Sources
Canonical texts
The main source of this tradition is the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Pitaka. The texts of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Pitaka are: * '' Sangītiparyāya'' ('Discourses on Gathering Together'), essentially a commentary on the ''Samgiti-sutra'' (T 9, Digha-nikaya no. 33). * '' Dharmaskandha'' ('Aggregation of Dharmas'), a list of key doctrinal topics. * '' Prajñāptiśāstra'' ('Treatise on Designations'), a list of doctrinal topics followed by question and answer sections. * '' Dhātukāya'' ('Collection of Elements'), similar to the ''Dhātukathā,'' though it uses a different doctrinal list of dharmas. * '' Vijñānakāya'' ('Collection of Consciousness'), attributed to master Devasarman. It is here that the existence of all dharmas through past, present and future, is first found. * '' Prakaraṇapāda'' ('Exposition') Together, these comprise the Six Treatises ( Chinese: 六足論;Exegetical texts
The ''Jñānaprasthāna'' became the basis for Sarvastivada exegetical works called ''vibhāṣa'', which were composed in a time of intense sectarian debate among the Sarvāstivādins in Kashmir. These compendia not only contain sutra references and reasoned arguments but also contain new doctrinal categories and positions. The most influential of these was the ''Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra'' ("Great Commentary"), a massive work which became the central text of the Vaibhāṣika tradition who became the Kasmiri Sarvāstivāda Orthodoxy under the patronage of the Kushan empire. There are also two other extant vibhāṣa compendia, though there is evidence for the existence of many more of these works which are now lost. The ''Vibhāṣa Śāstra'' of Sitapani and the ''Abhidharma Vibhāṣa Śāstra'' translated by Buddhavarman c. 437 and 439 CE are the other extant Vibhasa works. Though some scholars claim the ''Mahāvibhāṣa'' dates to the reign of Kanishka during the first century CE, this dating is uncertain. However, we at least know it was translated into Chinese by the late 3rd or early 4th century CE.Treatises
In addition to the canonical Sarvāstivādan Abhidharma, a variety of expository texts or treatises were written to serve as overviews and introductions to the Abhidharma. The best known belonging to the Sarvāstivāda tradition are: * ''Abhidharma-hṛdaya-sastra'' (''The Heart of Abhidharma''), by the Tocharian Dharmasresthin, circa 1st. century B.C., Bactria. It is the oldest example of a systematized Sarvāstivāda treatise. * ''Abhidharma-āmrtaṛasa'' (''The Taste of the Deathless'') by the Tocharian Ghoṣaka, 2nd century AD, based on the above work. * ''Abhidharma-hṛdaya-sastra'' (''The Heart of Abhidharma'') by Upasanta, also based on Dharmasresthin's ''hṛdaya-sastra''. * ''Samyuktabhidharma-hṛdaya'' by Dharmatrata, also based on Dharmasresthin's ''hṛdaya-sastra''. * ''Dharmas
Dharmas and their characteristics
All Buddhist schools of Abhidharma divided up the world into "dharmas" (phenomena, factors, or "psycho-physical events"), which are the fundamental building blocks of all phenomenal experience.Ronkin, NoaA dharma is defined as that which holds its intrinsic characteristic (''svalakṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmaḥ''). The intrinsic characteristic of the dharma called rūpa, for example, is the susceptibility of being molested (''rūpyate''), obstructability and visibility; that of another dharma called vedanā is sensation, etc. And for a dharma to be a dharma, its intrinsic characteristic must be sustainable throughout time: A rūpa remains as a rūpa irrespective of its various modalities. It can never be transformed into another different dharma (such as vedanā). Thus, a uniquely characterizable entity is a uniquely real (in the absolute sense) entity, having a unique intrinsic nature (''svabhāva''): “To be existent as an absolute entity is to be existent as an intrinsic characteristic (''paramārthena sat svalakṣaṇena sad ityarthaṛ'').”This idea is seen in the ''Jñānaprasthāna'' which states: "dharmas are determined with respect to nature and characteristic ...Dharmas are determined, without being co-mingled. They abide in their intrinsic natures, and do not relinquish their intrinsic natures (T26, 923c)." According to Vaibhāṣikas, the ''svabhāvas'' of dharmas are those things that exist substantially (''dravyasat'') as opposed to those things which are made up of aggregations of dharmas and thus only have a nominal existence (''prajñaptisat''). This distinction is also termed the doctrine of the two truths, which holds that there is a conventional truth ( ''saṁvṛti'') that refers to things which can be further analyzed, divided or broken up into smaller constituents and an ultimate truth (''paramārtha'') referring to that which resists any further analysis. Thus, a dharma's intrinsic characteristic (''svalakṣaṇa'') and the very ontological existence of a dharma (i.e. '' svabhāva,'' "intrinsic nature"'','' or ''dravya,'' "substance") is one and the same. For the Vaibhāṣika school, this "own nature" (''svabhāva'') was said to be the characteristic of a dharma that persists through the three times (past, present and future).Westerhoff, 2018, p. 70. Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma also describes dharmas as having "common characteristics" (''sāmānya-lakṣaṇa''), which applies to numerous dharmas (for example, impermanence applies to all material dharmas and all feelings, etc.). Only the mental consciousness can cognize common characteristics. However, the intrinsic characteristics of a dharma have a certain kind of relativity due to the relationship between various dharmas. For example, all rūpa (form) dharmas have the common characteristic of resistance, but this is also an intrinsic characteristic with respect to other dharmas like vedanā (feeling).Dhammajoti (2009) p. 21. Also, various sources state that the intrinsic nature of a dharma is "weak" and that they are interdependent with other dharmas. The ''Mahāvibhāṣa'' states that "conditioned dharmas are weak in their intrinsic nature, they can accomplish their activities only through mutual dependence" and that "they have no sovereignty (''aisvarya''). They are dependent on others." Thus, an intrinsic nature (''svabhāva)'' arises due to dependently originated processes or relationships between various dharmas and therefore, a ''svabhāva'' is not something which is completely ontologically independent.
