Cambridge School (intellectual History)

In intellectual history and the history of political thought, the Cambridge School is a loose historiographical movement traditionally associated with the University of Cambridge, where many of those associated with the school held or continue to hold academic positions, including Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, Peter Laslett, John Dunn and James Tully, David Runciman, and Raymond Geuss.

Overview

The Cambridge School can broadly be characterised as a historicist or contextualist mode of interpretation, placing primary emphasis on the historical conditions and the intellectual context of the discourse of a given historical era, and opposing the perceived anachronism of conventional methods of interpretation, which it believes often distort the significance of texts and ideas by reading them in terms of distinctively modern understandings of social and political life. In these terms, the Cambridge School is 'idealist' in the sense that it accepts ideas as constitutive elements of human history in themselves, and hence contradicts social-scientific positivism in historiography.

The text often held as the original declaration of the principles of the school is Quentin Skinner's 1969 article 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas'. Here, Skinner attacks what he describes as two "orthodoxies": "perennialism", the view that philosophers have always debated the same fundamental questions; and the notion that context is irrelevant to a historical understanding of texts, which can be read as self-standing material. In Mark Bevir's words, Skinner and his colleagues "defended the history of political theory against both reductionists who dismissed ideas as mere epiphenomena and canonical theorists who approached texts as timeless philosophical works".

The school has been criticised on a number of fronts. On the one hand, historians working in more materialist contexts such as social history have criticised the school's focus on ideas. Christopher Goto-Jones has argued that the school has developed in an orientalist direction by neglecting non-Western contributions to intellectual history.

Michael Oakeshott: debates over influence

Internal discordance seems manifest in the history of the idea of the Cambridge School, especially in regards to J.G.A. Pocock's dialectical call for both "global" contextualism as well as critical examination of the various "multiculturalism" iterations, and the subjective, if not potentially relative, contours of such contextualism. Pocock's own contextualism has been linked to Michael Oakeshott, especially after the 1968 publication of a critical essay on the lessons of socio-historical linguistics espoused by the liberal-conservative philosopher. Pocock had already candidly argued in a 1958 essay (published in 1962) that, despite paralleling an Oakeshottian commentary on the unavoidable influences of past society on human utterances, much of the burgeoning contextualist methodology derived from the teachings and efforts of Peter Laslett. In a recent response to an article on the history of the idea of the Cambridge School, Pocock was more bluntly political: "...in Cambridge during these years 956-58I was greatly attracted, though never quite converted, to the aesthetic conservatism of Oakeshott’s contention that the categories of discourse generated by a human society are...so numerous as to be incommensurable and their intimations for one another beyond analytic control."

J.G.A. Pocock mentioned Michael Oakeshott in a concluding passage of the 1965 article, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century." The passage warned against wholesale synchronic classification of "neo-Harringtonians" in '' The Machiavellian Moment'' as "reactionaries" and their opponents as "conservatives," even in diachronic studies. The passage consisted of summary arguments from an article that he had published the previous year, "Ritual, Language, Power: An Essay on the Apparent Political Meanings of Ancient Chinese Philosophy" for ''Political Science''. Pocock mused that readers would deem it "strange" to find "the conservative party repudiating he neo-Harringtonian "schoolbook interpretation of"history, and the opposition appealing to it...When the adversary by whom he he conservative party memberis faced is a fundamentalist reactionary, advocating a return to things as (he says) they once were, it is not surprising that the conservative should argue, first, that things in the past were not as the adversary supposes, second, that the whole idea of appeal to the past is out of order. He can achieve the former by means of historical criticism, which is just as likely to be a conservative as a radical technique. The latter he can achieve in either of two ways. Like Hooker and Burke, he can appeal to tradition...or he can have recourse to a hard-headed empiricism, which scouts the whole notion of history as a court of appeal...These two arguments are not as different as they might appear. The ancient Chinese philosopher Hsun Tzu tried to unite them, and in that Oakeshotten isle of Albion they are, of course, found in many combinations." On a related note, in his 2019 response to the Cambridge School article, Pocock further alluded to his 1975 ''The Machiavellian Moment'' as a " 'Cambridge' treatise uthoredin an American setting (suggested by Bernard Bailyn and Caroline Robbins)." This suggestion by Bailyn most likely derived from ''WMQ'' editorial comments on Pocock's 1965 article, but any impetus connected to Bailyn for Pocock's seminal study remains a subject of scholarly inquiry.

The Republican Position

J. G. A. Pocock periodically clarified and updated Cambridge School methodologies. In a 1981 methodological essay, for instance, Pocock critiqued deconstruction, expressed "surprise" at pundits and scholars who "denounced imas party to a conspiracy of American ideologues," and attempted to use ''Raiders of the Lost Ark'' character interpretations of the Ark of the Covenant to illustrate his approach to history. He thought it "clear that I am not supposing a state of things in which each idiom or paradigm defines a community of persons who speak in its terms and whose thinking is governed by its presuppositions." The aims of reconstructing discourse were to illuminate political thought, not to foreclose the possibility or probability of political thought independent of a given discourse.

