousness. The sixth consciousness, ''mano-vijñāna,'' was seen as the surveyor of the content of the five senses as well as of mental content like thoughts and ideas. The seventh consciousness developed from the early Buddhist concept of '' manas,'' and was seen as the defiled mentation (''kliṣṭa-manas'') which is obsessed with notions of "self". According to Paul Williams, this consciousness "takes the substratum consciousness as its object and mistakenly considers the substratum consciousness to be a true Self."

''Ālaya-vijñāna''

The eighth consciousness, ''ālaya-vijñāna'' (storehouse or repository consciousness), was defined as the storehouse of all karmic seeds, where they gradually matured until ripe, at which point they manifested as karmic consequences. Because of this, it is also called the "mind which has all the seeds" (''sarvabījakam cittam''), as well as the "basic consciousness" (''mūla-vijñāna'') and the "appropriating consciousness" (''ādānavijñāna''). According to the '' Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra,'' this kind of consciousness ''underlies'' and ''supports'' the six types of manifest awareness, all of which occur simultaneously with the ''ālaya.''Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, pp 94-95. William S. Waldron sees this "simultaneity of all the modes of cognitive awareness" as the most significant departure of Yogācāra theory from traditional Buddhist models of ''vijñāna,'' which were "thought to occur solely in conjunction with their respective sense bases and epistemic objects."

As noted by Schmithausen, the ''ālaya-vijñāna,'' being a kind of vijñāna, has an object as well (as all vijñāna has intentionality). That object is the sentient being's surrounding world, that is to say, the "receptable" or "container" (''bhājana'') world. This is stated in the 8th chapter of the ''Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra,'' which states that the ''ādānavijñāna'' is characterized by "an unconscious (or not fully conscious?) steady perception (or "representation") of the Receptacle (''*asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti'')."

The ''ālaya-vijñāna'' is also what experiences rebirth into future lives and what descents into the womb to appropriate the fetal material. Therefore, the ''ālaya-vijñāna's'' holding on to the body's sense faculties and "profuse imaginings" ('' prapañca'') are the two appropriations which make up the "kindling" or "fuel" (lit. ''upādāna'') that samsaric existence depends upon. Yogācāra thought thus holds that being unaware of the processes going on in the ''ālaya-vijñāna'' is an important element of ignorance ('' avidya''). The ''ālaya'' is also individual, so that each person has their own ''ālaya-vijñāna,'' which is an ever changing process and therefore not a permanent self. According to Williams, this consciousness "seen as a defiled form of consciousness (or perhaps sub- or unconsciousness), is personal, individual, continually changing and yet serving to give a degree of personal identity and to explain why it is that certain karmic results pertain to this particular individual. The seeds are momentary, but they give rise to a perfumed series which eventually culminates in the result including, from seeds of a particular type, the whole ‘inter-subjective’ phenomenal world." Also, Asanga and Vasubandhu write that the ''ālaya-vijñāna'' ‘ceases’ at awakening, becoming transformed into a pure consciousness.

According to Waldron, while there were various similar concepts in other Buddhist Abhidharma schools which sought to explain karmic continuity, the ''ālaya-vijñāna'' is the most comprehensive and systematic. Waldron notes that the ''ālaya-vijñāna'' concept was probably influenced by these theories, particularly the Sautrantika theory of seeds and Vasumitra's theory of a subtle form of mind ''(suksma-citta)''.

Transformations of consciousness

For Kalupahana, this classification of ''ālayavijñāna'' and ''manas'' as an eighth and seventh category of consciousness is based on a misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's ''Triṃśikaikā-kārikā'' by later adherents.

According to scholar Roger R. Jackson, a "'fundamental unconstructed awareness' (''mūla-nirvikalpa-jñāna'')" is "described ..frequently in Yogacara literature.", According to Kalupahana, instead of positing additional consciousnesses, the Triṃśikaikā-kārikā describes the ''transformations'' of this consciousness:

These transformations are threefold according to Kalupahana. The first is the ''ālaya'' and its seeds, which is the flow or stream of consciousness, without any of the usual projections on top of it. The second transformation is ''manana'', self-consciousness or "Self-view, self-confusion, self-esteem and self-love". It is "thinking" about the various perceptions occurring in the stream of consciousness". The ''ālaya'' is defiled by this self-interest. The third transformation is ''visaya-vijñapti'', the "''concept'' of the object". In this transformation the ''concept'' of objects is created. By creating these concepts human beings become "susceptible to grasping after the object" as if it were a real object (''sad artha'') even though it is just a conception (''vijñapti'').