Classification of dharmas
Abhidharma thought can be seen as an attempt at providing a complete account of every type of experience. Therefore, an important part of Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma comprises the classification, definition and explanation of the different types of dharma as well as the analysis of conventional phenomena and how they arise from the aggregation of dharmas. Thus there is the element of dividing up things into their constituents as well as the element of synthesis, i.e. how dharmas combine to make up conventional things. The Vaibhāṣikas made use of classic early Buddhist doctrinal categories such as the five skandhas, the sense bases ( ayatanas) and the "eighteen dhātus". Beginning with the ''Pañcavastuka'' of Vasumitra, the Vaibhāṣikas also adopted a five group classification of dharmas which outlined a total of 75 types of phenomena.Dhammajoti (2009), pp. 35-37. The five main classifications of dharmas are: * ''''Rūpa'' (matter)
Matter is that which is "subject to deterioration or disintegration." As Vasubandhu says, it is what "is repeatedly molested/broken" by contact. The main way of defining matter for Vaibhāṣikas is that it has two main distinctive natures: resistance (''sa-pratighātatva''), which is “the hindrance to the arising of another thing in its own location,” and visibility (''sa-nidarśanatva''), which allows one to locate matter since "it can be differently indicated as being here or being there" (Saṃghabhadra). The primary material dharmas are the four Great Elements (''Mind and mental factors
In Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma, the mind is a real entity, which is referred to by three mostly synonymous terms: ''citta'', ''manas'' (thinking) and ''''Cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras''
Unlike other Abhidharma schools, the Vaibhāṣikas added another ultimate classification termed ''citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra,'' “conditionings (forces) disjoined from thought.” These "are real entities which are neither mental nor material in nature, which yet can operate on both domains" and can be seen as laws of nature. Dhammajoti notes however that the Abhidharma works of other schools like the ''*Is a force that links a dharma to a particular serial continuity (''santati/santāna''), i.e., the individual. Non-acquisition is another real entity whose function and nature are just opposed to those of acquisition: It acts to ensure that a given dharma is delinked from the individual serial continuity...It was at a relatively later stage that acquisition came to be defined generally as the dharma that effects the relation of any dharma to a living being (''santāna'').These conditionings are particularly important because, due to their theory of tri-temporal existence, acquisition is central to the Vaibhāṣika understanding of defilement and purification. Since a defilement is a real dharma that exists always (''sarvadā asti''); it cannot be destroyed, however it can be de-linked from an individual by disrupting the acquisition-series. This also helps to explain how one can obtain a pure dharma such as nirvāṇa, since it is only through acquisition that one experiences nirvāṇa. Another doctrinally important set of conditionings are "the four characteristics of the conditioned (''saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa'')." Dharmas are said to have the production-characteristic (''jāti-lakṣaṇa'') which allows them to arise, the duration-characteristic (''sthiti-lakṣaṇa'') which is what enables it to temporarily remain and the decay-characteristic (''jarā‑lakṣaṇa'') which is the force which impairs its activity so that it can no longer continue projecting another distinct effect. A dharma also has the impermanence or disappearance characteristic (''anityatā/vyayalakṣaṇa'') which is what causes it to enter into the past.
