Wahhabism

Wahhabism is an exonym for a Salafi revivalist movement within Sunni Islam named after the 18th-century Hanbali scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It was initially established in the central Arabian region of Najd and later spread to other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, and was the official policy of Saudi Arabia until 2022. Despite being founded on the principles of Sunni Islam, the Hanbalite scholars Ibn Taimiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim in particular, Wahhabism may also refer to doctrinal differences distinct from other forms of Sunni Islam. Non-Wahhabi Sunnis also have compared Wahhabism to the belief of the Kharijites.

The Wahhabi movement staunchly denounced rituals related to the veneration of Muslim saints and pilgrimages to their tombs and shrines, which were widespread amongst the people of Najd. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers were highly inspired by the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–/ AH 661–728) who advocated a return to the purity of the first three generations () to rid Muslims of (innovation) and regarded his works as core scholarly references in theology. While being influenced by Hanbali school, the movement repudiated '' Taqlid'' to legal authorities, including oft-cited scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim (/AH 751).

Wahhabism has been characterized by historians as "puritanical", while its adherents describe it as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheistic worship". Socio-politically, the movement represented the first major Arab-led revolt against the Turkish, Persian and foreign empires that had dominated the Islamic world since the Mongol invasions and the fall of Abbasid Caliphate in the 13th century; and would later serve as a revolutionary impetus for 19th-century pan-Arab trends. In 1744, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab formed a pact with a local leader, Muhammad bin Saud, establishing a politico-religious alliance with the Saudi monarchy that lasted for more than 250 years. The Wahhabi movement gradually rose to prominence as an influential anti-colonial reform trend in the Islamic world that advocated the re-generation of the social and political prowess of Muslims. Its revolutionary themes inspired several Islamic revivalists, scholars, pan-Islamist ideologues and anti-colonial activists as far as West Africa.

For more than two centuries, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings were championed as the official creed in the three Saudi States. As of 2017, changes to Saudi religious policy by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have led to widespread crackdowns on Islamists in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab world. By 2021, the waning power of the religious clerics brought about by the social, economic, political changes, and the Saudi government's promotion of a nationalist narrative that emphasizes non-Islamic components, led to what has been described as the " post-Wahhabi era" of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's annual commemoration of its founding day on 22 February since 2022, which marked the establishment of Emirate of Dir'iyah by Muhammad ibn Saud in 1727 and de-emphasized his pact with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744, has led to the official "uncoupling" of the religious clergy by the Saudi state.

Name and definition

Etymology

The Arabic term translates in English to "of ", meaning "the Bestower", which is one of the names of God in Islam. The word is primarily an exonym and was not used by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab or by his partisans, who called themselves ("the Monotheists") derived from , the central Islamic tenet denoting the oneness of God. Later, many followers adopted the term instead, ascribing themselves to the first three generations known as the .

The designation for this movement was likely first used by Sulayman ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an ardent critic of his brother's views, who used the term in his purported treatise . The movement's political opponents widely used the term to denounce it. Modern-day followers of the movement continue to reject the term for themselves.

The term ''"Wahhabi"'' should not be confused with ''Wahbi'', which is the dominant creed within Ibadism.

Definition

Alongside its basic definition as an 18th century reformist/revivalist movement, the Wahhabi movement has also been characterized as a "movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society", "a conservative reform movement", and a sect with a "steadfastly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in the tradition of Ibn Hanbal".

Supporters of the Wahhabi movement characterize it as being "pure Islam", indistinct from Salafism, and in fact "the true Salafist movement" seeking "a return to the pristine message of the Prophet" and attempted to free Islam from "superimposed doctrines" and superstitions". Opponents of the movement and what it stands for label it as "a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances".. "While Wahhabism claims to represent Islam in its purest form, other Muslims consider it a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances." The term ''"Wahhabism"'' has also become as a blanket term used inaccurately to refer to "any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the ''Qur'an'' and ''hadith''".

Abdallah al Obeid, the former dean of the Islamic University of Medina and member of the Saudi Consultative Council, has characterized the movement as "a political trend" within Islam that "has been adopted for power-sharing purposes", but not a distinct religious movement, because "it has no special practices, nor special rites, and no special interpretation of religion that differ from the main body of Sunni Islam".

Naming controversy

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself or his followers typically refer to themselves as ''Salafi'', ''Sunni'' or '' Muwahhidun''. The term ''Wahhabi'' was probably first used by Sulayman ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a staunch opponent of his brother's views until /AH 1190, who declared the Wahhabi movement as the personal interpretation of its leader. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his movement's early followers referred to themselves as '' "al-muwahhidun"'' (monotheists; derived from ''Tawhid'' (the oneness of God). The movement's present-day followers continue to reject the term and instead often refer to themselves as '' Salafi'' (also used by followers of other Islamic reform movements).

The term "Wahhabism" has frequently been used by external parties as a sectarian The term used in this manner "most frequently used in countries where Salafis are a small minority" with the intent of "conjuring up images of Saudi Arabia" and foreign interference. Labelling by the term ''"Wahhabism"'' has historically been expansive beyond the doctrinal followers of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, who tend to all reject the label.

Since the colonial period, the Wahhabi epithet has been commonly invoked by various external observers to erroneously or pejoratively denote a wide range of reform movements across the Muslim world. During the colonial era, the British Empire had commonly employed the term to refer to those Muslim scholars and thinkers seen as obstructive to their imperial interests; punishing them under various pretexts. Many Muslim rebels inspired by Sufi '' Awliyaa'' (saints) and mystical orders, were targeted by the British Raj as part of a wider "Wahhabi" conspiracy which was portrayed as extending from Bengal to Punjab. Despite sharing little resemblance with the doctrines of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, outside observers of the Muslim world have frequently traced various religious purification campaigns across the Islamic World to Wahhabi influence. According to Qeyamuddin Ahmed:

In general, the so-called ''Wahhabis'' do not like – or at least did not like – the term. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was averse to the elevation of scholars and other individuals, including using a person's name to label an Islamic school (''madhhab''). Due to its perceived negative overtones, the members of the movement historically identified themselves as "''Muwahhidun''", Muslims, etc. and more recently as ''"Salafis"''. According to Robert Lacey "the Wahhabis have always disliked the name customarily given to them" and preferred to be called '' Muwahhidun'' (Unitarians). Another preferred term was simply "Muslims", since they considered their creed to be the "pure Islam". However, critics complain these terms imply that non-Wahhabi Muslims are either not monotheists or not Muslims. Additionally, the terms ''Muwahhidun'' and Unitarians are associated with other sects, both extant and extinct.

Other terms Wahhabis have been said to use and/or prefer include ''Ahl al-Hadith'' ("People of the Hadith"), ''Salafi dawah'' ("Salafi preaching"), or ''al-da'wa ila al-tawhid'' ("preaching of monotheism" for the school rather than the adherents), ''al-Tariqa al-Salafiyya'' ("the way of the pious ancestors"), "the reform or Salafi movement of the Sheikh" (the sheikh being Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab), etc. Their self-designation ''"People of the Sunnah"'' was important for Wahhabism's authenticity, because during the Ottoman period only Sunnism was the legitimate doctrine.

Other writers such as Quinton Wiktorowicz, urge use of the term ''"Salafi"'', maintaining that "one would be hard pressed to find individuals who refer to themselves as ''Wahhabis'' or organizations that use ''Wahhabi'' in their title, or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic terminology; even then, its use is limited and often appears as ''Salafi/Wahhabi'')". A ''New York Times'' journalist writes that Saudis "abhor" the term ''Wahhabism'', "feeling it sets them apart and contradicts the notion that Islam is a monolithic faith".

Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud for example has attacked the term as "a doctrine that doesn't exist here" n Saudi Arabiaand challenged users of the term to locate any "deviance of the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia from the teachings of the Quran and Prophetic Hadiths". Professor Ingrid Mattson stated that "''Wahhbism'' is not a sect: It is a social movement that began 200 years ago to rid Islam of rigid cultural practices that had eenacquired over the centuries." In an interview given to ''The Atlantic'' magazine in 2018, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asserted that the Western usage of the term itself has been a misnomer. Stating that the terminology itself is indefinable, Mohammed bin Salman said: "When people speak of Wahhabism, they don't know exactly what they are talking about."

On the other hand, according to authors at Global Security and Library of Congress the term is now commonplace and used even by Wahhabi scholars in the Najd, a region often called the "heartland" of Wahhabism. Journalist Karen House calls ''Salafi'' "a more politically correct term" for ''Wahhabi''. In any case, according to Lacey, none of the other terms have caught on, and so like the Christian Quakers, Wahhabis have "remained known by the name first assigned to them by their detractors". However, the confusion is further aggravated due to the common practice of various authoritarian governments broadly using the label ''"Wahhabi extremists"'' for all opposition, legitimate and illegitimate, to justify massive repressions on any dissident.

Another movement, whose adherents are also called ''"Wahhabi"'' but whom were Ibaadi Kharijites, has caused some confusion in North and sub-Saharan Africa, where the movement's leader – Abd al-Wahhab ibn Abd al-Rahman – lived and preached in the eighth century CE. This movement is often mistakenly conflated with the ''Muwahhidun'' movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Wahhabism and Salafism

There is considerable confusion between Wahhabism and Salafism, but many scholars and critics draw clear distinctions between the two terms. According to analyst Christopher M. Blanchard, Wahhabism refers to "a conservative Islamic creed centered in and emanating from Saudi Arabia", while Salafism is "a more general puritanical Islamic movement that has developed independently at various times and in various places in the Islamic world". However, many view Wahhabism as the Salafism native to Arabia. Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, all ''Wahhabis'' are ''salafists'', but not all ''salafists'' are ''Wahhabis''." Quintan Wiktorowicz asserts modern Salafists consider the 18th-century scholar Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Wahhab and many of his students to have been Salafis.

According to Joas Wagemakers, associate professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies at Utrecht University, ''Salafism'' consists of broad movements of Muslims across the world who aspire to live according to the precedents of the '' Salaf al-Salih''; whereas ''"Wahhabism"'' – a term rejected by its adherents – refers to the specific brand of reformation ('' islah'') campaign that was initiated by the 18th century scholar Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and evolved through his subsequent disciples in the central Arabian region of Najd. Despite their relations with Wahhabi Muslims of Najd; other Salafis have often differed theologically with the Wahhabis and hence do not identify with them. These included significant contentions with Wahhabis over their unduly harsh enforcement of their beliefs, their lack of tolerance towards other Muslims and their deficient commitment to their stated opposition to '' taqlid'' and advocacy of '' ijtihad''.