A similar perspective which emphasizes Yogācāra's continuity with early Buddhism is given by Walpola Rahula. According to Rahula, all the elements of this theory of consciousness with its three layers of ''Vijñāna'' are already found in the Pāli Canon:

The Three Natures and Emptiness

Yogācāra works often define three basic modes or "natures" (''svabhāva'') of experience. Jonathan Gold explains that "the three natures are all one reality viewed from three distinct angles. They are the appearance, the process, and the emptiness of that same apparent entity." According to Paul Williams, "all things which can be known can be subsumed under these Three Natures." Since this schema is Yogācāra's systematic explanation of the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness (''śūnyatā''), each of the three natures are also explained as having a lack of own-nature (''niḥsvabhāvatā'')." Vasubandhu's ''Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa'' gives a brief definition of these three natures:

"What appears is the dependent. How it appears is the fabricated. Because of being dependent on conditions. Because of being only fabrication. The eternal non-existence of the appearance as it is appears: That is known to be the perfected nature, because of being always the same. What appears there? The unreal fabrication. How does it appear? As a dual self. What is its nonexistence? That by which the nondual reality is there."

In detail, three natures (''trisvabhāva'') are:Williams (2008), p. 90.

#''Parikalpita-svabhāva'' (the "fully conceptualized" nature). This is the "imaginary" or "constructed" nature, wherein things are incorrectly comprehended based on conceptual construction, through the activity of language and through attachment and erroneous discrimination which attributes intrinsic existence to things. According to the '' Mahāyānasaṃgraha'', it also refers to the appearance of things in terms of subject-object dualism (literally "grasper" and "grasped"). The conceptualized nature is the world of everyday unenlightened people, i.e. samsara, and it is false and empty, it does not really exist (see ''Triṃśikā'' v. 20). According to Xuanzang's '' Cheng Weishi Lun'', "there is the ''absence of an existential nature by its very defining characteristic"'' (''lakṣana-niḥsvabhāvatā''). Because these conceptualized natures and distinct characteristics (''lakṣana'') are wrongly imputed not truly real, "they are like mirages and blossoms in the sky."
#''Paratantra-svabhāva'' (literally, "other dependent"), which is the dependently originated nature of dharmas, or the causal flow of phenomena which is erroneously confused into the conceptualized nature. According to Williams, it is "''the basis'' for the erroneous partition into supposedly intrinsically existing subjects and objects which marks the conceptualized nature." Jonathan Gold writes that it is "the causal ''process'' of the thing’s fabrication, the causal story that brings about the thing’s apparent nature." This basis is considered to be an ultimately existing ('' paramārtha'') basis in classical Yogācāra (see '' Mahāyānasaṃgraha,'' 2:25).Williams (2008), pp. 90-91. However, as Xuanzang notes, this nature is also empty in that there is an "''absence of an existential nature in conditions that arise and perish"'' (''utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā''). That is, the events in this causal flow, while "seeming to have real existence of their own" are actually like magical illusions since "they are said to only be hypothetical and not really exist on their own." As Siderits writes "to the extent that we are thinking of it at all - even if only as the non-dual flow of impressions-only - we are still conceptualizing it."
#''Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva'' (literally, "fully accomplished"): the "consummated nature" or the true nature of things, the experience of Suchness or Thatness ('' Tathātā'') discovered in meditation unaffected by conceptualization or language. It is defined as "''the complete absence'', in the dependent nature, of objects – that is, the objects of the conceptualized nature" (see '' Mahāyānasaṃgraha,'' 2:4). What this refers to is that empty non-dual experience which has been stripped of the duality of the constructed nature through yogic praxis. According to Williams, this is "''what has to be known'' for enlightenment" and Siderits defines it as "just pure seeing without any attempt at conceptualization or interpretation. Now this is also empty, but only of itself as an interpretation. That is, this mode of cognition is devoid of all concepts, and so is empty of being of the nature of the perfected. About it nothing can be said or thought, it is just pure immediacy." According to Xuanzang, it has the "''absence of any existential nature of ultimate meaning"'' (''paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā'') since it is "completely free from any clinging to entirely imagined speculations about its identity or purpose. Because of this, it is conventionally said that it does not exist. However, it is also not entirely without a real existence."

The central meaning of emptiness in Yogācāra is a twofold "absence of duality." The first element of this is the unreality of any ''conceptual duality'' such as "physical" and "non-physical", "self" and "other". To define something conceptually is to divide the world into what it is and what it is not, but the world is a causal flux that does not accord with conceptual constructs. The second element of this is a ''perceptual duality'' between the sensorium and its objects, between what is "external" and "internal", between subject (''grāhaka,'' literally "grasper") and object (''grāhya,'' "grasped"). This is also an unreal superimposition, since there is really no such separation of inner and outer, but an interconnected causal stream of mentality which is falsely divided up.