''Asaṃskṛta'' (the unconditioned)
Unconditioned dharmas are those which exist without being dependently co-arisen (''pratītya-samutpanna''), they are also not temporal or spatial. They transcend arising and ceasing, and are real existents that possess a unique efficacy (though not a temporal causal efficacy like other dharmas). The Vaibhāṣika school taught three types of unconditioned dharmas: space ('' ākāśa''), cessation through deliberation (''pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha''), and cessation independent of deliberation (''apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha'').Dhammajoti (2009), p. 471. In the MVŚ, some disagreement among Sarvāstivāda masters regarding these dharmas can be seen. Some like "the Bhadanta" (Dharmatrāta) denied the reality of space. Meanwhile, Dārṣṭāntikas denied the ontological reality of all three. According to Dhammajoti, cessation through deliberation refers to "the cessation of defilements acquired through the process of discriminative or deliberative effort." There are just as many of these cessations as there are with-outflow dharmas. Cessation independent of deliberation meanwhile "are those acquired simply on account of the deficiency in the required assemblage of conditions for the particular dharma‑s. They are so called because they are independent of any deliberative effort." There are as many of these cessations are there are conditioned dharmas. Cessation through deliberation is also the technical term for the Buddhist goal of nirvāṇa, which is also defined as "a disjunction (''visaṃyoga'') from with-outflow dharma‑s acquired through the process of discrimination/deliberation (''pratisaṃkhyāna'') which is a specific outflow-free prajñā." Nirvāṇa is the absolute absence of karma and the defilements, the escape from the skandhas and all saṃsāric existence which attained by an arhat.Nirvāṇa's real existence
In Sarvāstivāda, nirvāṇa is a "distinct positive entity" (''dravyāntara''). It is "an ontologically real force that is acquired by the practitioner when a given defilement is completely abandoned." This force ensures that the defilement's acquisition will never arise again. Master Skandhila's definition indicates how this real entity has a positive presence, which is said to be "like a dike holding back the water or a screen blocking the wind." Vaibhāṣika holds that the real existence of nirvāṇa is supported both by direct perception and by scripture which depict the Buddha stating that "there is definitely the unborn." Sautrāntikas disagree with this interpretation of scripture, holding that the unborn simply refers to the discontinuity of birth (''janmāpravṛtti''), and thus it is a mere concept referring to the absence of suffering due to the abandoning of the defilements and thus it is only relatively real (''prajñaptisat''). However, Saṃghabhadra argues that "it is only when the unborn is conceded to be a distinct real entity that it is meaningful to say 'there is'. Besides, if there were no such entity, the Buddha should have simply said 'there is the discontinuity of the born.'" According to Vaibhāṣika, nirvāṇa must be an ultimately real existent because no real supporting phenomena can be found which could serve as the basis on which to designate nirvāṇa as a relative existent (as the aggregates serve to designate the self as relative, for example). Also, if nirvāṇa is not a real force, then beings could not give rise to delight in nirvāṇa and disgust towards saṃsāra, for nirvāṇa would be inferior in terms of existence. It would also mean that the Buddha had been deluding everyone by speaking of non-existents in the same way that he spoke of the existents. Furthermore, if nirvāṇa was unreal, it could not be one of the four noble truths, since a non-existent cannot be said to be true or false. An ārya is said to directly see the four truths, including the third truth of ''duḥkhanirodha'' (the end of suffering, i.e. nirvāṇa) and wisdom cannot arise with regard to a non-existent object.Time and Ontology
Existence
The name Sarvāstivāda literally means "all exists" (''sarvām asti''), referring to their doctrine that allWhat exists truly (''dravyato’sti'') and what exists conceptually (''prajñaptito’sti''), the two being designated on the basis of conventional truth and absolute truth. If, with regard to a thing, a cognition (''buddhi'') is produced without depending on anything else, this thing exists truly — e.g., ''rūpa, vedanā'', etc. If it depends on other things to produce a cognition, then it exists conceptually/relatively — e.g., a vase, army, etc.Dhammajoti (2009), pp. 69-70.Furthermore, things that truly exist are also of two types: those things that just have their own nature and those things that have both their own nature and also have activities (''kāritra''). Additionally, this last type is divided into two: "with or without function (''sāmarthya/vyāpara/śakti'')." Lastly, relative existents are also of two types, "having existence on the basis of something real or on something relative, like a vase and an army, respectively."
Arguments in favor of temporal eternalism
According toTemporality
Regarding time (''adhvan''), for Vaibhāṣikas, it is just a superimposition on the activity of these different types of dharmas and does not exist independently.Dhammajoti (2009) p. 119. Because of this, there was a need to explain how one experiences time and change. Among the different Sarvāstivāda thinkers, there were different ideas on how dharmas change so as to give rise to the experience of time. The ''Mahāvibhāṣa'' (MVŚ) speaks of four major theories which attempt to do this: * The theory which says there is a change in mode of being (''bhāva-anyathātva''). * The theory which says there is a change in characteristic (''lakṣaṇa-anyathātva''). * The theory which says there is a change in state or condition (''avasthā-anyathātva''). * The theory which says there is a change in emporalrelativity (''anyathā-anyathātva''). The positions are further outlined byThe essential nature of a dharma remains eternally; its bhāva xistencechanges: When a saṃskṛta onditioneddharma traverses through adhvan ime it gives rise to its kāritra ctivityin accordance with the pratyaya-s onditions without abandoning its substantial nature; immediately after this, the kāritra produced ceases. Hence it is said that the svabhāva exists eternally and yet it is not permanent, since its bhāva changes.Thus, for Saṃghabhadra, "a dharma is present when it exercises its ''kāritra'', future when its ''kāritra'' is not yet exercised, past when it has been exercised." The term ''kāritra'' is defined as "a dharma’s capability of inducing the production of its own next moment." When the right set of conditions come together, a dharma becomes endowed with activity (which vanishes in a single moment). When it does not have activity, a dharma's own nature still has the capacity to causally contribute to other dharmas.