In doctrines of '' 'Aqida'' (creed), Wahhabis and Salafis resemble each other; particularly in their focus on ''Tawhid''. However, the ''Muwahidun'' movement historically were concerned primarily about ''Tawhid al-Rububiyya'' (Oneness of Lordship) and ''Tawhid al-Uloohiyya'' (Oneness of Worship) while the ''Salafiyya'' movement placed an additional emphasis on ''Tawhid al-Asma wa Sifat'' (Oneness of Divine Names and Attributes); with a literal understanding of God's Names and Attributes.

History

The Wahhabi movement started as a revivalist and reform movement in the Arabian Peninsula during the early 18th century, whose adherents described themselves as "'' Muwahhidun''" (Unitarians). A young Hanbali cleric named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–/AH 1115–1206), the leader of the '' Muwahhidun'' and eponym of the Wahhabi movement, called upon his disciples to denounce certain beliefs and practices associated with Sufi orders as idolatrous impurities and innovations in Islam ('' bid'ah''). His movement emphasized adherence to the Quran and ''hadith'', and advocated the use of '' ijtihad''. Eventually, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab formed a pact with a local leader, Muhammad bin Saud,. "the two ... concluded a pact. Ibn Saud would protect and propagate the stern doctrines of the Wahhabi mission, which made the Koran the basis of government. In return, Abdul Wahhab would support the ruler, supplying him with 'glory and power'. Whoever championed his message, he promised, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men'." offering political obedience and promising that protection and propagation of the Wahhabi movement meant "power and glory" and rule of "lands and men".

18th and 19th century European historians, scholars, travellers and diplomats compared the Wahhabi movement with various Euro-American socio-political movements in the Age of Revolutions. Calvinist scholar John Ludwig Burckhardt, author of the well-received works "''Travels in Arabia''" (1829) and "''Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys''" (1830), described the ''Muwahhidun'' as Arabian locals who resisted Turkish hegemony and its " Napoleonic" tactics. Historian Loius Alexander Corancez in his book "''Histoire des Wahabis''" described the movement as an Asiatic revolution that sought a powerful revival of Arab civilisation by establishing a new order in Arabia and cleansing all the irrational elements and superstitions which had been normalised through Sufi excesses from Turkish and foreign influences. Scottish historian Mark Napier attributed the successes of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's revolution to assistance from "frequent interpositions of Heaven".

After the Unification of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabis were able to spread their political power and consolidate their rule over the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. After the discovery of petroleum near the Persian Gulf in 1939, Saudi Arabia had access to oil export revenues, revenue that grew to billions of dollars. This moneyspent on books, media, schools, universities, mosques, scholarships, fellowships, lucrative jobs for journalists, academics and Islamic scholarsgave Wahhabi ideals a "preeminent position of strength" in Islam around the world..

Relations with other Islamic reform movements

Islamic revivalism

The Wahhabi movement was part of the Islamic revivalist trends of the 18th and 19th centuries; such as the Mahdist movement in 19th century Sudan, Senussi movement in Libya, Fulani movement of Uthman Dan Fodio in Nigeria, Faraizi movement of Haji Shariatullah (1784–1840) in Bengal, the South Asian '' Mujahidin'' movement of Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi (1786–1831) and the Padri movement (1803–1837) in Indonesia, all of which are considered precursors to the Arab '' Salafiyya'' movement of late nineteenth century. These movements sought an Islamic Reform, renewal and socio-moral re-generation of the society through a direct return to the fundamental Islamic sources (''Qur'an'' and ''Hadith'') and responded to the military, economic, social, moral, cultural stagnation of the Islamic World. The cause of decline was identified as the departure of Muslims from the Islamic values of the early Muslims during the era of the ''Salaf'', brought about by the infiltration and assimilation of local and un-Islamic beliefs and practices. The prescribed cure for Muslim societies was therefore a return to "true Islam".

Kadizadeli

Kadizadeli (also ''Qādīzādali'') was a seventeenth-century puritanical fundamentalist religious movement in the Ottoman Empire that followed Kadızade Mehmed (1582–1635), a revivalist Islamic preacher. Kadızade and his followers were determined rivals of Sufism and popular religion. They condemned many of the Ottoman practices that Kadızade felt were bidʻah "non-Islamic innovations", and passionately supported "reviving the beliefs and practices of the first Muslim generation in the first/seventh century" (" enjoining good and forbidding wrong").

Driven by zealous and fiery rhetoric, Kadızade Mehmed was able to inspire many followers to join in his cause and rid themselves of any and all corruption found inside the Ottoman Empire. Leaders of the movement held official positions as preachers in the major mosques of Baghdad, and "combined popular followings with support from within the Ottoman state apparatus". Between 1630 and 1680 there were many violent quarrels that occurred between the Kadızadelis and those that they disapproved of. As the movement progressed, activists became "increasingly violent" and Kadızadelis were known to enter "mosques, tekkes and Ottoman coffeehouses in order to mete out punishments to those contravening their version of orthodoxy."

Ahl-i-Hadith

The Wahhabi movement was part of the overall current of various Islamic revivalist trends in the 18th century. It would be influenced by and in turn, influence many other Islamic reform-revivalist movements across the globe. The Ahl-i Hadith movement of Indian subcontinent was a Sunni revivalist movement inspired by the thoughts of Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, al-Shawkani, and Syed Ahmad Barelvi. They condemned '' taqlid'' and advocated '' ijtihad'' based on scriptures. Founded in the mid-19th century in Bhopal, it places great emphasis on hadith studies and condemns imitation to the canonical law schools. They identify with the early school of Ahl al-Hadith. During the late 19th century, Wahhabi scholars would establish contacts with Ahl-i-Hadith and many Wahhabi students would study under the Ahl-i-Hadith ''ulama'', and later become prominent scholars in the Saudi Wahhabi establishment.

The Wahhabi and Ahl-i-Hadith movements both oppose Sufi practices such as visiting shrines and seeking aid at the tombs of Islamic saints. Both the movements revived the teachings of the medieval Sunni theologian and jurist, Ibn Taymiyya, whom they both consider a Shaykh al-Islam. Suffering from the instabilities of 19th-century Arabia, many Wahhabi ''ulama'' would make their way to India and study under Ahl-i-Hadith patronage. After the establishment of Saudi Arabia and the subsequent oil boom, the Saudi Sheikhs would repay their debts by financing the Ahl-i-Hadith movement. The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Ibn Baz strongly supported the movement, and prominent Ahl-i-Hadith scholars were appointed to teach in Saudi Universities.

''Salafiyya'' movement

During the early 19th century, Egyptian Muslim scholar al-Jabarti had defended the Wahhabi movement. From the 19th century, prominent Arab ''Salafiyya'' reformers would maintain correspondence with Wahhabis and defend them against Sufi attacks. These included Shihab al Din al Alusi, Abd al Hamid al Zahrawi, Abd al Qadir al Jabarti, Abd al Hakim al Afghani, Nu'man Khayr al-Din Al-Alusi, Mahmud Shukri Al Alusi and his disciple Muhammad Bahjat al-Athari, Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, , Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Muhammad Hamid al Fiqi and most notably, Muhammad Rasheed Rida who was considered as the "leader of Salafis". All these scholars would correspond with Arabian and Indian ''Ahl-i-Hadith'' scholars and champion the reformist thought. They shared a common interest in opposing various Sufi practices, denouncing blind following and reviving correct theology and Hadith sciences. They also opened Zahiriyya library, Salafiyya library, ''Al Manar'' Library, etc., propagating Salafi thought as well as promoting scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Hazm. Rashid Rida would succeed in his efforts to rehabilitate Wahhabis in the Islamic World and would attain the friendship of many Najdi scholars. With the support of the Third Saudi State by the 1920s, a concept of ''"Salafiyya"'' emerged on a global scale claiming heritage to the thought of 18th-century Islamic reform movements and the pious predecessors (''Salaf''). Many of Rida's disciples would be assigned to various posts in Saudi Arabia and some of them would remain in Saudi Arabia. Others would spread the ''Salafi da'wa'' to their respective countries. Prominent amongst these disciples were the Syrian Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (1894–1976), Egyptian Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi (1892–1959) and the Moroccan Taqi al-Din al-Hilali (1894–1987).

The Syrian- Albanian Islamic scholar Al-Albani (), an avid reader of '' Al-Manar'' and also student of Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (disciple of Rida and Al-Qasimi), was an adherent to the ''Salafiyya'' methodology. Encouraged by their call for hadith re-evaluation and revival, he would invest himself in Hadith studies, becoming a renowned ''Muhaddith''. He followed in the footsteps of the ancient ''Ahl al-Hadith'' school and took the call of Ahl-i-Hadith. In the 1960s, he would teach in Saudi Arabia making a profound influence therein. By the 1970s, Albani's thoughts would gain popularity and the notion of "''Salafi Manhaj''" was consolidated.

Contemporary relations

Original ''Salafiyya'' and its intellectual heritage were not hostile to competing Islamic legal traditions. However, critics argue that as Salafis aligned with Saudi promoted neo-Wahhabism, religious concessions for Saudi political patronage distrted the early thrust of the renaissance movement. The early ''Salafiyya'' leaders like Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Shawkani (), Ibn al-Amir Al-San'ani (), Muhammad Rashid Rida (), etc. advocated '' Ijtihad'' (independent legal research) of Scriptures to solve the new contemporary demands and problems faced by Muslims living in a modern age through a pragmatic, juristic path faithful to the rich Islamic tradition. However, as other Salafi movements got increasingly sidelined by the Saudi-backed neo-Wahhabi Purists; the legal writings that were made easily accessible to the general public became often rigidly literalist and intolerant of the wider Sunni legal tradition, limited to a selective understanding of the Hanbalite works of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim.

