History
Informal part-whole reasoning was consciously invoked inAxioms and primitive notions
Reflexivity: A basic choice in defining a mereological system, is whether to consider things to be parts of themselves. InVarious systems
Simons (1987), Casati and Varzi (1999) and Hovda (2008) describe many mereological systems whose axioms are taken from the above list. We adopt the boldface nomenclature of Casati and Varzi. The best-known such system is the one called ''classical extensional mereology'', hereinafter abbreviated CEM (other abbreviations are explained below). In CEM, P.1 through P.8' hold as axioms or are theorems. M9, ''Top'', and ''Bottom'' are optional. The systems in the table below are partially ordered by inclusion, in the sense that, if all the theorems of system A are also theorems of system B, but the converse is not necessarily true, then B ''includes'' A. The resulting Hasse diagram is similar to Fig. 3.2 in Casati and Varzi (1999: 48). There are two equivalent ways of asserting that theSet theory
The notion of "subset" in set theory is not entirely the same as the notion of "subpart" in mereology. Stanisław Leśniewski rejected set theory as related to but not the same asMathematics
Husserl never claimed that mathematics could or should be grounded in part-whole rather than set theory. Lesniewski consciously derived his mereology as an alternative to set theory as a foundation of mathematics, but did not work out the details. Goodman and W. V. O. Quine, Quine (1947) tried to develop the natural numbers, natural and real numbers using the calculus of individuals, but were mostly unsuccessful; Quine did not reprint that article in his ''Selected Logic Papers''. In a series of chapters in the books he published in the last decade of his life, Richard Milton Martin set out to do what Goodman and Quine had abandoned 30 years prior. A recurring problem with attempts to ground mathematics in mereology is how to build up the theory of Relation (mathematics), relations while abstaining from set-theoretic definitions of the ordered pair. Martin argued that Eberle's (1970) theory of relational individuals solved this problem. Topology, Topological notions of Boundary (topology), boundaries and connection can be married to mereology, resulting in mereotopology; see Casati and Varzi (1999: ch. 4,5). Whitehead's 1929 ''Process and Reality'' contains a good deal of informal mereotopology.Natural language
Bunt (1985), a study of the semantics of natural language, shows how mereology can help understand such phenomena as the mass noun, mass–count distinction and grammatical aspect, verb aspect. But Nicolas (2008) argues that a different logical framework, called Plural quantification, plural logic, should be used for that purpose. Also, natural language often employs "part of" in ambiguous ways (Simons 1987 discusses this at length). Hence, it is unclear how, if at all, one can translate certain natural language expressions into mereological predicates. Steering clear of such difficulties may require limiting the interpretation of mereology to mathematics and natural science. Casati and Varzi (1999), for example, limit the scope of mereology to physical objects.Metaphysics
InMereological constitution
In metaphysics, there are several puzzles concerning cases of mereological constitution, that is, what makes up a whole. There is still a concern with parts and wholes, but instead of looking at what parts make up a whole, the emphasis is on what a thing is made of, such as its materials, e.g., the bronze in a bronze statue. Below are two of the main puzzles that philosophers use to discuss constitution. ''Ship of Theseus:'' Briefly, the puzzle goes something like this. There is a ship called the Ship of Theseus. Over time, the boards start to rot, so we remove the boards and place them in a pile. First question, is the ship made of the new boards the same as the ship that had all the old boards? Second, if we reconstruct a ship using all of the old planks, etc. from the Ship of Theseus, and we also have a ship that was built out of new boards (each added one-by-one over time to replace old decaying boards), which ship is the real Ship of Theseus? ''Statue and Lump of Clay:'' Roughly, a sculptor decides to mold a statue out of a lump of clay. At time t1 the sculptor has a lump of clay. After many manipulations at time t2 there is a statue. The question asked is, is the lump of clay and the statue (numerically) identical? If so, how and why? Constitution typically has implications for views on persistence: how does an object persist over time if any of its parts (materials) change or are removed, as is the case with humans who lose cells, change