An important difference between the Yogācāra conception of emptiness and the Madhyamaka conception is that in classical Yogācāra, emptiness ''does exist'' and so does consciousness, while Madhyamaka refuses to endorse such existential statements. The '' Madhyāntavibhāga'' for example, states "there exists the imagination of the unreal (''abhūta-parikalpa''), there is no duality, but there is emptiness, even in this there is that," which indicates that even though the dualistic imagination is unreal and empty, it does exist.King, Richard, Early Yogācāra and its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East & West Volume 44, Number 4 October 1994 pp. 659-683. Contra Madhyamaka, which was criticized by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga for being nihilistic (see '' Vimśatikā'' v. 10'')'', the Yogācāra position is that there is something that exists (the ''paratantra-svabhāva'' that is mere ''vijñapti''), and that it is empty. The '' Bodhisattvabhūmi'' likewise argues that it is only logical to speak of emptiness if there is ''something'' (i.e. ''dharmatā'') that is empty. Thus Asaṅga speaks of emptiness as "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the no-self."

The Yogācāra school also gave special significance to the ''Lesser Discourse on Emptiness'' of the '' Āgamas''. It is often quoted in later Yogācāra texts as a true definition of emptiness.

Karma

An explanation of the Buddhist doctrine of karma (action) is central to Yogācāra, and the school sought to explain important questions such as how moral actions can have effects on individuals long after that action was done, that is, how karmic causality works across temporal distances. Previous Abhidharma Buddhist schools like the Sautrantika had developed theories of karma based on the notion of "seeds" ('' bījā'') in the mind stream, which are unseen karmic habits (good and bad) which remain until they meet with the necessary conditions to manifest. Yogācāra adopts and expanded this theory. Yogācāra then posited the "storehouse consciousness" (Sanskrit: ''ālayavijñāna''), also known as the basal, or eighth consciousness, as the container of the seeds. It simultaneously acts as a storage place for karmic latencies and as a fertile matrix of predispositions that bring karma to a state of fruition. In the Yogācāra system, all experience without exception is said to result from karma or mental intention ( ''cetana''), either arising from one's own subliminal seeds or from other minds.

For Yogācāra, the seemingly external or dualistic world is merely a "by-product" (''adhipati-phala'') of karma. The term ''vāsanā'' ("perfuming") is also used when explaining karma, and Yogācārins were divided on the issue of whether vāsāna and bija were essentially the same, whether the seeds were the effect of the perfuming, or whether the perfuming simply affected the seeds. The type, quantity, quality and strength of the seeds determine where and how a sentient being will be reborn: one's race, sex, social status, proclivities, bodily appearance and so forth. The conditioning of the mind resulting from karma is called ''saṃskāra''.

Vasubandhu's ''Treatise on Action'' (''Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa''), treats the subject of karma in detail from the Yogācāra perspective.

Meditation and awakening

As the name of the school suggests, meditation practice is central to the Yogācāra tradition. Practice manuals prescribe the practice of mindfulness of body, feelings, thoughts and dharmas in oneself and others, out of which a revolutionary and radically transformative understanding of the non-duality of self and other is said to arise. This process is referred to as ''āśraya-parāvṛtti'', "overturning the Cognitive Basis", or "revolution of the basis", which refers to "overturning the conceptual projections and imaginings which act as the base of our cognitive actions." This event is seen as the transformation of the basic mode of cognition into '' jñāna'' (knowledge, direct knowing), which is seen as a non-dual knowledge that is non-conceptual (''nirvikalpa''), i.e., "devoid of interpretive overlay". When this occurs, the eight consciousnesses come to an end and are replaced by direct knowings. According to Lusthaus:

Overturning the Basis turns the five sense consciousnesses into immediate cognitions that accomplish what needs to be done (''kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna''). The sixth consciousness becomes immediate cognitive mastery (''pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna''), in which the general and particular characteristics of things are discerned just as they are. This discernment is considered nonconceptual (''nirvikalpa-jñāna''). ''Manas'' becomes the immediate cognition of equality (''samatā-jñāna''), equalizing self and other. When the Warehouse Consciousness finally ceases it is replaced by the Great Mirror Cognition (''Mahādarśa-jñāna'') that sees and reflects things just as they are, impartially, without exclusion, prejudice, anticipation, attachment, or distortion. The grasper-grasped relation has ceased. ..."purified" cognitions all engage the world in immediate and effective ways by removing the self-bias, prejudice, and obstructions that had prevented one previously from perceiving beyond one's own narcissistic consciousness. When consciousness ends, true knowledge begins. Since enlightened cognition is nonconceptual its objects cannot be described.