The Syrian- Albanian Salafi '' Muhaddith'' Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani () publicly challenged the foundational methodologies of the neo-Wahhabite establishment. According to Albani, although Wahhabis doctrinally professed exclusive adherence to the ''Qur'an'', the ''Hadith'', and the '' Ijma'' of Salaf al-salih; in practice they almost solely relied on Hanbali jurisprudence for their ''fatwas''—acting therefore as undeclared partisans of a particular '' madhab''. As the most prominent scholar who championed anti-madhab doctrines in the 20th century, Albani held that adherence to a madhab was a '' bid'ah'' (religious innovation). Albani went as far as to castigate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a "Salafi in creed, but not in ''Fiqh''". He strongly attacked Ibn Abd al-Wahhab on several points; claiming that the latter was not a mujtahid in fiqh and accused him of imitating the Hanbali school. Albani's outspoken criticism embarrassed the Saudi clergy, who finally expelled him from the Kingdom in 1963 when he issued a '' fatwa'' permitting women to uncover their face, which ran counter to Hanbali jurisprudence and Saudi standards.

In addition, Albani would also criticise Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab for his weakness in ''hadith'' sciences. He distinguished between Salafism and Wahhabism, criticizing the latter while supporting the former. He had a complex relationship to each movement. Although he praised Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in general terms for his reformist efforts and contributions to the Muslim ''Ummah'', Albani nonetheless censured his later followers for their harshness in ''Takfir''.

In spite of this, Albani's efforts at ''hadith'' revivalism and his claims of being more faithful to the spirit of Wahhabism than Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself; made the former's ideas highly popular amongst Salafi religious students across the World, including Saudi Arabia.

Theology

In theology, Wahhabism is closely aligned with the Athari (traditionalist) school which represents the prevalent theological position of the Hanbali legal school. Athari theology is characterized by reliance on the zahir (apparent or literal) meaning of the ''Qur'an'' and ''hadith'', and opposition to rational argumentation in matters of '' 'Aqidah'' (creed) favored by Ash'arite and Maturidite theologies. However, Wahhabis diverged in some points of theology from other Athari movements.. Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab did not view the issue of God's Attributes and Names as a part of '' Tawhīd'' (monotheism), rather he viewed it in the broader context of '' aqāʾid'' (theology). While his treatises strongly emphasised ''Tawhid al-ulūhiyya'' (monotheism in Worship), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did not give prominence to the theology of God's Names and Attributes that was central to Ibn Taymiyya and the Salafi movement. Following this approach, the early Wahhabi scholars had not elucidated the details of Athari theology such as Divine Attributes and other creedal doctrines. Influenced by the scholars of the Salafiyya movement, the later Wahhabis would revive Athari theological polemics beginning from the mid-twentieth century; which lead to charges of anthropomorphism against them by opponents such as Al-Kawthari. By contrast, the creedal treatises of early Wahhabis were mostly restricted to upholding Tawhid and condemning various practices of saint veneration which they considered as shirk (polytheism). They also staunchly opposed '' Taqlid'' and advocated '' Ijtihad''.

Hammad Ibn 'Atiq () was one of the first Wahhabi scholars who seriously concerned himself with the question of God's Names and Attributes; a topic largely neglected by the previous Wahhabi scholars whose primary focus was limited to condemning idolatry and necrolatry. Ibn 'Atiq established correspondence with Athari scholars like Sīddïq Hasān Khán, an influential scholar of the ''Ahl al-Hadith'' movement in the Islamic principality of Bhopal. In his letters, Ibn 'Atiq praised ''Nayl al-Maram'', Khan's Salafi commentary on ''Qur'an'', which was published via prints in Cairo. He solicited Khan to accept his son as his disciple and requested Khan to produce and send more commentaries on the various treatises of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. Khan accepted his request and embarked on a detailed study of the treatises of both the scholars. Hammad's son Sa'd ibn Atiq would study under Khan and various traditionalist theologians in India. Thus, various Wahhabi scholars began making efforts to appropriate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's legacy into mainstream Sunni Islam by appropriating them to the broader traditionalist scholarship active across the Indian subcontinent, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, etc.

The Hanafite scholar Ibn Abi al-Izz's ''sharh'' (explanation) on Al-Tahawi's creedal treatise '' Al-Aqida al-Tahawiyya'' proved popular with the later adherents of the ''Muwahidun'' movement; who regarded it as a true representation of the work, free from Maturidi influences and as a standard theological reference for the Athari creed. A number of Salafi and Wahhabi scholars have produced super-commentaries and annotations on the ''sharh'', including Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Saleh Al-Fawzan, etc. and is taught as a standard text at the Islamic University of Madinah.

Tawhid

David Commins describes the "pivotal idea" in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching as being that "Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism were not ... misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether." This put Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching at odds with that of those Muslims who argued that the "'' shahada''" (i.e., the testimony of faith; "There is no god but God, Muhammad is his messenger") alone made one a Muslim, and that shortcomings in that person's behavior and performance of other obligatory rituals rendered them "a sinner", but "not an unbeliever.".

In Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's major work, a small book called ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', he states that '' 'Ibādah'' (Worship) in Islam consists of conventional acts of devotion such as the five daily prayers (''salat''); fasting for the holy month of Ramadan ( Sawm); Dua (supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Isti'âna (seeking help), and Istigātha to Allah (seeking benefits and calling upon Allah alone). Directing these deeds beyond Allahsuch as through ''du'a'' or ''Istigāthā'' to the dead – are acts of '' shirk'' and in violation of the tenets of ''Tawhid'' (monotheism). Based on the doctrine of ''Tawhid'' espoused in ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', the followers of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab referred themselves by the designation "''Al-Muwahhidun''" (Unitarians).

The essence of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's justification for fighting his opponents in Arabia can be summed up as his belief that the original pagans fought by Muhammad "affirmed that God is the creator, the sustainer and the master of all affairs; they gave alms, they performed pilgrimage and they avoided forbidden things from fear of God". What made them pagans whose blood could be shed and wealth plundered was that they performed sacrifices, vows and supplications to other beings. According to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, someone who perform such things even if their lives are otherwise exemplary; is not a Muslim but an unbeliever. Once such people have received the call to "true Islam", understood it and then rejected it, their blood and treasure are forfeit. Clarifying his stance on ''Takfir'', Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab states:

The disagreement between Wahhabis and their opponents over the definition of worship (''Ibadah'') and monotheism (''Tawhid'') has remained much the same since 1740, according to David Commins: "One of the peculiar features of the debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries is its apparently static nature... the main points in the debate avestay dthe same ince 1740" According to another source, Wahhabi jurists were unique for their literal interpretation of the ''Qur'an'' and ''Sunnah'' which tended to re-inforce local practices of the region of Najd. Whether the teachings of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab included the need for social renewal and "plans for socio-religious reform of society" in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than simply a return to "ritual correctness and moral purity", is disputed.

''Ijtihad'' and ''Taqlid''

The Wahhabi scholars upheld the right of qualified scholars to perform '' Ijtihad'' on legal questions and condemned '' Taqleed'' of ''Mujtahids''. This stance pitted them against the Ottoman Sufi '' ulema'' who shunned ''Ijtihad'' and obligated ''Taqleed''. The Arab '' Salafiyya'' reformers of 19th and 20th centuries would defend the Wahhabis on the ''Ijtihad'' issue as well as join forces with Wahhabis to condemn various Sufi practices and orders (''tariqats'') which they considered to be reprehensible '' Bid'ah'' (innovations). Prominent amongst those ''Salafiyya'' ''ulema'' who backed Wahhabism included Khayr al-Din al-Alusi, Tahir al-Jaza'iri, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi, etc.

Condemning the doctrine of blind-following (''Taqlid'') prevalent amongst the masses and obliging them to directly engage with the Scriptures; Sulāyman ibn Ābd-Allah Aal-Shaykh (1785–/AH 1199–1233) wrote:

The Wahhabis furthermore rejected the idea of closure of '' Ijtihad'' as an innovated principle. Although they professed adherence to Hanbali school, they refrained from taking its precepts as final. Since the issue of ''Ijtihad'' and ''Taqlid'' was amongst their principal concerns, Wahhabis developed a new set of juristic procedures to solve legal questions. Accordingly, they first search the ''Qur'an'' and ''Hadith'' as the primary sources of legislation In case the solution was not accessible from the Scriptures, the principle of '' 'Ijma'' (consensus) was employed. ''Ijma'' was restricted to Ahl al-Sunnah and consisted of consensus of ''Companions of the Prophet'', '' Salaf as-Salih'' and the consensus of scholars.

Prominent Wahhabi '' Qadi'' of the Second Saudi State, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan Aal-Al Shaykh (1782–/AH 1196–1285) strongly condemned the practice of ''taqlid'' as a form of '' shirk'' (polytheism) in his treatises, writing:

The Wahhabis also advocated a principle in Islamic legal theory often referred to as "the rule against ''Ijtihad'' reversal". This principle allows overturning a scholar's '' fatwa'' (legal judgement) when he bases it on personal ''Ijtihad'' (personal legal reasoning), rather than a clear textual source from ''Qur'an'' and ''Hadith''. In effect, this allowed the Wahhabi '' qadis'' to remain autonomous. Opponents of Wahhabi movement harshly rebuked them for advocating ''Ijtihad'' and not recognising the finality of '' mad'habs'' (law schools).

Practices

As a religious revivalist movement that works to bring Muslims back from what it considers as foreign accretions that have corrupted Islam, and believes that Islam is a complete way of life which has prescriptions for all aspects of life, Wahhabism is quite strict in what it considers Islamic behavior. The ''Muwahhidun'' movement has been described by ''The Economist'' as the "strictest form of Sunni Islam". On the other hand, religious critics assert that Wahhabism is not strict, castigating it as a distorted version of Islam that deviates from traditional Shari'a law, and argue that their practices are neither typical nor mired in the roots of Islam. Unlike other schools of Sunnism, Wahhabis admonishes to ground Islamic principles solely on the ''Qur'an'' and ''Hadith'', rejecting much material derived within Islamic culture.

This does not mean, however, that all adherents agree on what is required or forbidden, or that rules have not varied by area or changed over time. In Saudi Arabia, the strict religious atmosphere of Wahhabi doctrines were visible as late as the 1990s; such as the conformity in dress, public deportment, public prayers. Its presence was visible by the wide freedom of action of the " religious police", clerics in mosques, teachers in schools, and '' Qadis'' (i.e. judges who are religious legal scholars) in Saudi courts.

