Background
Arab–Iranian conflict
The Arab–Iranian conflict or Arab-Persian conflict is a term which is used in reference to the modern conflict betweenIranian Revolution
{{Main, Iranian Revolution {{Further, Iran–Saudi Arabia relations The proxy conflict can be traced back to theQatif conflict
{{See, Qatif conflict The direct trigger of the Qatif uprising following the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a mourning procession marking the Shia religious holiday of Ashura, which was prohibited to be celebrated publicly in Saudi Arabia. The ensuing marches and protests led to escalating tensions resulting in bloody clashes between demonstrators and the Saudi security forces over the next few days as the latter opened fire on the former. A sequence of protests followed in the next months, sometimes involving mass arrests and violence, but these mainly reflected local and community concerns like discrimination, exploitation, the absence of basic freedoms, and disappointment regarding failed promises of modernisation and development. The uprising was not a direct response to Ayatollah Khomeini's call for revolution, but was inspired by the Iranian Revolution. The Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabic Peninsula (OIR or OIRAP), a regional activist organisation who had connections with Iran was involved in the events of the uprising. The organisation run a radio station from Iran and had an office in Tehran. It encouraged Shia resistance and demands for the addressing of social and political concerns. Throughout the 1980s, relations between the Shia and the state remained tense with hundreds of activists in exile as the Shia opposition relocated to Iran after 1979 in light of the then relevant conditions. The OIRAP focused on publishing, fundraising, and building a social movement in Saudi Arabia from Iran, with a non-violent but radical rhetoric, criticising and deeming the Saudi government illegitimate. Between 1982 and mid-1984, hundreds of OIRAP sympathisers were arrested mainly for the distribution of movement literature, the writing of graffiti, fundraising and attempts at large-scale mobilisation, until 1985 when a mass arrest dismantled its internal organisation in Saudi Arabia. The "hajj incident" of 1987 led to the exacerbation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the OIRAP decided to shift its operations out of Iran to avoid getting caught up in the animosity. OIRAP refused to create a military wing and carry out attacks in Saudi Arabia against the state when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps urged it to do so.{{Cite book , last=Matthiesen , first=Toby , url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/other-saudis/9F2459A2FC189C95053A2D9044AF0389 , title=The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism , date=2014 , publisher=Cambridge University Press , isbn=978-1-107-04304-6 , series=Cambridge Middle East Studies , location=Cambridge , pages=114–214 , language= , doi=10.1017/cbo9781107337732 A new organisation emerged in the wake of the "hajj incident", the Hizbullah al-Hijaz which was willing to ally with Iran and retaliate militarily. Its long-term political goal was the establishment of an Islamic republic in the Arabian Peninsula and advocated the overthrow of the Saudi government through violence, involving implicitly the separation of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. The Hizbullah al-Hijaz was the military wing of the Khat al-Imam movement which referred to the followers of Imam Khomeini's line. The movement was initially religious, social and cultural in nature, but then became politicised. The relations between the two remain unclear. Hizbullah al-Hijaz took over OIRAP's role on the radical end of the spectrum of the Shia opposition in Saudi Arabia and its role in the Iranian propaganda effort against Saudi Arabia. The two distanced themselves from each other leading to the fragmentation of the Saudi Shia Islamist opposition. Hizubllah al-Hijaz perpetrated bombings in Saudi Arabia in response of the "hajj incident", which contributed to Saudi Arabia severing diplomatic relations with Iran on 26 April 1988. However, after 1989 the networks of Hizbullah al-Hijaz and Khat al-Imam inside Saudi Arabia were severely weakened through the arrests of many of its leaders. Meanwhile, during the Gulf War OIRAP changed its name to Shia Reform Movement (RMS) and its strategy with it, shifting away from the Islamic and Shia discourse and moving towards pro-democracy and pro-human rights activism with government opposition concentrated in Qatif and the Eastern Province. Saudi Shia played an important role in the opposition but during the Gulf War the OIRAP remained loyal to Saudi Arabia. Rapprochement between the opposition and the government became possible after the death of Imam Khomeini and the end of the Gulf War, with diplomatic ties being restored between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the 26th of March in 1991. Hizbullah al-Hijaz opposed the 1993 agreement between the mainly Shia opposition and the government, even when the government released Shia political prisoners and granted amnesty to those in exile, arguing that it would only support it if real gains for the Shia were achieveable.The Khat al-Imam movement gained prominence briefly before the 1996 Khoban Towers bombings when some Shia became disillusioned with the agreement. After the attack on the Khoban Towers in 1996 a widespread mass arrest campaign was carried out imprisoning many of its