Five Categories of Beings

One of the more controversial teachings espoused by the Yogacara school was an extension of the teachings on seeds and store-conscious. Based on the '' Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra'' and the ''Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra'', the Yogacara school posited that sentient beings had innate seeds that would make them capable of achieving a particular state of enlightenment and no other. Thus, beings were categorized in 5 ways:

# Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to achieve full Buddhahood (i.e. Bodhisattva path).
# Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to achieve the state of a pratyekabuddha (private Buddha).
# Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to achieve the state of an arhat.
# Beings whose innate seeds had an indeterminate nature, and could potentially be any of the above.
# Beings whose innate seeds were incapable of achieving enlightenment ever because they lacked any wholesome seeds.

The fifth class of beings, the Icchantika, were described in various Mahayana sutras as being incapable of achieving Enlightenment, unless in some cases through the aid of a Buddha or Bodhisattva. Nevertheless, the notion was highly criticized by adherents of the Lotus Sutra (e.g. the Tiantai school) and its teaching of universal Buddhahood. This tension appears in East Asian Buddhist history.

Alikākāravāda and Satyākāravāda

An important debate about the reality of mental appearances within Yogācāra led to its later subdivision into two systems of Alikākāravāda ( Tib. ''rnam rdzun pa'', False Aspectarians) and Satyākāravāda (''rnam bden pa'', True Aspectarians) or "Aspectarians" (''ākāra'') and "Non-Aspectarians" (''anākāra''). The core issue is whether appearances or “aspects” (''rnam pa, ākāra'') of objects in the mind are treated as true (''bden pa, satya'') or false (''rdzun pa, alika''). While this division did not exist in the works of the early Yogācāra philosophers, tendencies similar to these views can be discerned in the works of Yogacara thinkers like Dharmapala (c. 530–561?) and Sthiramati (c. 510–570?). According to Yaroslav Komarovski the distinction is:

Although Yogācāras in general do not accept the existence of an external material world, according to Satyākāravāda its appearances or “aspects” (''rnam pa, ākāra'') reflected in consciousness have a real existence, because they are of one nature with the really existent consciousness, their creator. According to Alikākāravāda, neither external phenomena nor their appearances and/in the minds that reflect them really exist. What exists in reality is only primordial mind (''ye shes, jñāna''), described as self-cognition (''rang rig, svasamvedana/ svasamvitti'') or individually self-cognizing primordial mind (''so so(r) rang gis rig pa’i ye shes'').

Practice

The main source for the yogic and meditative practices of the Yogācāra school is the encyclopedic '' Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra (''YBh'', Treatise on the Foundation for Yoga Practitioners).'' The YBh presents a structured exposition of the Mahāyāna Buddhist path of ''yoga'' (here referring to spiritual practice in general) from a Yogācāra perspective and relies in both Āgama/ Nikāya texts and Mahāyāna sūtras while also being influenced by Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma. According to some scholars, this text can be traced to communities of ''Yogācāras,'' which initially referred not to a philosophical school, but to groups of meditation specialists whose main focus was Buddhist yoga. Other Yogācāra texts which also discuss meditation and spiritual practice (and show some relationship with the YBh) include the '' Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,'' the '' Madhyāntavibhāga'', '' Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'' and Asanga's '' Mahāyānasaṃgraha''.

The main or basic section of the YBh is structured around seventeen ''bhūmis'' (explained in fourteen books), which are "foundations" or "groundings" of meditation, referring to "a field of knowledge that the Yogācāra acolyte ought to master in order to be successful in his or her yoga practice." Some of these are doctrinal topics such as the five '' vijñānas'' (book 1), the ''ālayavijñāna'', afflictive cognition ''(kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ),'' the 51 mental factors (book 2)'','' and the defilements ('' saṃkleśa,'' book 3). Other books discuss meditation practice proper (books 4, 9, 10, and 12).Timme Kragh 2013 pp. 51, 60–230

The YBh discusses numerous classic Buddhist topics dealing with the spiritual practice of both Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna. Some of the main topics are the eight different forms of dhyāna (meditative absorptions), the three ''samādhis'', different types of liberation ( ''vimokṣa''), meditative attainments (''samāpatti'') such as '' nirodhasamāpatti'', the five hindrances ('' nivaraṇa''), the various types of foci (''ālambana'') or 'images' (''nimitta'') used in meditation, the various types of meditation used as antidotes (''pratipakṣa'') against the afflictions (like contemplating death, unattractiveness, impermanence, and suffering), the practice of ''śamatha'' through "the nine aspects of resting the mind" (''navākārā cittasthitiḥ''), the practice of insight ('' vipaśyanā''), mindfulness of breathing (''ānāpānasmṛti''), how to understand the four noble truths

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