Commanding right and forbidding wrong

Wahhabism is noted for its policy of "compelling its own followers and other Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the five prayers", and for "enforcement of public morals to a degree not found elsewhere". According to the American journalist Lawrence Wright, due to Wahhabi emphasis on the "purification of Islam"; the teaching becomes very repressive to the followers.

While other Muslims might urge salat prayer, modest dress, and abstention from alcohol, for Wahhabis, prayer "that is punctual, ritually correct, and communally performed not only is urged but publicly required of men." Not only is modest dress prescribed, but the type of clothing that should be worn, especially by women (a black abaya, covering all but the eyes and hands) is specified. Not only is wine forbidden, but so are "all intoxicating drinks and other stimulants, including tobacco". While being influenced by Hanbali doctrines, the movement repudiated '' Taqlid'' to legal authorities, including oft-cited scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim (/AH 751).

Following the preaching and practice of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab that coercion should be used to enforce following of ''sharia'' (Islamic law), an official committee was empowered to "Command the Good and Forbid the Evil" (the so-called "religious police") in Saudi Arabiathe one country founded with the help of Wahhabi warriors and whose scholars and pious citizens dominated many aspects of the Kingdom's life. Committee "field officers" enforce strict closing of shops at prayer time, segregation of the sexes, prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, driving of motor vehicles by women, and other social restrictions.

A large number of practices was reported to be forbidden by Saudi Wahhabi officials, preachers or religious police. Practices that have been forbidden as Bid'a (innovation) or shirk (polytheism) and sometimes "punished by flogging" during Wahhabi history include performing or listening to music; dancing; fortune telling; amulets; non-religious television programs; smoking; playing backgammon, chess, or cards; drawing human or animal figures; acting in a play or writing fiction; dissecting cadavers, even in criminal investigations and for the purposes of medical research; recorded music played over telephones on hold; or the sending of flowers to friends or relatives who are in the hospital. Common Muslim practices Wahhabis believe are contrary to Islam include listening to music in praise of Muhammad, praying to God while visiting tombs (including the tomb of Muhammad), celebrating mawlid (birthday of the Prophet), the use of ornamentation on or in mosques, all of which is considered orthodoxy in the rest of the Islamic world. Until 2018, driving of motor vehicles by women was allowed in every country except the Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia. Certain forms of Dream interpretation, practiced by the famously strict Taliban, is sometimes discouraged by Wahhabis.

Wahhabism also emphasizes "''Thaqafah Islamiyyah''" or Islamic culture and the importance of avoiding non-Islamic cultural practices and non-Muslim friendship no matter how innocent these may appear,Husain, ''The Islamist'', 2007, p. 250 on the grounds that the ''Sunnah'' forbids imitating non-Muslims. Foreign practices sometimes punished and sometimes simply condemned by Wahhabi preachers as un-Islamic, include celebrating foreign days (such as Valentine's Day or Mothers Day) giving of flowers, standing up in honor of someone, celebrating birthdays (including the Prophet's), keeping or petting dogs. Some Wahhabi activists have warned against taking non-Muslims as friends, smiling at or wishing them well on their holidays.

Wahhabis are not in unanimous agreement on what is forbidden as sin. Some Wahhabi preachers or activists go further than the official Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars in forbidding (what they believe to be) sin. Juhayman al Utaybi declared football forbidden for a variety of reasons including it is a non-Muslim, foreign practice, because of the revealing uniforms and because of the foreign non-Muslim language used in matches. In response, the Saudi Grand Mufti rebuked such '' fatwas'' and called on the religious police to prosecute its author.

According to senior Saudi scholars, Islam forbids the traveling or working outside the home by a woman without their husband's permissionpermission which may be revoked at any timeon the grounds that the different physiological structures and biological functions of the two sexes mean that each is assigned a distinctive role to play in the family. Sexual intercourse out of wedlock may be punished with flogging,

Despite this strictness, throughout these years senior Saudi scholars in the kingdom made exceptions in ruling on what is '' haram'' (forbidden). Foreign non-Muslim troops are forbidden in Arabia, except when the king needed them to confront Saddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non-Muslims is discouraged, but not at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). Until 2018, movie theaters and driving by women were forbidden, except at the ARAMCO compound in eastern Saudi, populated by workers for the company that provides almost all the government's revenue. The exceptions made at KAUST were also in effect at ARAMCO.House, Karen Elliott, ''On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future'', Knopf, 2012, p. 9

More general rules of permissiveness changed over time. Abdulaziz Ibn Saud imposed Wahhabi doctrines and practices "in a progressively gentler form" as his early 20th-century conquests expanded his state into urban areas, especially the Hejaz. After vigorous debate Wahhabi religious authorities in Saudi Arabia allowed the use of paper money (in 1951), the abolition of slavery (in 1962), education of females (1964), and use of television (1965). Music, the sound of which once might have led to summary execution, is now commonly heard on Saudi radios. Minarets for mosques and use of funeral markers, which were once forbidden, are now allowed. Prayer attendance, which was once enforced by flogging, is no longer.

Appearance

The uniformity of dress among men and women in Saudi Arabia (compared to other Muslim countries in the Middle East) has been called by Arthur G Sharp as a "striking example of Wahhabism's outward influence on Saudi society", and an example of the Wahhabi belief that "outward appearances and expressions are directly connected to one's inward state."

A "badge" of a particularly pious Wahhabi man is a robe too short to cover the ankle, an untrimmed beard, and no cord (''Agal'') to hold the head scarf in place. The warriors of the Wahhabi Ikhwan religious militia wore a white turban in place of an ''agal''.

Propagation

''Da'wah Wahhabiyya'', or the Wahhabi mission, is the idea of spreading Wahhabism throughout the world. Tens of billions of dollars have been spent by the Saudi government and charities on mosques, schools, education materials, scholarships, throughout the world to promote the Wahhabi influences. Tens of thousands of volunteers and several billion dollars also went in support of the jihad against the atheist communist regime governing Afghanistan.

Beliefs

Adherents to the Wahhabi movement identify as Sunni Muslims. The primary Wahhabi doctrine is affirmation of the uniqueness and unity of God (''Tawhid''), and opposition to ''shirk'' (violation of tawhid"the one unforgivable sin", according to Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab). They call for adherence to the beliefs and practices of the '' Salaf al-Salih'' (exemplary early Muslims). They strongly oppose what they consider to be heterodox doctrines, particularly those held by the Sufi and Shiite traditions, such as beliefs and practices associated with the veneration of Prophets and saints. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab associated such practices with the culture of '' Taqlid'' (imitation to established customs) adored by pagan-cults of the ''Jahiliyya'' period. The movement emphasized reliance on the literal meaning of the ''Quran'' and ''hadith'', rejecting rationalistic theology ('' kalam''). Adherents of Wahhabism are favourable to derivation of new legal rulings ( ijtihad) so long as it is true to the essence of the Quran, Sunnah and understanding of the ''salaf'', and they do not regard this as ''bid'ah'' (innovation).

The movement is heavily influenced by the works of thirteenth-century Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya who rejected '' Kalam'' theology; and his disciple Ibn Qayyim who elaborated Ibn Taymiyya's ideals. Ibn Taymiyya's priority of ethics and worship over metaphysics, in particular, is readily accepted by Wahhäbis. Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was a dedicated reader and student of Ibn Taymiyya's works, such as '' Al-Aqidah Al-Wasitiyya'', ''Al-Siyasa Al-Shar'iyya'', '' Minhaj al-Sunna'' and his various treatises attacking the cult of saints and certain forms of Sufism. Expressing great respect and admiration for Ibn Taymiyya; Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab wrote:

Loyalty and disassociation

According to various sourcesscholars,.
former Saudi students, Arabic-speaking/reading teachers who have had access to Saudi text books,
and journalists Ibn `Abd al Wahhab preached and his successors preach that theirs is the one true form of Islam. According to the doctrine known as '' al-wala` wa al-bara`'' (literally, "loyalty and disassociation"), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was "imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims", and that this "enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal".
Even as late as 2003, entire pages in Saudi textbooks were devoted to explaining to undergraduates that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation. Shia critic Hamid Algar argued in 2002 that Saudi government had "discreetly concealed" this view from other Muslims "over the years" in order to depict itself as the defender of "Muslim interests".

In a reply dated 2003, the Saudi Arabian government "has strenuously denied the above allegations", including claims that "their government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education."

On Jihad

Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab defined armed jihad as a sacred endeavour that must have a valid religious justification and which can only be declared by an ''Imam''. The purpose of combat was to safeguard the community from the aggression and military attacks by various external threats. While early methods of his reformist efforts were based on preaching and educational efforts; state consolidation project of Emirate of Diriyah resulted in military conflicts with rival tribal chiefs. As a senior scholar, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab closely advised Emir Muhammad ibn Saud on military tactics; convincing him to pursue a largely defensive strategy and enjoining him to adhere to Islamic rules of warfare. The Emirate's soldiers were rigorously forbidden from launching attacks targeting women, children and non-combatant civilians.

Throughout his letters and treatises, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb maintained that the military campaigns of the Emirate of Dirʿiyya were strictly defensive and rebuked his opponents as being the first to initiate ''Takfir''. Justifying the Wahhabi military campaigns as defensive operations against their enemies, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab asserts:

This defensive approach to warfare largely got abandoned after Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's retirement in 1773. Emir Abdulaziz, Muhammad ibn Saud's son and successor, was an advocate of expansionist policy and launched offensive military campaigns. The excesses reported to have committed by soldiers of Emirate of Diriyah were regularly rebuked by the traditional Wahhabi Aal al-Shaykhs (descendants of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab) who took care to condemn and religiously delegitimise war crimes. Condemning the military excesses committed during the Wahhabi conquest of Mecca in 1218–1803, Abdullah ibn Muhammad Aal Ash-Shaykh (1751–/AH 1164–1244) stated:

Criticism of Shi'ism

Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab considered some beliefs and practices of the Shia to violate the doctrine of monotheism. DeLong-Bas maintains that when Ibn Abd al-Wahhab denounced the '' Rafidah'', he was not using a derogatory name for Shia but denouncing "an extremist sect" within Shiism who call themselves ''Rafidah''. He criticized them for assigning greater authority to their current leaders than to Muhammad in interpreting the ''Qur'an'' and ''sharia'', and for denying the validity of the consensus ('' 'Ijma'') of the early Muslim community. In his treatise "''Risalah fi al-radd ala al-Rafidah''" (Treatise/Letter on the Denial/Rejection Pertaining to the Rafidah), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab addressed thirty-two topics on points of both theology and law refuting the ''Raafida''. In doing so, Ibn Abdul Wahhab spoke as a scholar who had studied Shi'i scholarly works, outlining a broad and systematic perspective of the Shi'i worldview and theology. He also believed that the Shia doctrine of infallibility of the imams constituted associationism with God. However, at no point did Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab "suggest that violence of any sort should be used against the Rafidah or Shi'is". Rather, he implored his followers to peacefully clarify their own legal teachings. He instructed that this procedure of education and debate should be carried out with the support of truthful ''ulama'', ''hadith'' transmitters, and righteous people employing logic, rhetoric, examination of the primary texts and scholarly debates.