''Svabhāva'' in time
Regarding the essential nature ('' svabhāva'') or reality (''dravya'') of a dharma, all Vaibhāṣika thinkers agreed that it is what remains constant and does not change as a dharma moves throughout the three times. However, as noted by K.L. Dhammajoti, this does not necessarily mean that a dharma's ''svabhāva "''is immutable or even permanent, for a dharma’s mode of existence and its essential nature are not different, so that when the former is undergoing transformation, so is its ''svabhāva''." From the Vaibhāṣika perspective this is not a contradiction, since it is the same process that remains (even while changing) throughout time. Thus, in this particular sense, there is no change in the ''svabhāva'' or ''svalakṣaṇa''. This is said to be the case even though a dharma is always being transformed into different modes of being. Each of these is actually a new occasion or event in a causal stream (though it is not different in terms of its nature than previous dharmas in that stream).Dhammajoti (2009) p. 135 Thus according to K.L. Dhammajoti, there is a way in which the essential natures are transformed, and yet, one can say that they remain the same ontologically. Dharmatrāta used the example of a piece of gold that is transformed into different things (cups, bowl, etc). While there are different entities, the essential nature of gold remains the same. This perspective is expressed by Saṃghabhadra who argues that ''svabhāva'' is not permanent since it goes through time and its existence (''bhāva'') varies through time. Saṃghabhadra also notes that a dharma is produced by various causes (and is part of a causal web which has no beginning), and once a dharma has ceased, it does not arise again. However, for Saṃghabhadra, one can still say that dharmas do not lose their ''svabhāva.'' He uses the example of ''vedanās'' (sensation). Even though we speak of various modes of sensation, all the types of sensation in a person's mindstream have the same nature of being sensitive phenomena (''prasāda rūpa''). Saṃghabhadra then states:It is not the case that since the function is different from the existence, that there can be the difference in the functions of seeing, hearing, etc. Rather, the very function of seeing, etc., is none other than the existence of the eye, etc. On account of the difference in function, there is definitely the difference in the mode of existence… Since it is observed that there are dharma‑s that co-exist as essential substances and whose essential characteristics do not differ but that everthelesshave different modes of existence, we know that when dharma‑s traverse the three times, their modes of existence vary while their essential characteristics do not change.He also states:
ur explanationsalso have properly refuted the objection that ur theory of ''sarvāstitva''implies the permanence of dharma’sessential nature, for, while the essential nature remains alwaysAccording to K.L. Dhammajoti, what the Vaibhāṣikas had in mind with this view was that even though the different dharmas in a causal series are different entities, there is an overall "individuality or integrity", and the series thus remains "dynamically identical." This is a relationship of identity-in-difference (''bhedābheda''). In this sense, a ''svabhāva'' is not a static entity, it is impermanent and undergoes change and yet "ontologically it never becomes a totally different substance." Saṃghabhadra claimed that it is only when understood in this way that the doctrine of "all exists" is logically compatible with the doctrine of impermanence.he same He or HE may refer to: Language * He (pronoun), an English pronoun * He (kana), the romanization of the Japanese kana へ * He (letter), the fifth letter of many Semitic alphabets * He (Cyrillic), a letter of the Cyrillic script called ''He'' in ...its ''avasthā'' onditiondiffers n the stages of timesince there is change. This difference of ''avasthā'' is produced on account of conditions and necessarily stays no more than one ''kṣaṇa'' oment Accordingly, the essential nature of the dharma too is impermanent, since it is not distinct from the difference hat arises in it utit is only in an existent dharma that changes can obtain; there cannot be change in a non-existent. In this way, therefore, we have properly established the times.Dhammajoti (2009) p. 136.
Momentariness
Orthodox Sarvāstivāda also defended the theory of moments (''kṣaṇavada''). This doctrine held that dharmas last only for a moment, this measure of time is the smallest measure of time possible, it is described in the ''Samyukta-abhidharma-hrdaya'' as:Theory of Causality
An important topic covered in Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma was the investigation of causes, conditions and their effects. Vaibhāṣikas used two major schemes to explain causality: the four conditions (''pratyaya'') and the six causes (''hetu''). In this system, the arising of dharmas is totally dependent on specific causes. Causal force is what makes a dharma real and thus they are also called '' saṃskāras'' (conditioning forces). Because of this, all dharmas belong to some kind of causal category, and are said to have causal efficacy. Indeed, it is only through examining their causes that the intrinsic nature manifests in a cognizable way. In the Vaibhāṣika system, the activities of dharmas arises through the mutual interdependence of causes. Thus, their intrinsic natures are said to be "feeble", which means they are not able to act on their own, and their activity is dependent on other dharmas. A particularly unique feature of the Vaibhāṣika system is their acceptance of simultaneous causation. These "co-existent causes" are an important part of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of causality. It allowed them to explain their theory ofThe Six Causes