members and individuals associated with it and members of the Hizbullah al-Hijaz, even when the organisation denied its involvement. However, it vowed to continue its struggle against the government and denounced the 1993 deal, even if most of its members were arrested. Iran maintained its influence over Hizbullah al-Hijaz, but the mainstream of Saudi Shia distanced themselves from it once the Saudi government accepted the RMS as their representative. However, the political reforms and full recognition of Saudi Shia as Saudi citizens and their integration into the state did not get realised. Tensions in the Eastern Province had been building up for years and erupted during the 2011 Arab Spring, but remained confined to Qatif and the Eastern Province within Saudi Arabia. Shia representatives, leaders and notables, among them Khat al-Imam sided with the government and asked the population to stop the protests to preserve sectarian peace, which eventually happened. The protests were accompanied by arrests, violence and demanded democracy, Islam unity and the release of political prisoners. Loyalty of the Shia was questioned and the Saudi state blamed Iran.Khuzestan conflict
{{see, Khuzestan conflict Amid theIran–Iraq War
{{main, Iran-Iraq War The1987 Makkah incident
In response to the 1987 Makkah incident in which Shia pilgrims clashed with Saudi security forces during theTimeline
Arab Spring
{{main, Arab Spring The current phase of the conflict began in 2011 when theArab Winter
{{main, Arab Winter Saudi Arabia has become increasingly concerned about the United States' commitment as an ally and security guarantor. The American foreign policy pivot to Asia, its lessening reliance on Saudi oil, and the potential of2015 Mina stampede
{{main, 2015 Mina stampede The 2015 Mina stampede in2016 Saudi executions and attack on Saudi mission in Iran
{{Main, 2016 Saudi Arabia mass execution, 2016 attack on the Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran On 2 January 2016, 47 people were put to death in several Saudi cities, including prominent Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Protesters of the executions responded by demonstrating in Iran's capital, Tehran. That same day a few protesters would eventually ransack the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and later set it ablaze.2017
In May 2017, Trump declared a shift in US foreign policy toward favoring Saudi Arabia at Iran's expense, marking a departure from President Obama's more reconciliatory approach. This move came days after the re-election of Rouhani in Iran, who defeated conservative candidate Ebrahim Raisi. Rouhani's victory was seen as a popular mandate for liberal reforms in the country. Several incidents in mid-2017 further heightened tensions. In May 2017, Saudi forces laid siege on Al-Awamiyah, the home of Nimr al-Nimr, in a clash with Shia militants.{{citation needed, date=December 2020 Dozens of Shia civilians were reportedly killed. Residents are not allowed to enter or leave, and military indiscriminately shells the neighborhoods with artillery fire and snipers are reportedly shooting residents. In June, the Iranian state-owned news agency Press TV reported that the president of a Quran council and two cousins of executed Nimr al-Nimr were killed by Saudi security forces in Qatif. During the subsequent crackdown the Saudi government demolished several historical sites and many other buildings and houses in Qatif. On 17 June, Iran announced that the Saudi coast guard had killed an Iranian fisherman. Soon after, Saudi authorities captured three Iranian citizens who they claimed were2018
Saudi Arabia under King Salman has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, particularly reflected in the country's intervention in Yemen in 2015 and its involvement in Lebanon in 2017. This has continued with the June 2017 appointment of Mohammad bin Salman as2019–2021:Persian Gulf crisis, Arab-Israeli alliance
{{See also, February 2019 Warsaw Conference Military tensions between Iran and the United States escalated in 2019 amid a series of confrontations involving the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Attacks on oil tankers in the2022
In 2022, Iran and Saudi Arabia participated in peace talks brokered by Iraq. Iran has accused Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and Israel of meddling within their internal affairs due to the Mahsa Amini protests. In late October 2022, Saudi intelligence was shared to the U.S., warning of an imminent attacks by Iran, which placed the GCC, Iraq, and Israel on high alert. The intelligence showed that Iran was allegedly planning to strike Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. Iran denied these accusations and intel as baseless.Involved parties
Iranian supporters and proxies
{{See also, Axis of ResistanceSyria
{{see also, Iran–Syria relations, Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil warHamas
Hezbollah
{{Main, Hezbollah, Hezbollah military activitiesNigerian Islamic Movement
{{main, Islamic Movement (Nigeria) The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shiite religious and political organisation founded and headed by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaki, constitutes another proxy in the conflict. It constitutes another asset that could enable Iran in disrupting Sunni States in West Africa. Thus, Saudi Arabia by supporting the Nigerian government in its suppressing efforts, and by providing support to rival Sunni groups such as Izala and not seriously condemning Boko Haram's actions, aims to limit its influence and growth in the region.{{Cite journal , last=Bahi , first=Riham , year=2018 , title=Iran-Saudi Rivalry in Africa: Implications for Regional Stability , url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12374 , journal=Middle East Policy , language=en , volume=25 , issue=4 , pages=33 , doi=10.1111/mepo.12374, s2cid=159397471Houthis