Although Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his son and successor 'Abdullah categorised various Shi'ite sects like ''Raafida'', Zaydis, etc. as heretics and criticized many of their tenets, they had regarded them as Muslims. Abdullah's son, Sulayman () would articulate a new doctrine of ''Takfir'' which set the foundations for the excommunication of Shi'ites outside the pale of Islam. Sulayman's doctrines were revived by later scholars of the ''Muwahhidun'' like 'Abd al-Latif ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (1810–1876) during the Ottoman annexation of Al-Hasa in 1871. Al-Hasa was a Shi'ite majority area, and Ottoman invasion was assisted by the British. The Ottoman invasion had become a major danger to the Emirate of Nejd. From 1871, 'Abd al-Latif began to write tracts harshly condemning the Ottomans, Shi'ites and British as polytheists and called upon Muslims to boycott them. Integrating the concept of '' Hijra'' into his discourse of ''Takfir'', 'Abd al-Latif also forbade Muslims to travel or stay in the lands of Ottomans, '' Rafidis'', British, etc. 'Abd al-Latif viewed the Shi'ite sects of his time as idolators and placed them outside the pale of Islam.

Views on mysticism

According to Jeffry R. Halverson, the ''Muwahidun'' movement was characterised by a strong opposition to mysticism. Although this feature is typically attributed to the influence of the classical theologian Ibn Taymiyya, Jeffry Halverson states that Ibn Taymiyyah only opposed what he saw as Sufi excesses and never mysticism in itself, being himself a member of the '' Qadiriyyah'' Sufi order. DeLong-Bas writes that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did not denounce Sufism or Sufis as a group, but rather attacked specific practices which he saw as inconsistent with the ''Qur'an'' and ''hadith''.

When he was asked on a religious matter, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab praised the pious Sufis, stating:

Scholars like Esther Peskes point to the cordial relations between the ''Muwahidun'' movement and the Sufi Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Idris and his followers in Mecca during the beginning of the 19th century; to aver that notions of absolute incompatibility between Sufism and Wahhabism are misleading. The early Wahhabi historiography had documented no mention that suggested any direct confrontations between Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and contemporary Sufis nor did it indicate that his activism was directed specifically against Sufism. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's reforms were not aimed against socio-religious orientations such as Sufism; but were directed against the status quo prevalent in Islamic societies. Thus his efforts attempted a general transformation of Islamic societies, including Sufis and non-Sufis; the elite as well as the commoners. This resulted in the widespread desacralisation of the public sphere that heralded the advent of a new socio-political model in Arabia.

Explaining the stance of early Wahhabis on ''Tasawwuf'', Abdullah Aal al-Shaykh (), son of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab writes:

Views on modernity

Since the Arabian Peninsula was never occupied by colonial powers, it wasn't directly challenged by Western modernity until the mid-twentieth century, unlike the rest of the Islamic World. While the Saudi ruling class spearheaded modernization drive across the Kingdom; response of the religious establishment to the drastic influx of modernity was varied, ranging from scholars who rejected modern influences to tech-savvy clerics who eagerly embrace modern technology and social media. Various preachers harmonise pious lifestyle with modern culture while simultaneously engaging with Muslims of diverse backgrounds across the globe through social media networks. Assisted by scholarly guidance from a wide range of Islamic revivalists across the world like Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Abul A'la Maududi, etc. The Islamic University of Medina was established in 1961 to promote a pan-Islamic response to contemporary challenges and modern ideologies. To intellectually counter the ideological spread of Western liberalism, socialism and secular nationalism; numerous works of classical scholars like Ibn Kathir, Ibn Qudama, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim, etc. were mass-distributed through Saudi publishing centres and during Pilgrimages.

On the other hand, some influential Wahhabi clerics had also been noteworthy for issuing various archaic '' fatawa'' such as declaring "that the sun orbited the Earth", and forbidding "women from riding bicycles on the grounds that they were "the devil's horses", and "from watching TV without veiling, just in case the presenters could see them through the screen". The most senior cleric in Saudi Arabia as of early 2022, Saleh Al-Fawzan, once issued a ''fatwa'' forbidding "all-you-can-eat buffets, because paying for a meal without knowing what you'll be eating is akin to gambling". Despite this, the contemporary Wahhabi religious framework has largely been able to maintain Saudi Arabia's global image as a pious society which is also aptly capable of addressing modern challenges.

To resolve the novel issues of the 20th century, King 'Abd al-Azeez ibn Saud appointed Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal Al-Shaykh () as the Grand Mufti in 1953 to head ''Dar al-Ifta'', the legal body tasked with crafting Wahhabi juristic response to the novel problems faced by Arabian Muslims. In 1971, ''Dar al-Ifta'' was re-organized to include a larger number of elder scholars to boost its intellectual output. Dar al-Ifta headed by the Saudi Grand Mufti, consists of two agencies: i) Board of Senior Ulema (BSU) ii) Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions (C.R.L.O) Wahhabi scholars advocated a positive approach to embracing technology, political affairs, etc. while maintaining a traditional stance on social issues. Contemporary ''fatwas'' also demonstrate a receptive outlook on visual media, medical field, economic affairs, etc. ''Dar al-Ifta'' became an influential institution in Arabian society and it sought a balanced approach to modernity; positioning itself between religious idealism and varying societal, economic and material demands. As a result, some scholars like Fandy Mamoun have stated that "In Saudi Arabia, different times and different places exist at once. Saudi Arabia is both a pre-modern and a post-modern society." The legal approach is characterized by taking from all law schools ('' Madhabs'') through Scriptural precedents to sustain a legal system compatible with modernity.

In opposition to the ''Taqlid'' doctrine, Wahhabi scholars advocated the proof-evaluation theory which believes in the continuous appearance of absolute '' Mujtahids'' (''Mujtahid Mutlaq'') and claims an '' 'Ijma'' (scholarly consensus) that the doors of '' Ijtihad'' remain always open. This juristic approach had enabled flexibility in response of Wahhabi legal bodies to modernity. These include the encouragement of mass-media like television, internet, etc. to promote virtue. Internet would be made publicly accessible to Saudi citizens as early as 1997. In 2000 '' fatwa'' on the internet, Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āal al-Shaykh explains:

In the financial sector, Wahhabi approach is based on Islamic economics. Islamic banking system is encouraged and digital transactions like credit cards have been sanctioned. Employing the results from observatories to sight the monthly Crescent moon is today permitted and preferred by the clerics. In the medical field, various ''fatwas'' legalising novel procedures like corneal transplant, autopsies, organ donations, etc. have been issued. In marital and gender-related issues, divorce is encouraged for incompitable marriages. On the issues of birth control, abortions and family planning, the legal bodies are conservative and generally prohibit them, viewing them as a contrary to Qur'anic commandments and Islamic principles to raise Muslim population. However, family planning measures are permitted in certain scenarios, wherein the legal principles of necessity are applicable. The Board of Senior Ulema (BSU) stated in a 1976 ''fatwa'':

Jurisprudence

Wahhabi approach to ''Fiqh'' radically challenged prevalent conventions of school ''Taqlid'' and was based on Ibn Taymiyya's broader theological call for a return to the values of the '' Salaf al-Salih''. Of the four major sources in Sunni ''Fiqh''the ''Qur'an'', the '' Sunna'', '' 'Ijma'' (juristic consensus) and ''Qiyas'' (analogical reasoning)Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's writings emphasized the ''Qur'an'' and ''Sunna''. He used '''ijma'' only "in conjunction with its corroboration of the ''Qur'an'' and ''hadith''" (and giving preference to the ''ijma'' of Muhammad's companions rather than the ''ijma'' of legal specialists after his time), and ''qiyas'' only in cases of extreme necessity. He rejected deference to past juridical opinion ('' taqlid'') in favor of independent reasoning ('' ijtihad''), and opposed using local customs. He urged his followers to "return to the primary sources" of Islam in order "to determine how the ''Qur'an'' and Muhammad dealt with specific situations" without being beholden to the interpretations of previous Islamic scholarship, while engaging in ''Ijtihad''.

Historically, many established figures from Hanbalite and Shafiite schools were noteworthy for their denunciation of ''taqlid'' since the classical period. Influenced by these scholars, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, fervently denounced ''Taqlid'' and upheld that the Gates of '' Ijtihad'' remained open. According to Edward Mortimer, it was imitation of past judicial opinion in the face of clear contradictory evidence from ''hadith'' or ''Qur'anic'' text that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab condemned.Mortimer, Edward, ''Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam'', Vintage Books, 1982, p. 61 According to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers, God's commandments to obey Him alone and follow the Prophetic teachings, necessitated a complete adherence to ''Qur'an'' and ''hadith''. This entailed a rejection of all interpretations offered by the four legal schools – including the ''Muwahhidun'''s own Hanbali school – wherein they contradict the two primary sources.