*Efficient cause (''kāraṇa-hetu''). According to Dhammajoti, "It is any dharma that either directly or indirectly — by not hindering — contributes to the arising of another dharma." Vasubandhu defines it as: "A conditioned dharma has all dharma‑s, excepting itself, as its efficient cause, for, as regards its arising, hese dharma‑sabide in the state of non-obstructiveness." This is type of cause is rejected by Sautrāntikas like Śrīlāta. *Homogeneous cause (''sabhāga-hetu''). This refers to the kind of causality in which an effect is of the same moral type as the previous cause in a series. Thus, in the series c1 → c2 → c3, if c1 is skillful, it is the homogeneous cause for c2 which is also skillful, and so on. According to Vaibhāṣika, this form of causality exists among mental and material dharmas, but Sautrāntikas deny that it can apply to material dharmas. *Universal cause (''sarvatraga-hetu''). This is similar to the homogeneous cause in that it is a cause that produces the same kind of effect, however, it only applies to defiled dharmas. Another way it is distinct from the homogeneous is that there is "no necessary homogeneity in terms of category of abandonability." This is because, as Saṃghabhadra says in the ''Nyāyānusāra,'' "they are the cause of efiled dharma‑sbelonging to other categories as well, for, through their power, defilements belonging to categories different from theirs are produced." *Retribution cause (''vipāka-hetu''). This is the skill or unskillful dharmas that are karmic causes, and thus lead to good or bad karmic retribution.Dhammajoti (2009) p. 153. For Vaibhāṣikas, retribution causes and their fruits comprise all five aggregates. Sautrāntikas held that retribution cause is only volition (''The Four Conditions
Saṃghabhadra argues that even though the arising of dharmas depends on numerous conditions, the Buddha taught only four conditions in the sutras. Against the Sautrāntikas, who held that these were mere conceptual designations, Vaibhāṣikas assert that they are real existents. The four conditions are first found in Devaśarman’s ''Vijñānakāya'' (ca. 1st C.E.) and they are: *Condition qua cause (''hetu-pratyaya''). According to Dhammajoti, "This is the condition in its capacity as direct cause in the production of an effect — it is the cause functioning as the condition." This condition subsumes all causes, except the efficient cause. *Equal-immediate condition (''samanantara-pratyaya''). This refers to a mental process (a citta or caitta) that is a condition for the arising of the next mental process. Dhammajoti: "It both gives way to and induces the arising of the next citta-caitta in the series." For Vaibhāṣikas, this does not apply to matter, but Sautrāntikas argued that it does. *Condition qua object (''ālambana-pratyaya''). This refers to the fact that cognition cannot arise without an object and thus "in this sense, the object serves as a condition for the cognition." Since the mind can take any object, "the condition qua object is none otherthan the totality of dharma‑s (Saṃghabhadra)." *Condition of dominance (''adhipati-pratyaya''). Dhammajoti defines it thus: "This is the most comprehensive or generic condition, corresponding to efficient cause: It is whatever serves as a condition, either in the sense of directly contributing to the arising of a dharma, or indirectly through not hindering its arising. From the latter perspective, the unconditioned dharma‑s — although transcending space and time altogether — are also said to serve as conditions of dominance."Five Fruits
The Sarvāstivāda also taught that there are five fruits i.e. causal effects: * Disconnection fruit (''visaṃyogaphala''). This refers to disconnection from the defilements, and is acquired through the practice of the noble path which leads to the acquisition of the dharma "cessation through deliberation" (''pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha''). * Virile fruit (''puruṣakāra-phal''a). This is related to the co-existent cause and the conjoined cause. According to Vasubandhu it is "That which is the activity or efficacy (''kāritra'') of a dharma; o calledbecause it is like a virile action." * Fruit of dominance (''adhipati-phala''). This is the most generic fruit, they are produced by efficient causes. According to Dhammajoti, "the fruits commonly shared by a collection of beings by virtue of their collective karma‑s belong to this category. Thus, the whole universe with all its planets, mountains and oceans, etc., is the result — the fruit of dominance — of the collective karma‑s of the totality of beings inhabiting therein." * Uniform-emanation fruit (''niṣyanda-phala''). This is a fruit issued from a cause of a similar nature, it is correlated to the homogeneous cause and the universal cause. * Retribution fruit (''vipāka-phala''). This fruit only deals with individual sentient beings (sattvākhya), and is correlated with the retribution cause.Epistemology
The VaibhāṣikaAn absolute non-existent (''atyantam asad)'' has no function whatsoever and hence can never engender a consciousness. Thus, in the case of the perception of the unreal pudgala, the perceptual object is not the pudgala which is superimposed, but the five skandha‑s which are real existents.Furthermore, as noted by Dhammajoti: "sensory perception as a ''pratyakṣa'' experience is fully accomplished only in the second moment on recollection." This is because the external object must first be experienced by "direct perception supported by a sense faculty" (''indriyāśrita-pratyakṣa'') before a discerning perception (''buddhi-pratyakṣa'') can arise, since the discerning perception uses the previous sense faculty perception as a cognitive support ('' ālambana''). Vaibhāṣika defended the real existence of external objects by arguing that mental defilements arise in different ways because of the causal force of the mind's intentional object. Likewise, sensory perception (''pratyakṣa'') is said to arise due to various causes and conditions, one of which is a real external object.Dhammajoti (2009) p. 243. According to Dhammajoti, for Vaibhāṣikas like Saṃghabhadra, "a sensory consciousness necessarily takes a physical assemblage or agglomeration of atoms (he ji 和集; *saṃcaya, *saṃghāta, *samasta). What is directly perceived is just these atoms assembled together in a certain manner, not a conceptualized object such as a jug, etc." For Vaibhāṣika knowledge (''jñāna'') is a ''caitta'' (mental factor) that has the distinguishing characteristic of being "understanding that is decisive or definite (''niścita'')". There are various kinds of knowledge, for example, dharma-knowledge (''dharma-jñāna''), is the knowledge that realizes the true nature of dharmas, conventional-knowledge (''saṃvṛti-jñāna'') deals with conventional (not ultimate) things and knowledge of non-arising (''anutpāda-jñāna'') refers to the knowledge one has when one knows nirvana has been achieved.