{{See also, Houthi movement Iran and its allies North Korea, Syria, Iraq, Qatar, Hezbollah, and Venezuela are known to have provided political, economical, diplomatic, and military support to the Houthis Houthis overthrew the government in Yemen in the September 21 Revolution or 2014–15 coup d'état, supported by Iran while Saudi Arabia was attempting to restore the central government through a military campaign. Since the uprising, they have evolved into a well-organised and equipped militia in Yemen. Houthis can be considered to be similar in their response to Hamas, rather than Hezbollah, given the varying degrees of resources and support without actually responding to or informing Iran. In fact, Houthis took control of Sanaa in September 2014, despite Iran's advising restraint. Saudi officials believe Houthis will become the "next Hezbollah" that operates close to Saudi territory. Moreover, Houthis have been supported in their fight against the Yemeni government through a gateway for arms and supplies smuggling from Iran through Somalia since 2015.{{Cite journal , last=Bahi , first=Riham , year=2018 , title=Iran-Saudi Rivalry in Africa: Implications for Regional Stability , url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12374 , journal=Middle East Policy , language=en , volume=25 , issue=4 , pages=30 , doi=10.1111/mepo.12374, s2cid=159397471 Access to Somalia, as well as to Eritrea, together with control of Yemen's Red Sea coast through the Houthis, provided Iran's with an enhanced ability to threaten international shipping in theIraqi militias
{{See also, Popular Mobilization Forces, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah Various Iraqi groups, many of them as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, have been described as Iranian proxies.{{cite web, url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia, title=The Iranian and Houthi War against Saudi Arabia, date=December 21, 201, access-date=11 July 2022, agency= CSIS During theBahraini militias
{{see also, Shia insurgency in Bahrain Iran and its allies have backed multiple Shia groups in Bahrain. These opposition groups include: * Al-Ashtar Brigades * Al-Mukhtar Brigades * Waad Allah Brigades * Saraya Thair Allah * Popular Resistance Brigades *Saudi Arabian supporters and proxies
Gulf Cooperation Council
{{see also, Peninsula Shield Force The=Bahrain
==Kuwait
==United Arab Emirates
= {{see also, Saudi Arabia–United Arab Emirates relations The U.A.E and Saudi Arabia are strategic allies, as both see Iran as a common enemy. The U.A.E has been a major contributor to the Saudi Arabian–led coalition in Yemen, has supported thePeople's Mujahedin of Iran
People's Muhajedin of Iran, also known asKurdish insurgents
Saudi Arabia has allegedly provided support to the Kurdish militants within the KDPI, PAK, andAlbania
Due to Albania's decision to welcome the MEK to take refuge in the country, tensions between Iran and Albania increased. Since 2018, Albania has accused Iran of hounding Iranian dissidents and has expelled several Iranian diplomats.{{Better source needed, date=April 2021 In January 2020, following the death ofJaish ul-Adl
The rebel group Jaish ul-Adl, active in the Sistan and Baluchestan region of Iran, is accused by Iranian authorities of receiving Saudi and American support.Israel
{{See also, Arab states–Israeli alliance against Iran The speaker of Iran's parliament, Ali Larijani, stated that Saudi Arabia gave "strategic" intelligence information to Israel during theUnited States
{{See also, Saudi Arabia–United States relations, United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action {{further, Iran–United States relations after 1979 The United States and Saudi Arabia have a strategic relationship that dates back to 1947. When theJordan
Jordan has historically been on the Saudi bloc despite its slight rivalry. Jordan and Iran have sour relations with each other.Other involved parties
Turkey
{{main, Turkey and the Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict {{See also, Turkish involvement in the Syrian civil war, Assassination of Jamal Khashoggi The Turkish involvement in this conflict has been by large, exploiting the difficulties of both sides to reinstate their neo-Ottomanism, especially under the Erdoğan Presidency, who is determined to begin the project in 2023.Qatar
{{See also, Qatar–Saudi Arabia diplomatic conflict, Qatar diplomatic crisisRussia
Russia has been aligned with Iran and Syria for years. It intervened in Syria to provide support for the Assad government and to target rebel groups, working together with Iran and using Iranian air bases to stage air strikes. It also joined Iran, Iraq, and Syria in forming a joint intelligence-sharing coalition as part of the fight against ISIL. The alliance coincided with the US-led coalition created a year earlier to fight ISIL. The competing military actions were seen as part of a larger proxy conflict between the United States and Russia. However, Russia's tie with Saudi Arabia has become increasingly warmed since 2010s despite numerous differences, thus sometimes affected Iran's stance on relations with Russia. In the past, Saudi Arabia backed Chechen and Dagestani fighters as well as Arab Mujahedeen in theOman