height, hair color, memories, and yet we are said to be the same person today as we were when we were first born. For example, Ted Sider is the same today as he was when he was born—he just changed. But how can this be if many parts of Ted today did not exist when Ted was just born? Is it possible for things, such as organisms to persist? And if so, how? There are several views that attempt to answer this question. Some of the views are as follows (note, there are several other views): (a) Constitution view. This view accepts cohabitation. That is, two objects share exactly the same matter. Here, it follows, that there are no temporal parts. (b) Mereological essentialism, which states that the only objects that exist are quantities of matter, which are things defined by their parts. The object persists if matter is removed (or the form changes); but the object ceases to exist if any matter is destroyed. (c) Dominant Sorts. This is the view that tracing is determined by which sort is dominant; they reject cohabitation. For example, lump does not equal statue because they're different "sorts". (d) Nihilism—which makes the claim that no objects exist, except simples, so there is no persistence problem. (e) Four-dimensionalism, 4-dimensionalism or temporal parts (may also go by the names perdurantism or Four-dimensionalism, exdurantism), which roughly states that aggregates of temporal parts are intimately related. For example, two roads merging, momentarily and spatially, are still one road, because they share a part. (f) 3-dimensionalism (may also go by the name endurantism), where the object is wholly present. That is, the persisting object retains numerical identity.Mereological composition
One question that is addressed by philosophers is which is more fundamental: parts, wholes, or neither? Another pressing question is called the special composition question (SCQ): For any Xs, when is it the case that there is a Y such that the Xs compose Y? This question has caused philosophers to run in three different directions: nihilism, universal composition (UC), or a moderate view (restricted composition). The first two views are considered extreme since the first denies composition, and the second allows any and all non-spatially overlapping objects to compose another object. The moderate view encompasses several theories that try to make sense of SCQ without saying 'no' to composition or 'yes' to unrestricted composition.Fundamentality
There are philosophers who are concerned with the question of fundamentality. That is, which is more ontologically fundamental the parts or their wholes. There are several responses to this question, though one of the default assumptions is that the parts are more fundamental. That is, the whole is grounded in its parts. This is the mainstream view. Another view, explored by Schaffer (2010) is monism, where the parts are grounded in the whole. Schaffer does not just mean that, say, the parts that make up my body are grounded in my body. Rather, Schaffer argues that the whole ''cosmos'' is more fundamental and everything else is a part of the cosmos. Then, there is the identity theory which claims that there is no hierarchy or fundamentality to parts and wholes. Instead wholes ''are just'' (or equivalent to) their parts. There can also be a two-object view which says that the wholes are not equal to the parts—they are numerically distinct from one another. Each of these theories has benefits and costs associated with them.Special composition question (SCQ)
Philosophers want to know when some Xs compose something Y. There are several kinds of responses: *One response to this question is called ''nihilism''. Nihilism states that there are no mereological complex objects (read: composite objects); there are only simples (philosophy), simples. Nihilists do not entirely reject composition because they do think that simples compose themselves, but this is a different point. More formally Nihilists would say: Necessarily, for any non-overlapping Xs, there is an object composed of the Xs if and only if there is only one of the Xs. This theory, though well explored, has its own set of problems. Some of which include, but are not limited to: experiences and common sense, incompatible with atomless gunk, and it is unsupported by space-time physics. *Another prominent response is called ''universal composition'' (UC). UC says that so long as the Xs do not spatially overlap, the Xs can compose a complex object. Universal compositionalists are also considered those who support unrestricted composition. More formally: Necessarily, for any non-overlapping Xs, there is a Y such that Y is composed of the Xs. For example, someone's left