Defilement (''kleśa'')
The goal of Buddhism is often seen as the freedom from suffering which arises from the complete removal of all defilements (''kleśa''). This is a state of perfection that is known by an arhat or Buddha through the "knowledge of the destruction of the outflows" (''āsravakṣaya-jñāna''). Ābhidharmikas saw the Abhidharma itself, which in the highest sense is just wisdom (''prajñ''ā), as the only means to end the defilements. ''Kleśa'' is commonly defined as that which "soils" or defiles as well as that which disturbs and afflicts a psycho-physical series. Another important synonym for defilement is ''anuśaya,'' which is explained by Vaibhāṣikas as a subtle or fine (''aṇu'') dharma that adheres and grows with an object, "like the adherence of dust on a wet garment or the growth of seeds in an irrigated field". This is in contrast to other interpretations of ''anuśaya'', such as that of the Sautrāntikas, who saw them as "seeds" ( ''bīja'') of ''kleśas.'' Thus, for Vaibhāṣikas there is no such thing as a latent defilement. The defilements are seen as the root of existence (''mūlaṃ bhavasya''), since they produce karma, which in turn leads to further rebirths. The most fundamental defilements are known as the three unskillful roots ( ''akuśala-mūla''), referring to greed (''rāga''), hostility (''pratigha'') and ignorance ('' avidyā''). Out of these, ignorance is the most fundamental of all. It is defined by Saṃghabhadra as "a distinct dharma which harms the capability of understanding (''prajñā''). It is the cause of topsy-turvy views and obstructs the examination of merits and faults. With regard to dharma-s to be known it operates in the mode of disinclination, veiling the thought and thoughtconcomitants." According to Dhammajoti, other major terms used to describe defilements are: 1. fetter (''saṃyojana''); 2. bondage (''bandhana''); 3. envelopment (''paryavasthāna''); 4. outflow ( āsrava); 5. flood (''ogha''); 6. yoke (''yoga''); 7. clinging (''upādāna''); 8. corporeal tie (''kāya-grantha''); 9. hindrance (''nivaraṇa''). These numerous categories are used to describe various doctrinal topics and create a taxonomy of dharmas. For example, all dharmas are either with or without outflows (''āsrava''), which are dharmas that keep sentient beings flowing on through existence and also cause impurities to flow through the sense fields. These are also further divided into sub-categories. For example, there are three āsrava types: sensuality-outflow (''kāmāsrava''), existence-outflow (''bhavāsrava'') and ignorance-outflow (''avidyāsrava''); there are four clingings: sensuality-clinging (''kāmopādāna''), view-clinging (''dṛṣṭy-upādāna''), clinging to abstentions and vows (''śīlavratopādāna''), and Soul-theory-clinging (''ātmavādopādāna''); and there are five hindrances: (i) sensual-desire, (ii) malice, (iii) torpor-drowsiness (''styāna-middha''), (iv) restlessness-remorse (''auddhatyakaukṛtya''), and (v) doubt. For Vaibhāṣikas, the elimination of the defilements thus begins with an investigation into the nature of dharmas (''dharma-pravicaya''). This examination is carried out in various ways, such as investigating how defilements arise and grow, what its cognitive objects are, and whether a defilement is to be abandoned by insight into the four noble truths (''darśanapraheya'') or by cultivation (''bhāvanāpraheya''). In the Vaibhāṣika system, the abandonment of a defilement is not the complete destruction of it, since all dharmas exist throughout the three times. Instead, one becomes defiled when the dharma of acquisition links one with the defilement (''saṃyoga''), and one abandons the defilement when there is both the ceasing of the dharma of acquisition as well as the arising of the acquisition of disconnection (''visaṃyoga-prāpti''). While the abandonment of a dharma happens at once and is not repeated, the acquisition of disconnection can take place over and over again, reflecting deeper and firmer spiritual progress. This is important because as Dhammajoti notes, Vaibhāṣikas affirm that "freedom from duḥkha must be gained by gradually and systematically abandoning the defilements" and reject the view that awakening happens abruptly. There are four methods of abandoning a defilement, the first three deal with abandonment by insight (''darśana-heya''): # ''ālambana-parijñāna'': Complete understanding of the nature of the object due to which the defilement arises. # ''tadālambana-saṃkṣaya'': The destruction of a defilement which is the object of another defilement along with the destruction of the latter (the subject). # ''ālambana-prahāṇa'': The abandonment of a defilement that takes as object another defilement by abandoning the latter — the object. # ''pratipakṣodaya'': The abandonment of a defilement on account of the arising of its counteragent. This is specifically applied to the defilements that are abandoned by cultivation (''bhāvanā-heya)''.Karma
While the Vaibhāṣikas acknowledge the profound and ultimately inconceivable nature ofClassifications
There are three main types of karma: bodily, vocal and mental. Out of all the different elements of karma, it is the volitional aspect (''abhisam-√kṛ, cetanā''), which comprises all mental karma, that is the most central and fundamental, since it is originates and assists the other types of karma. Saṃghabhadra, citing the sutras, states that volition (i.e. mental karma) is karma "in the proper or specific sense inasmuch as it is the prominent cause (''*viśiṣṭa-hetu'') in projecting a sentient existence." The Vaibhāṣikas also had further classifications of the different types of karma. For example, there are: * Volitional karma (''cetanā'') and karma subsequent to willing (''cetayitvā''); *Informative (''vijñapti'') and non‑informative (''avijñapti'') karma. This refers to bodily and vocal actions which inform others of the corresponding mental state. * Skillful (''kuśala''), unskillful (''akuśala'') and morally neutral (''avyākṛta'') karmas. * Karmas which are with-outflow (''sāsrava'') and outflow-free (''anāsrava'') karmas. *Determinate (''niyata'') and indeterminate (''aniyata'') karma. *Karma that is