Pakistan
Pakistan is a major partner of Saudi Arabia, but is also a neighbor of Iran, sharing historical ties as well. Prior to 1979, the three countries formed a moderate relationship and acted as responsible Muslim states. However, since 1979, Pakistan has fallen into sectarian discord due to growing attempt by Iran and Saudi Arabia to spread influence to the country, with Pakistan having a balance of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia has been historically strong, and often Pakistan has feared Iran is trying to recruit its large Shi'a population to serve for Iran's military adventures, given by increasing number of vanishing Shi'as in Pakistan. Its link with Iran is also marred with a number of problems regarding not just Shia issue, but also due to conflict in Afghanistan, with Iran-backed proxies have fought against Pakistan and its allyInvolvement in regional conflicts
Syrian Civil War
{{Main, Saudi Arabian involvement in the Syrian civil war, Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil warYemeni Civil War
{{main, Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen, Houthi insurgency in Yemen#Alleged foreign involvement Yemen has been called one of the major fronts in the conflict as a result of theWar in Iraq
{{Main, Iranian intervention in Iraq (2014–present) {{see also, Sectarian violence in Iraq While the majority of Muslims in Iraq are Shia, the country has been ruled for decades by Sunni-dominated governments under theBahraini uprising
{{Main, Saudi-led intervention in Bahrain Saudi Arabia and Iran have sought to extend their influence in Bahrain for decades. While the majority of Muslims in Bahrain are Shia, the country is ruled by the Sunni Al Khalifa family – who are widely viewed as being subservient to the Saudi government. Iran claimed sovereignty over Bahrain until 1970, when ShahLebanese politics
{{See also, 2017 Lebanon–Saudi Arabia dispute In 2008, Saudi Arabia proposed creating an Arab force backed by US and NATO air and sea power to intervene in Lebanon and destroy Iranian-backed Hezbollah, according to a US diplomatic cable released byWar in Afghanistan
{{main, Afghan Civil War (1992–1996) The rivalry has contributed to the ongoing instability inPakistani sectarian violence
{{Main, Sectarian violence in Pakistan {{See also, Afghan Civil War, Pakistan Armed Forces deployments in Saudi Arabia Since the 1980s, Pakistan has been dealing with sporadic sectarian conflict, and the Muslim population is predominantly Sunni with about 10–15% Shia adherents. The Saudi Arabia enjoys a strong public support from the county's conservative sphere and has occupied a unique statue in Pakistan's foreign policy stature. Pakistan is economically dependent on oil imports from Saudi Arabia, a key strategic ally but shares some historical cultural ties with Iran. The foreign employees Saudi oil industry from Pakistan plays a crucial role in Pakistan's economic stability who sends large remittances back home. The largest amount comes from the 1.5 million Pakistanis working in Saudi Arabia who sent home about US$5.5 billion in remittances in 2017.{{cite news, last1=Shah, first1=Saeed, last2=Talley, first2=Ian, title=Saudi Arabia Stymies U.S. Over Pakistan Terror List, url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-avoids-inclusion-on-international-terror-financing-watch-list-1519257040, access-date=22 February 2018, work=The Wall Street Journal, date=21 February 2018 There are also allegations of Saudi Arabia's financial grants to Pakistan's national laboratories that built Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The Saudi monarchy also views theNigerian Sectarianism
{{See also, Boko Haram The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shiite religious and political organisation founded and headed by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaki, constitutes another proxy in the conflict. It constitutes another asset that could enable Iran in disrupting Sunni States in West Africa. Thus, Saudi Arabia by supporting the Nigerian government in its suppressing efforts, and by providing support to rival Sunni groups such as Izala and not seriously condemning Boko Haram's actions, aims to limit its influence and growth in the region.Israeli–Palestinian conflict
{{See also, Iran–Israel proxy conflict Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have employed different methods to resolve theLibyan Crisis
{{see also, Second Libyan Civil War Iran and Saudi Arabia have waged a proxy war inNuclear programs of Iran and Saudi Arabia
{{Main, Nuclear program of Saudi Arabia, Iran and weapons of mass destruction Although both Iran and Saudi Arabia signed theSee also
{{Portal bar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Asia, War * Anti-Shi'ism * Anti-Sunnism * Arab League–Iran relations * Arab states–Israeli alliance against Iran *References
{{Reflist, refs= See: * {{cite news, url=https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-03-21/exclusive-iran-steps-up-support-for-houthis-in-yemens-war-sources, title=Exclusive: Iran Steps up Support for Houthis in Yemen's War – Sources, work= U.S. News & World Report, date=21 March 2017, access-date=30 March 2017 * {{cite news, title=Arab coalition intercepts Houthi ballistic missile targeting Saudi city of Jazan, url=http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/03/20/Arab-coalition-intercepts-Houthi-ballistic-missile-targeting-Saudi-city-of-Jazan.html, publisher=