Perspective on other schools

Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab asserted that every Muslim layman, even one without modest educational credentials, have a duty to read and study the ''Qur'an'' and the ''Sunnah''; encouraging them to research religious scriptures. Regional rivals castigated him as a self-taught "ignorant" since "knowledge could come only from being taught by shaykhs" and not by treating the Scriptures as one's teacher. Although the issue of '' ijtihad'' and rejection of '' taqlid'' were central themes of his doctrines, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did not lay down his approach to '' Usul-al Fiqh'' (Principles of Jurisprudence) comprehensively. Rather, that was left to his son-in-law and pupil Hamad ibn Nasir ibn Mu'ammar (), who would explicate a clarified Wahhabi position on ''Usul al-Fiqh'', after Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Moreover, in his writings, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab relied primarily only on ''hadith'' (Prophetic traditions) rather than opinions of early Hanbali jurists. This stance arose uncertainty over his formal affiliation to the Hanbali ''mad'hab'' and would lead many local Hanbalite detractors to accuse him of undermining classical ''fiqh'' in general. Despite their conceptual doctrine based on repudiation of '' taqlid'' (emulating legal precedent) to a legal school and jettisoning the juristic super-structure that developed after the Islamic fourth century; in-order to lower clerical resistance to their campaign; Wahhabis sustained the local juristic tradition of Najd, which was based on Hanbalism.

According to an expert on law in Saudi Arabia (Frank Vogel), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself "produced no unprecedented opinions". The "Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over ''fiqh'' rules at all, but over '''aqida'', or theological positions". Professor of history at Dickinson College, David Commins also states that early disputes with other Muslims did not center on ''fiqh'', and that the belief that the distinctive character of Wahhabism stems from Hanbali legal thought is a "myth".. Some scholars are ambivalent as to whether Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali legal school. The ''Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World'' maintains Wahhabis "rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith". Cyril Glasse's '' The New Encyclopedia of Islam'' states that "strictly speaking", Wahhabis "do not see themselves as belonging to any school", and that in doing so they correspond to the ideal aimed at by Ibn Hanbal, and thus they can be said to be of his 'school'. According to DeLong-Bas, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably to ''Fiqh'', and did not consider "the opinion of any law school to be binding". In the absence of a ''hadith'', he encouraged following the examples of the companions of Muhammad rather than following a law school. He did, however, follow the Hanbali methodology of judging everything not explicitly forbidden to be permissible, avoiding the use of ''qiyas'' (analogical reasoning), and taking '' maslaha'' (public interest) and '' 'adl'' (justice) into consideration.

Ibn Mu'ammar's Legal Theory

While Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself was not inclined to adhere to a particular '' madhab'', many of his followers would perpetuate the Hanbali legal theory. Hanbali jurist Hamad ibn Nasir ibn Mu'ammar (AH 1160–1125/ 1747–) laid out a comprehensive legal theory in his treatises like
Risala al-Ijtihad wal Taqlid
' ("Treatise on Ijtihad and Taqlid") which became influential in the scholarly circles of the ''Muwahhidun''. Ibn Mu'ammar believed that maintaining the practice of ''Ijtihad'' in every era was a religious obligation and tasked the Islamic scholars for carrying out this responsibility. This was to be done through proof evaluation from the Scriptures and by employing '' Usul al-Fiqh'' (Principles of Jurisprudence). Based on one's expertise and knowledge, Ibn Mu'ammar ranked a hierarchy of '' Fuqaha'' (Islamic jurists) for carrying out the duty of issuing ''fatwas''. At the top was the absolute '' Mujtahid'' who issues verdicts solely based on the principles (''Usul'') of his madhab by independently determining the preponderant view from all the possible scenarios tracked down by himself as well as supplement the former rulings. After this came the 3 levels of partial ''Ijtihad'' which limited the scope of research: initially just to the past opinions, then to the rulings found in the 4 '' madhabs'' and finally to the views within one's own ''madhab''. The lowest of Ibn Mu'ammar's hierarchy constituted the non-Mujtahid laity who are required to directly engage with the Scriptural sources in consultation with scholars, as well as by analysing past scholarly works. Thus, Ibn Mu'ammar's legal theory strived for the reconciliation between the reformist programme of the ''Muwahhidin'' and the classical jurisprudential structures. What made Ibn Mu'ammar's proposed system unique was its "microcosmic" and flexible nature; which permitted the scholars to simultaneously represent different ranks within the hierarchy to carry out their responsibilities of ''Ijtihad''.

The Wahhabi legal theory stipulated proof-evaluation based on Hanbali principles as one of its major hallmarks. By claiming themselves as Hanbali, ''Muwahhidun'' scholars implied directly adhering to the five '' Usul al-Fiqh'' (Principles of jurisprudence) of the Hanbali school. Despite the main methodology of ''Wahhabi movement'' being derived from Hanbalite Ahl al-Hadith, scholars also take the rulings from other ''Madhhabs'', as long they regard them as being verified through Hadith and traditions or Sunnah authenticated by Sahabah. (''Qaul Sahabiyyah'' according to modern contemporary Muslim scholars). Prominent Wahhabi scholar Muhammad ibn Salih al-Uthaymeen derived rulings from the Shafiite jurisprudence in his commentary of The Meadows of the Righteous book authored by al-Nawawi, wherein the Ijtihad (reasoning) of Abu Hurairah was taken by al-Nawawi for rulings of Wudu (ablution ritual).

Social reform

Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab concerned himself with the social reformation of his people. He stressed the importance of education, especially for females and encouraged women to be active in educational endeavours and lead various communal and social activities. Diriyah had become a major centre of learning and foreign travellers often noted the higher literacy rates of townsfolk of Central Arabia. In line with his methodology, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab also denounced the practice of instant ''triple talaq'', counting it as only a single ''talaq'' (regardless of the number of pronouncements). The outlawing of ''triple talaq'' has been considered to be one of the most significant reforms in the Islamic World in the 20th and 21st centuries. As an 18th-century reformer, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab advocated ''Ijtihad'' of qualified scholars in accordance with the teachings of ''Qur'an'' and ''Hadeeth''. His thoughts reflected the major trends apparent in the 18th-century Islamic reform movements. Numerous significant socio-economic reforms would be advocated by the Imam during his lifetime. After his death, his followers continued his legacy. Notable jurists like Ibn Mu'ammar (AH 1160–1225/ 1747–) would issue ground-breaking '' fatwas'' (legal verdicts) on contemporary issues such as authorization of small-pox vaccinations; at a time when opposition to small-pox vaccinations was widespread among the scientific and political elites of Europe. Many women were influential in various reformist endeavours of the ''Muwahhidun''; such as mass-education, communal activities, campaigns against superstitions, etc. These included Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's own daughter Fatimah, a revered Islamic scholar who travelled far and wide; and taught numerous men and women. However, future events such as the destruction of the Emirate of Diriyah in the Wahhabi Wars of 1818, subsequent persecution of Salafis and other Islamic reformers, etc. would result in a halt to the social reforms implemented by the Wahhabi jurists and their suspicions towards the outside world would linger throughout the 19th century.

With the resurgence of rising reform currents of '' Salafiyya'' across the Muslim world from the late 19th century, the Wahhabis of Najd too underwent a rejuvenation. After the establishment of the Third Saudi State and Unification of Saudi Arabia, a ''Salafiyya'' Global movement would crystallise with the backing of a state. Ibn Saud's reforms would get criticism from zealots amongst some of his Wahhabi clergy-men; reminiscent of the 19th-century harshness. However, other '' ulema'' would allow them, eventually paving way for gradual reforms in KSA. Thus, new education policies would be approved that taught foreign languages, sciences, geography, etc. Overruling the objections of '' Ikhwan'', the Wahhabi ''ulema'' would permit the introduction of telegraph and other wireless communication systems. Soon after, oil industries would be developed with the discovery of petroleum. Influential clerics such as Mufti Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal ash-Shaykh would endorse female education.

Politics

According to ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab; there are three objectives for Islamic government and society: "to believe in Allah, enjoin good behavior, and forbid wrongdoing". This doctrine has been sustained in missionary literature, sermons, '' fatwa'' rulings, and explications of religious doctrine by Wahhabis since the death of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab saw a role for the ''Imam'', "responsible for religious matters", and the '' Amir'', "in charge of political and military issues". Despite this, in Saudi history; the ''Imam'' had not been a religious preacher or scholar, but Muhammad ibn Saud and the subsequent Saudi dynastic rulers.

He also believed that the Muslim ruler is owed unquestioned allegiance as a religious obligation from his subjects; so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God ('' Shari'ah''). A Muslim must present a '' bay'ah'' (oath of allegiance) to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death. Any counsel given to a ruler from community leaders or ''ulama'' should be private, not through public acts such as petitions, demonstrations, etc. This principle caused confusion during the dynastic disputes of the Second Saudi State during the late 19th-century, when rebels succeeded in overthrowing the monarch, to become ruler. While it gave the king a wide range of power, respecting ''shari'a'' does impose limits, such as giving '' qadi'' (Islamic judges) independence. This meant non-interference in their deliberations, as well as not codifying laws, following precedents or establishing a uniform system of law courtsboth of which violate the ''qadi's'' independence.

Wahhabis have traditionally given their allegiance to the House of Saud, but a movement of " Salafi jihadis" has emerged in the contemporary among those who believe that Al-Saud has abandoned the laws of God.. According to Zubair Qamar, while the "standard view" is that "Wahhabis are apolitical and do not oppose the State", there is another "strain" of Wahhabism that "found prominence among a group of Wahhabis after the fall of the second Saudi State in the 1800s", and post 9/11 is associated with Jordanian/Palestinian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and "Wahhabi scholars of the ' Shu'aybi' school".

Wahhabis share the belief of Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Islamic dominion over politics and government and the importance of '' da'wah'' (proselytizing or preaching of Islam) not just towards non-Muslims but towards erroring Muslims. However Wahhabi preachers are conservative and do not deal with concepts such as social justice, anticolonialism, or economic equality, expounded upon by Islamist Muslims.. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's original pact promised whoever championed his message, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men'." While socio-political issues constituted a major aspect of his reformist programme, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab nonetheless didn't advocate revolutionary overthrowal of the ruling order to establish a Caliphate across the Muslim world. Following the classical Sunni understanding, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab advocated accommodation with the status quo, stating:
18th and 19th century European travellers, ambassadors and writers considered the ''Muwahhidun'' as championing an "Islamic revolution" that campaigned for a pristine Islam stripped of all complex rituals, cultural accretions, superstitions, etc. and a simpler creedal ethos based on universal brotherhood and fraternity; analogous to various European frondeurs during the Age of Revolutions. Contemporary European diplomats and observers who witnessed its emergence drew parallels with the American and French revolutions in Wahhabi opposition to Ottoman clerical hierarchy and foreign imperialism; with some even labelling them as "Wahhabi Jacobins" and its reformist efforts as a sort of "Protestantism".