done (''kṛta'') and karma that is accumulated (''upacita''). *Projecting (''ākṣepaka'') and completing (''paripūraka'') karmas. The informative and non-informative category is particularly important. For the Vaibhāṣika, both types are real entities and are included as cetayitvā karma. Also, the nature of informative karma is material, it is the specific bodily shape at the time of the accomplishment of an action (which includes sound). Saṃghabhadra defends this by arguing that if all karma is mere volition (as held by Sautrāntika), then as soon as one has the intention to kill, this is the same as committing the deed. Vaibhāṣikas also held that non-informative karma was a kind of subtle "non-resistant" matter which preserved karmic efficacy, a view that was vigorously attacked by the Sautrāntikas. Like other Buddhist schools, the Vaibhāṣikas taught the ten paths of karma as a major ethical guide to what should be avoided and what should be cultivated. It should be emphasized that volition remains the core of this teaching, that is, even if one avoids acting on one's harmful intentions, the intention itself remains an unskillful karma.Karma through time
The Vaibhāṣika theory of karma is also closely related to their theory of tri-temporal existence, since karmas also exist in the past and in the future. Indeed, the efficacy of past karma is part of their argument for "all exists", since, for the Vaibhāṣika, if a past karmic retributive cause ceases to exist completely, it cannot lead to the karmic effect or fruit. As Dhammajoti explains:At the very moment when a retributive cause arises, it determines the causal connection with the fruit-to-be; i.e., ‘it grasps the fruit’. At a subsequent time, when the necessary conditions obtain, it, although past, can causally actualize the fruit by dragging it, as it were, out of the future into the present; i.e., ‘it gives the fruit’.This was of course rejected by the Sautrāntikas, who posited a competing theory, known as the theory of seeds, which held that a volition creates a chain of momentary dharmas called seeds, which are continuously transmitted in the mind stream until they sprout, producing the karmic effect. Saṃghabhadra critiques this theory by pointing out that when a seed turns into a plant, there is no interruption in the process. But in the Sautrāntika view, there can be an interruption, as when a person has thoughts of a different ethical type or when they enter into meditations that completely interrupt mental activity (such as ''asaṃjñi-samāpatti'' or ''nirodha-samāpatti''). And since Sautrāntikas are presentists, the past karma has also ceased to exist at this point and thus cannot be a cause for its fruit.
Karmic retribution
In Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma, the nature of karmic retribution, i.e. how a person experiences the results of their actions, is not fixed and depends on different conditions, such as the spiritual status and wisdom of the person. There are six factors that effect the gravity of karmic retribution (and subsequently, how bad one's future rebirth is): * The actions performed after the major karmic act. * The status of the ‘field’ (''kṣetra-viśeṣa''), referring to the ethical and spiritual status of the person. * The basis (''adhiṣṭhāna''), which is the act itself. * The preparatory action (''prayoga'') leading up to the main act. * Volition (''cetanā''), the intentional mental force behind the act. * The strength of the intention (''āśaya-viśeṣa''). There are also said to be some karmas that may or may not lead to retribution at all, these are indeterminate (''aniyata'') karmas which are contrasted with determinate karmas, i.e. those that necessarily cause retribution (whether in this life, in the next or in some further life).Dhammajoti (2009) p. 411. These indeterminate karmas can be rendered weak or fruitless through the practice of the spiritual path. The "Salt-simile sutra" (''Loṇa-phala-sutta'') is cited in support of this. Determinate karmas are particularly dark acts, such as killing one's parents, which cannot be so transformed. Another important distinction here is that between karma that is done (''kṛta'') which refers to preparatory and principal actions, and karma that is accumulated (''upacita'') which refers to the consecutive actions which "complete" the action. For example, one may prepare to kill someone and attempt to do so, but fail. In this sense, the action is not accumulated. Also, an action not done intentionally is not accumulated. Though the preparation is still a bad karma, it is not necessarily retributive. If however, something willed and accomplished is necessarily retributive. Yet another key distinction is that between projecting (''ākṣepaka'') and completing (''paripūraka'') karmas. A projecting karma is a single act which is the principal cause that projects one's future existence (as well as for the intermediate existence, the '' antarā-bhava''), while completing karmas are responsible for specific experiences within that one existence, such as lifespan. Finally, it is important to note that in this system, karma is primarily individual. That is to say, one person's karma will not cause a retribution fruit to be experienced by another person. However, there is a karmic fruit which is experienced by a collective of individuals, which is the fruit of dominance (''adhipati-phala''), which affects the vitality and durability of external things, such as plants and planets. This is used to explain how, when persons do good actions, the external world is affected by the "four increases": "of lifespan, of sentient beings, of external items of utility and enjoyment (''pariṣkāra''), and of skillful dharma‑s." In this sense then, there is "collective karma." Thus, for the Vaibhāṣikas, the whole universe is the collective karma (i.e. the fruit of dominance) of all beings living in it.Dependent Origination