thumb, the top half of another person's right shoe, and a quark in the center of their galaxy can compose a complex object according to universal composition. Likewise, this theory also has some issues, most of them dealing with our experiences that these randomly chosen parts make up a complex whole and there are far too many objects posited in our ontology. *A third response (perhaps less explored than the previous two) includes a range of ''restricted composition views''. Though there are several views, they all share a common idea: that there is a restriction on what counts as a complex object: some (but not all) Xs come together to compose a complex Y. Some of these theories include: (a) Contact—the Xs compose a complex Y if and only if the Xs are in contact; (b) Fastenation—the Xs compose a complex Y if and only if the Xs are fastened; (c) Cohesion—the Xs compose a complex Y if and only if the Xs cohere (cannot be pulled apart or moved in relation to each other without breaking); (d) Fusion—the Xs compose a complex Y if and only if the Xs are fused (fusion is when the Xs are joined together such that there is no boundary); (e) Organicism—the Xs compose a complex Y if and only if either the activities of the Xs constitute a life or there is only one of the Xs; and (f) Brutal Composition—"It's just the way things are." There is no true, nontrivial, and finitely long answer. This is not an exhaustive list as many more hypotheses continue to be explored. However, a common problem with these theories is that they are vague. It remains unclear what "fastened" or "life" mean, for example. But there are many other issues within the restricted composition responses—though many of them are subject to which theory is being discussed. * A fourth response is called ''deflationism''. Deflationism states that there is variance on how the term "exist" is used, and thus all of the above answers to the SCQ can be correct when indexed to a favorable meaning of "exist." Further, there is no privileged way in which the term "exist" must be used. There is therefore no privileged answer to the SCQ, since there are no privileged conditions for when X composes Y. Instead, the debate is reduced to a mere verbal dispute rather than a genuine ontological debate. In this way, the SCQ is part of a larger debate in general ontological realism and anti-realism. While deflationism successfully avoids the SCQ, it is not devoid of problems. It comes with the cost of ontological anti-realism such that nature has no objective reality at all. For, if there is no privileged way to objectively affirm the existence of objects, nature itself must have no objectivity.Important surveys
The books by Simons (1987) and Casati and Varzi (1999) differ in their strengths: *Simons (1987) sees mereology primarily as a way of formalizingSee also
* Finitist set theory * Gunk (mereology) * Implicate and explicate order according to David Bohm * ''Laws of Form'' by G. Spencer-Brown * Mereological essentialism * Mereological nihilism * Mereotopology * Meronomy * Meronymy * Monad (philosophy) * Plural quantification * Quantifier variance * Simple (philosophy) * Whitehead's point-free geometry * Composition (objects)References
Sources
* Bowden, Keith, 1991. ''Hierarchical Tearing: An Efficient Holographic Algorithm for System Decomposition'', Int. J. General Systems, Vol. 24(1), pp 23–38. * Bowden, Keith, 1998. ''Huygens Principle, Physics and Computers''. Int. J. General Systems, Vol. 27(1-3), pp. 9–32. * Bunt, Harry, 1985. ''Mass terms and model-theoretic semantics''. Cambridge Univ. Press. * John P. Burgess, Burgess, John P., and Gideon Rosen, Rosen, Gideon, 1997. ''A Subject with No Object''. Oxford Univ. Press. * Burkhardt, H., and Dufour, C.A., 1991, "Part/Whole I: History" in Burkhardt, H., and Smith, B., eds., ''Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology''. Muenchen: Philosophia Verlag. * Casati, Roberto, and Achille Varzi (philosopher), Varzi, Achille C., 1999. ''Parts and Places: the structures of spatial representation''. MIT Press. * Cotnoir, A. J., and Achille Varzi (philosopher), Varzi, Achille C., 2021, ''Mereology'', Oxford University Press. * Eberle, Rolf, 1970. ''Nominalistic Systems''. Kluwer. * Etter, Tom, 1996. ''Quantum Mechanics as a Branch of Mereology'' in Toffoli T., ''et al.'', ''PHYSCOMP96, Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Physics and Computation'', New England Complex Systems Institute. * Etter, Tom, 1998. ''Process, System, Causality and Quantum Mechanics''. SLAC-PUB-7890, Stanford Linear Accelerator Centre. * Peter Forrest (philosopher), Forrest, Peter, 2002,External links
* * *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: *