Cambridge historian Christopher Allen Bayly noted that the religious movement of the Arabian ''Muwahhidun'' also had a revolutionary political programme comparable to the European revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries. The difference lied in their political language; wherein themes of anti-imperialism, opposition to foreign aggression, promotion of civic values, duties & rights, etc. were conveyed to the local populace in terms of Islamic values. Tracing the movement's popularity to the wider phenomenon of Ottoman decline, the far-reaching impacts of the French revolution on the Arab world; and deciphering the sudden collapse of its revolutionary Emirate to invasion by military despots of the old order; Bayly wrote:

Prevalence

The Wahhabi movement, while predominant across Saudi Arabia, was established from the Najd region, and it is there that its conservative practices have the strongest support, more so than in regions in the kingdom to the east or west of it. Cyril Glasse credits the softening of some Wahhabi doctrines and practices outside of the Najd region on the conquest of the Hejaz region "with its more cosmopolitan traditions and the traffic of pilgrims which the new rulers could not afford to alienate". Aside from Saudi Arabia, the only other country whose native population is predominantly Wahhabi is the adjacent gulf monarchy of Qatar. Estimates of the number of adherents to Wahhabism vary.

The "boundaries" of Wahhabism have been called "difficult to pinpoint", but in contemporary usage, the terms "''Wahhabi''" and "''Salafi''" are sometimes used interchangeably, and they are considered to be movements with different roots that have merged since the 1960s. However, Wahhabism is generally recognised as form of Salafism", contextualised as an ultra-conservative, Saudi brand of the wider movement. Muhammad Iqbal, praised the 18th-century Najdi movement as "the first throb of life in modern Islam", and noted that its influence on 19th-century religious reformers was "traceable, directly or indirectly nnearly all the great modern movements of Muslim Asia and Africa".

Notable leaders

There has traditionally been a recognized head of the Wahhabi "religious estate", often a member of Al ash-Sheikh (a descendant of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab) or related to another religious head. For example, Abd al-Latif was the son of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan.
* Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) was the founder of the Wahhabi movement.
* 'Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1752–1826) was the head of Wahhabism after his father retired from public life in 1773. After the fall of the first Saudi emirate, Abd Allah went into exile in Cairo where he died.
* Sulayman ibn 'Abd Allah (1780–1818) was a grandson of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and author of an influential treatise that restricted travel to and residing in land of idolaters.
* 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan (1780–1869) was head of the religious estate in the second Saudi emirate.
* 'Abd al-Latif ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (1810–1876) Head of religious estate in 1860 and early 1870s.
* Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Latif Al ash-Sheikh (1848–1921) was the head of religious estate during period of Rashidi rule and the early years of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud.
* Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al ash-Sheikh (1893–1969) was the head of Wahhabism in mid twentieth century. He has been said to have "dominated the Wahhabi religious estate and enjoyed unrivaled religious authority".
* Ghaliyya al-Wahhabiyya was a Bedouin woman from the town of Turubah who rose to the rank of "''Amira al-Umara''" ( generalissimo) and led Wahhabi forces in defending Mecca during the Ottoman-Saudi Wars.
* 'Abd al-Azeez ibn Baz (1910–1999) has been called "the most prominent proponent" of Wahhabism during his time.
* Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925–2001) is another "giant". According to David Dean Commins, no one "has emerged" with the same "degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment" since their deaths.

International influence and propagation

Explanation for influence

Khaled Abou El Fadl listed four major factors that contributed to expansion of Wahhabi ideas across the Islamic World:
* The appeal of Arab nationalism, which considered the Ottoman Empire to be a foreign occupying power and took a powerful precedent from the Wahhabi rebellion against the Ottomans
* Wahhabi calls for a return to the pristine Islam of the '' Salaf al-Salih'' (righteous predecessors) which rejected much of the classical legal precedents; instead deriving directly from ''Qur'an'', ''Hadith'' and the sayings of the ''Salaf''; through '' Ijtihad''. This also appealed to the Islamic reformers who pushed for a revival of ''ijtihad'', and a direct return to the original sources for interpreting the ''Qur'an'' and ''Sunnah'', to seek solutions to the present day problems.
* Control of Mecca and Medina, which allowed the King of Saudi Arabia to take the mantle of " Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques". This enabled the Wahhabis to exert great influence on Islamic culture and thinking;
* Saudi Oil industry, especially after its boom during the 1970s energy crisis, allowed Saudi Arabia to successfully promote their interpretations of Islam throughout the Islamic World.

Peter Mandaville lists two more reasons:
* Societal factors: With the influx of modernity, younger generations of Muslims increasingly departed from the "localized" religious understanding of their parents and looked up to a pan-Islamic outlook authentically rooted in Scriptures and early generations of '' Salaf al-Salih''
* Rise of other native Islamic reformist movements such as the '' Ahl-e Hadith'' in South Asia and the '' Salafiyya'' movement in the Arab world which shared a common religious outlook. These movements expanded collaboration in various socio-economic, political and educational fields and formed a joint intellectual alliance. Additionally, influential conservative reform movements like Deobandism began co-operating with Wahhabis to a certain extent, despite doctrinal variations

According to French scholar and critic of Islamism Gilles Kepel, the tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s and the progressive takeover of Saudi Aramco in the 1974–1980 period, provided the source of much influence of Wahhabism in the Islamic World.

Funding

Estimates of Saudi spending on religious causes abroad include "upward of $100billion"; $2–3billion per year since 1975 (compared to the annual Soviet propaganda budget of $1billion/year);Yahya Birt, an academic who is director of The City Circle, a networking body of young British Muslim professionals, quoted i
Wahhabism: A deadly scripture
, Paul Vallely 1 November 2007 and "at least $87billion" from 1987 to 2007. Reliability of these rough estimates have been disputed due to their inconsistencies and lack of a scientific methodology for precise quantification.

Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim world, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.Dawood al-Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' ''Al-Hayat'', 19 May 2003 It extended to young and old, from children's madrasas to high-level scholarship. "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for. It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.Murphy, Caryle, ''Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience'', Simon and Schuster, 2002 p. 32 Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools". Apart from state patronage, a major source of proselytization has been the private charities and religious activities of Muslim individuals and organizations.

This financial aid has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew, arguing that it caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam") to be perceived as the correct interpretationor the "gold standard" of Islamin many Muslims' minds.

Peter Mandaville asserts that the commonly reported data estimates regarding Saudi religious funding are unreliable due to the sources being "internally inconsistent" and based on "non-specific hearsay". According to Mandaville, the wide-ranging and controversial usage of the term "Wahhabism" has rendered researching Saudi religious transnationalism and assessing its actual magnitude even more confusing. Moreover, the post-Cold War era governments had commonly used the label "Wahhabism" to designate a wide swathe of religious sects, including those which were doctrinally at odds with Wahhabism.

Militant and political Islam

Allegations of links between Wahhabism proper and the ideology of militant Islamists such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State, have been disputed. Throughout the 20th century Board of Senior Ulema (BSU) of the ''Dar al-Ifta'' in Saudi Arabia, were known for issuing ''fatawa'' which strongly condemned various forms of war crimes and terrorism, in line with Islamic military jurisprudence. In a well-known '' fatwa'' issued at its 32nd session in Ta'if on 25 August 1988, the board members recommended the death penalty for acts of terrorism. Moreover, the Wahhabi '' ulema'' of Saudi Arabia had ruled the illegality of all forms of suicide bombings, including in Israel. The doctrine of suicide bombings which started appearing in the manuals of various Egyptian extremists during the 1970s and 1980s; has been rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi scholars. Jonathan Sozek reports that while Bin Laden self-identified as a Salafist, he was not affiliated with the Wahhabi movement.

The Yemeni origins of the Bin Laden family also reflected a non-Wahhabi heritage. Bin Laden's feud with the Saudi government intensified during the Gulf War; prompting Saudi authorities to place Bin Laden under house arrest in 1991, before exiling him the same year. In 1994, Saudi Arabia revoked Bin Laden's citizenship and froze all his assets, turning him into a fugitive and the Bin Laden family disowned him. After Saudi pressure on Sudan, the Al-Qaeda leader sought refuge under the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Taliban's denial of Saudi requests to extradite Bin Laden led to a diplomatic row between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. Throughout the 1990s, mainstream Wahhabi clerics in the Kingdom supported US-Saudi alliance against Ba'athist Iraq during the Gulf War and condemned terrorist acts by Al-Qaeda. Anti-establishment Wahhabi scholars have also been vehemently opposed to tactics advocated by Bin Laden, not withstanding their opposition to American foreign policy in West Asia. Scholars like Professor F. Gregory Gause have strongly opposed hysterical assertions made by war hawks in the Bush administration, contrasting their portrayals of Wahhabism with attempts made by far-right militants to appropriate American patriotism.

Contemporary discourse

In contemporary discourse, the post-Soviet states widely employ the term ''"Wahhabism"'' to denote any manifestation of Islamic assertion in neighbouring Muslim countries. During the Soviet-era, the Muslim dissidents were usually labelled with terms such as "Sufi" and "fanatic" employing Islamophobic discourses that aroused hysteria of an underground religious activists threatening the stability of the Marxist order. By the late 1990s, the ''"Wahhabi"'' label would become the most common term to refer to the alleged "Islamic menace" in state propaganda, while "Sufism" was invoked as a "moderate" force that balanced the "radicalism" of those who were being accused as ''"Wahhabis"''. The old-guard of the post-Soviet states found the label useful to depict all opposition as extremists, thereby bolstering their 'strongman' credentials. In short, any Muslim critical of the religious or political status quo, came at risk of being labelled ''"Wahhabi"''.