The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma interpretation of the key Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Origination (''pratītya-samutpāda'') focuses on how the 12 links (''nidāna'') contribute to rebirth from the perspective of three periods of existence (past, present, future). This is explained in the following way: *Past causes **''1. ignorance'' (avidyā), represents all the defilements in one's past life, since all defilements are conjoined with and caused by ignorance. **''2. conditionings'' (saṃskāra), this refers to all past karmic constructions driven by ignorance. *Present effects ** 3. consciousness (vijñāna), this specifically refers to the consciousness that enters the womb at the moment of rebirth. ** 4. psycho-physical complex (nāma-rūpa), represents the body and mind, particularly as it develops in the womb ** 5. six sense fields (ṣaḍāyatana), refers to the five senses and the mental sense ** 6. contact (sparśa), refers to contact between the sense faculties and their objects ** 7. sensation (vedanā), refers to different pleasant, unpleasant and neutral sensations *Present causes ** 8. craving (tṛṣṇā), craving for sensuality, desire for material things and sex ** 9. grasping (upādāna), strong clinging for the objects of craving ** 10. existence (bhava), refers to all present karmas that project a future existence *Future effects ** 11. birth (jāti), represents the first re-linking consciousness in a future birth ** 12. old-age-and-death (jarā-maraṇa), represents everything that happens from future rebirth until death. Though presented in a linear way in the form of a list, these factors are said to be mutually conditioning among each other in various interconnected ways. Though the three life model, also called "prolonged" (''prākarṣika''), is the most widely used way of understanding dependent origination, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharmikas also accepted three other ways of explaining it: * Momentary (kṣaṇika): the 12 links are explained as being present within a single mind moment. * Pertaining to states (āvasthika): This model states that the five aggregates are present in each of the 12 links. Each link is so named because it is the predominant force among the aggregates at that moment, and thus the entire collection of aggregates is given the name ignorance (and so on) at that point in time. * Connected (sāṃbandhika): Refers to how the 12 links are conjoined with the entire field of causes and effects, i.e. "all conditioned dharmas" or the whole of phenomenal existence.Spiritual path
The study of the nature and function of spiritual paths is important to Abhidharma. For the Vaibhāṣikas the spiritual path is a gradual process of abandoning the defilements; there is no " sudden enlightenment". The analysis of the various spiritual paths provided by the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma correspond to the abandoning of various defilements. The beginning of the path consists of preliminary practices: approaching "true persons", listening to the Dharma, contemplating the meaning and practicing the Dharma and what accords with the Dharma. Preparatory practices also include the observance of the ethical precepts (''śīlaṃ pālayati''),At the beginning, because of his aspiration for the fruit of liberation, he diligently practices giving (dāna) and the pure precepts (śīla); ithe understanding derived from listening, the contemplation of the impure, mindfulness of breathing and the foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna); and iiwarmth, summits,receptivities and the supreme mundane dharma‑s; and hen he enters into vthe 15 moments of the path of vision. This is collectively said to be “firmly on one’s feet”.
Stages of the path
Vaibhāṣika developed an influential outline of the path to awakening, one which was later adapted and modified by the scholars of the Mahayana tradition into the schema of the "five paths" (''pañcamārga):Watanabe, Chikafumi (2000), ''A Study of Mahayanasamgraha III: The Relation of Practical Theories and Philosophical Theories.'' Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Calgary, pp. 38–40.''Losangsamten, ''Introduction to the Buddhist Path''In the first moment, called the unhindered path (ānantarya-mārga), the outflow-free understanding that arises is called a receptivity (kṣānti) to knowledge, and with this, the defilements abandonable by vision into the particular truth are abandoned. In the following moment, called the path of liberation (vimukti-mārga), knowledge proper arises through the induction of which the acquisition (prāpti) of the cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) of the defilements arises. In this way, for the whole contemplative process covering the sphere of sensuality followed by the two upper spheres, there arise eight receptivities and eight knowledges, all being prajñā in their intrinsic nature.From the first moment of insight, which is the first moment of receptivitity, one is said to be an ārya, a noble being. This is because the out-flow free path has arisen in them and thus they are no longer an ordinary worldling (''pṛthagjanatva''). Also, according to this system, when one has entered into stream entry, there is no going back, no retrogression. Regarding arhatship, some arhats can retrogress, mainly those who, due to their weak faculties, entered the path as a "pursuer through faith" (''śraddhānusārin''). Those who have sharp faculties and have studied and understood the teachings (''dharmānusārins'') are not retrogressible, they are ‘ones liberated through wisdom’ (''prajñā-vimukta'').
The three vehicles and noble beings
The Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins are known to have employed schema of the Three Vehicles, which can be seen in the ''Mahāvibhāṣā'': # ''References
Notes
Sources
* Dhammajoti, Bhikkhu K.L. (2009) ''Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma''. Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong. * * * Westerhoff, Jan (2018) ''The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy in the First Millennium CE'', pp. 60–61. * Willemen, Charles; Dessein, Bart; Cox, Collett (1998). ''Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism'', Handbuch der Orientalistik. Zweite Abteilung. Indien. {{refend Early Buddhist schools Nikaya schools Buddhism in India Abhidharma