According t
M. Reza Pirbhai
Associate Professor of History at Georgetown University, notions of a ''"Wahhabi conspiracy"'' against the West have in recent times resurfaced in various sections of the Western media; employing the term as a catch-all phrase to frame an official narrative that erases the concerns of broad and disparate disenchanted groups pursuing redress for local discontentment caused by neo-colonialism. The earliest mention of ''"Wahhabism"'' in ''The New York Times'' had appeared in a 1931 editorial which described it as a "traditional" movement; without associating it with "militant" or " anti-Western" trends. Between 1931 and 2007, ''The New York Times'' published eighty-six articles that mentioned the word ''"Wahhabism"'', out of which six articles had appeared before September 2001, while the rest were published since. During the 1990s, it began to be described as "militant", but not yet as a hostile force. By the 2000s, the 19th century terminology of ''"Wahhabism"'' had resurfaced, reprising its role as the " 'fanatical' and 'despotic' antithesis of a civilized world. Reza Pirbhai asserts that this use is deployed to manufacture an official narrative that assists imperial purposes by depicting a coherent and coordinated international network of ideological revolutionaries. Common neo-liberal depictions of ''Wahhabism'' define it as a collection of restrictive dogmas, particularly for women, while neo-conservative depictions portray "Wahhabis" as "savages" or "fanatics".

Criticism and support

Criticism by other Muslims

Wahhabism has been critizized by traditional Muslims as a deviant sect sometimes in Satanic terms. Both Sunnis and Shias do not view Wahhabism as a revival or reform movement, but as a separate sect. It is not so much strict and uncompromising as aberrant, going beyond the bounds of Islam in its restricted definition of ' (Islamic monotheistic tenets), and much too willing to commit (excommunicate) Muslims found in violation of Wahhabi doctrines. According to some sources, during the second Wahhabi-Saudi conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, an estimated 400,000 were killed or wounded according to some estimates. Some Muslims also consider Wahhabism to be outside of Islam; a form of apostasy. Other Muslims see Wahhabism as being created by Imperialists in an attempt to divide and weaken the Muslim World. Muhammad bin Saud's agreement to wage jihad to spread Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's teachings has been linked to Najdi practice of raiding"instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre"than with religion;

From a theological perspective, Wahhabism has been linked to the Horn of Najd, which allegedly predicted the arrival of the Devil or the False Prophet, the place where Wahhabism was founded. This view is further supported by Sunni Clerics of Al-Azhar who declared Wahhabism to be "a satanic faith which has led to division, debate, dishonesty, and mistrust of Muslims". The doctrines upheld by Wahhabism are considered as deviant from traditional Islamic teachings. The rejection of (imitation of juristic precedent) and advocate opening of (independent legal judgement) would have resulted in various ideological pretensions that "erode the very essence of Islam". Sufi traditionalists strongly emphasize the necessity of taqlid to the four major (legal schools) and invoke the teachings and legacy of its founders to defend the ''madhhab''-based legal system. The rejection of the "orthodox" belief in saints, a belief which had become a cardinal doctrine in Sunni Islam very early on, represents a departure from something which has been an "integral part of Islam... for over a millennium."

Initial criticism

It has been reported that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's father was critical of his son. The dispute arose when Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab began his public '' da'wa'' activities in Huraymila. However, none of the sources state the exact nature of this disagreement. Salafi scholar al-Uthaymin noted that it probably was not concerning an issue of '' 'Aqidah'' (beliefs) as Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, "did not lend any support to the saint-cults and other false practices". It is speculated that they disputed over payment of judges in solving disputes and in the manner of giving '' da'wa'', spreading Islamic teachings. Until his father's death in AH 1153; Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was not overly active and public in his ''da'wah'' efforts.

Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's brother allegedly wrote a book in refutation of his brother's new teachings, called: "The Final Word from the Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Sayings of the Scholars Concerning the School of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab", also known as:
"Al-Sawa`iq al-Ilahiyya fi Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya" ("The Divine Thunderbolts Concerning the Wahhabi School"). It has been reported that his brother repented and eventually returned to his call.

In "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932", Hamadi Redissi provides original references to the description of Wahhabis as a divisive sect (''firqa'') and outliers ('' Kharijites'') in communications between Ottomans and Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali. Redissi details refutations of Wahhabis by scholars ( muftis); among them Ahmed Barakat Tandatawin, who in 1743 describes Wahhabism as ignorance (''Jahala'').

Sunni criticism

Turkish columnist Ekrem Buğra Ekinci wrote an article in the pro- AKP newspaper '' Daily Sabah'', in which he argued against classifying Wahhabism as part of Sunnism. According to British writer Simon Ross Valentine, Wahhabism has been vehemently criticized by many Sunni Muslims and some Islamic scholars in the strongest terms as a "new faction, a vile sect"..

In the 18th century, prominent Ottoman Hanafi scholar Ibn Abidin declared the Wahhabi movement of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab to be a modern-day manifestation of the Kharijites. He said:

The followers of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab considered the ideas of the Hanbali theologian Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya () highly attractive and made him their central classical scholarly reference. However, for centuries Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts were mostly ignored by those who constituted the scholarly mainstream; who would accuse the Wahhabis for overemphasizing the scholarly works of Ibn Taymiyya. It was only during the 19th century that Ibn Taymiyya came to exercise prominent scholarly influence over Muslim youth and by the 20th century he would be a major reference for Islamic revolutionaries. On the other hand, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab would deny that he had bias towards Ibn Taymiyya; and states in ''Hadiyya al-Thaniyya'':

Another early rebuttal of Wahhabism came from the Sunni Sufi jurist Ibn Jirjis, who argued that supplicating the saints is permitted to whoever "declares that there is no god but God and prays toward Mecca" for, according to him, supplicating the saints is not a form of worship but merely calling out to them, and that worship at graves is not idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buried saints have the power to determine the course of events. These arguments were specifically rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi leader at the time.

= Turkey

=
The leader of the Gulen movement, Fethullah Gülen accused Arabs of conspiring against the Ottoman Empire as well as reducing Islam strictly to Wahhabism and Arab norms.

= South Asia

=
Opposition to Wahhabism emerged in South Asia during the early 19th century; which was led by prominent Islamic scholar and theologian Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (1796–1861). By the late 19th century, the anti-Wahhabi campaign in South Asia was led by Ahmed Raza Khan (1856–1921) and his disciples, who engaged in extensive written refutations and polemics against Wahhabism. His movement became known as the Barelvi movement and was defined by rejection of Wahhabi beliefs.

= Lebanon

=
The transnational Lebanon-based Al-Ahbash movement uses takfir against Wahhabi and Salafi leaders. The head of Al-Ahbash, Abdullah al-Harari accuses Wahhabis of falling into anthropomorphic descriptions of God and imitating polytheists.

= United States

=
The Sufi Islamic Supreme Council of America founded by the Naqshbandi Sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbani condemn Wahhabism as "extremist" and "heretical"; accusing it of being a terrorist ideology that labels other Muslims, especially Sufis as polytheists, a practice known as takfir.

Non-religious motivations

According to French Political Scientist Gilles Kepel, the alliance between Ibn 'Abd-al Wahhab and the tribal chief Muhammad ibn Saud to wage ''jihad'' on neighboring allegedly ignorant Muslims, was a "consecration" by Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab since he renamed the Saudi tribe's long-standing raids as Jihad. Part of the Najd's " Hobbesian state of perpetual war pitted Bedouin tribes against one another for control of the scarce resources that could stave off starvation." And a case of substituting ''fath'', "the 'opening' or conquest of a vast territory through religious zeal", for the "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre".

Support

Pakistani poet Muhammad Iqbal praised the movement as an influential endeavour of Islamic Golden Age that campaigned to put an end to the general stagnation of Muslims, while saying that:

Salafi scholar Bilal Philips asserted that the charge of " Wahhabi" was deployed by the proponents of ''Madh'hab'' fanaticism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to ''Takfir'' (excommunicate) the legal non-conformists. According to Philips:

Syrian- Egyptian Islamic revivalist scholar Muhammad Rashid Rida was one of the most influential supporters of the Wahhabi movement during the 20th century. Rida had developed favourable views towards the Wahhabis as early as his arrival in Egypt during the 1890s; after reading about the movement in the histories of Al-Jabartī and Al-Nāṣiri. Rida asserted that the social and military expansion of the Wahhabi movement could successfully launch an authentic Islamic revival throughout the Islamic World. Rida believed that the decline of Muslims was a result of the stagnation caused by the excesses of Sufism; which had distorted the pristine message of Islam. As a leading figure of the Salafiyya movement, Rida launched his project of re-habilitating WahhabismRashid Rida, al-Manar, vol 8. No. 731, 732. and would popularise Najdi scholarly treatises across the Muslim World through his '' Al-Manar'' printing press.

Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, had openly expressed his view in his book , that the progressive '' Tajdid'' movement by Wahhabis was essentially a positive influence on Islam globally, particularly in developing nations struggling to gain independence. Sukarno also appreciated the "wisdom of Ibn Saud to support Wahhabi scholars in their effort to reject various one thousand one kind of Bidʻah". It is argued by some that Sukarno was also influenced by Islamist figures such as Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi, Agus Salim, and particularly Hamka, his elementary teacher.

According to notable Arab Linguist Taha Hussein (1889–), the Wahhabi movement was new, yet simultaneously old. Although it was novel for its contemporary generations, it was also ancient in its powerful calls for return to a pure Islam untainted by the impurities of '' Shirk'' (polytheism). Acclaiming its role in the Arab Awakening and intellectual renewal, Taha Hussein states:

See also

* '' Ahl-i Hadith''
* '' Islah''
* '' Salafiyya''
* Decline and modernization of the Ottoman Empire
* Destruction of early Islamic heritage sites in Saudi Arabia
* International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism
* Islamic schools and branches
* Muslim World League
* Ottoman–Saudi War
* Petro-Islam
* Quran
* Schools of Islamic theology
* Shia–Sunni relations
* Sufi–Salafi relations
* Aqidah

References

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

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Further reading

* Burckhardt, John Lewis
''Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys''
H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830.
*
* De Gaury, Gerald and Stark, Freya, ''Arabia Phoenix'', Kegan Paul International Limited,
* Holden, David and Johns, Richard, ''The House of Saud'', Pan, 1982,
* Imran N. Hosein (1996)
'The Caliphate, the Hejaz and the Saudi-Wahhabi Nation-State'
. New York: Masjid Darul Qur'an.
*
* Al-Rasheed, Madawi, ''A History of Saudi Arabia'', Cambridge University Press, 2002,
*
* Oliver, Haneef James, ''The 'Wahhabi' Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link with Bin Laden'', TROID Publications, 2004,
* Quist, B. Wayne and Drake, David F., ''Winning the War on Terror: A Triumph of American Values'', iUniverse, 2005,
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Islamism
Sunni Islamic branches
Islamic fundamentalism
Sunni Islamic movements