In 2004, J. G. A. Pocock expounded on one of his many purposes for contributing to the Cambridge School. Pocock confirmed that " uentinSkinner and I agree in a certain sympathy for the 'positive,' or as will appear, the 'republican' position." The latter "position" usually, but not always, signified modes of government rather than, for example, industrial and post-industrial North American "progressive business" or collectivism in stateless societies and subcultures. Mira Siegelberg maintains that the ideas of Hannah Arendt, rather than serving "as a source for the normative implications of his aterargument—as some of his critics have claimed—Pocock placed himself in critical relation to her valorization of civic republicanism."

Rejoinder to Critiques of Cambridge School Contextualism by J.G.A. Pocock

In 1995, historian Bernard Bailyn delivered a lecture at La Trobe University, published in '' Quadrant'' as "Context in History," on critical appraisals of contextualism and on ideas that transcended such contexts. Gordon S. Wood cited and recapitulated Bailyn's arguments on "Context in History" in reviews for ''The Weekly Standard'', a vessel for neoconservatism during the demise of ''The Public Interest''. In 1996, J. G. A. Pocock engaged with this lecture in "Concepts and Discourses: A Difference in Culture " Pocock aimed to explain why Cambridge School publications should not be "homogenized" as the history of ideas, conceptual history, or even the history of discourses. According to Pocock, "long ago, I decided that I would no longer describe what I was doing by the then conventional term 'history of ideas' on the grounds that, while ideas obviously formed themselves in the human mind, the term by itself did not indicate the concrete historical form in which ideas exhibited themselves as undergoing continuity and change in history grounding_as_continuity_and_change_in_history.html" ;"title="Grounding_(metaphysics).html" ;"title="erhaps Grounding (metaphysics)">grounding as continuity and change in history">Grounding_(metaphysics).html" ;"title="erhaps Grounding (metaphysics)">grounding as continuity and change in history ''Ideen'' and ''Begriffe'' [glossed in English as ideas and concepts] are of course not necessarily identical, but I think the same difficulty may arise regarding a history of concepts as regarding a history of ideas. That is, scholars in this field shall find themselves examining a history of language, of vocabularies, grammars, rhetorics, and their usages, for the most part in written and printed form, in which words and usages convey concepts from mind to mind...I am not saying that concepts are epiphenomenal or unreal; and it is not my business to say that language is the only ultimate reality." The attempt to draft a " ' history of the concept of the state,' " for example, was a worthwhile endeavor because "there must have been a tract of time in which locally specific historical agents continuously employed language in which cognates of the word state—alternatively, terminology from some other language that one can regularly translate, and justify oneself in translating, by that word and its cognates—were used in ways that permit historians to establish a developmental or dialectical history of conceptualization accompanying the history of language usage as one of its effects. We may then find that some concept of the state took shape over the period we are studying." For conceptual history and the history of ideas, mutually agreeable translations were important, and Pocock seemed to require common lexical cognates and/or epistemic justification to "regularly translate." Otherwise, "we are imposing our interpretation and our language on historical actors inhabiting a language world other than ours, and saying that they must, ideally, be supposed to have inhabited a world that our language defines." There were "dangers" in, for instance, using the "word state as a translation of the Greek ''polis'' �όλις the Chinese ''kuo'' �� the Latin ''civitas'' or ''imperium'' or ''res publica'', the early modern English ''commonwealth'', the Florentine ''stato'', the French ''état'', or the English ''estate''." Translations of ''all'' of the foregoing as "state" was "difficult to do without imposing an ideal construct—which is to say, a body of our own concepts—upon history."

J. G. A. Pocock still held to his example of the " 'history of the concept of the state' " as possible with common lexical cognates and/or epistemic justification to "regularly translate" the concept of "state" within a select set of comparable and compound, albeit shifting, contexts. He suggested that "''Sattelzeit'' he saddle time and gradual or accelerated shift to an epoch threshold of modernitiesas Professor Koselleck has described," itself substantiated "the history of concepts as a feature of, and as exhibited within, an ongoing history of discourses arranged against each other in constant and continuing debate." Conversely, scholars that "concern themselves with a history of contexts and texts...set up a synchronically existing language-world in order to see how it was being used at the moment and how it was being changed in the short run." Despite this apparent synchronic emphasis, these adherents of the Cambridge School "are as heavily committed to the dynamic as they are to the static." Pocock acknowledged, though, "that they are better at establishing the character of innovations in the synchronic than at tracing the more long-term pattern of changes in the diachronic." Thus, in dialectical fashion, both the history of ideas and conceptual history, in turn, propelled the Cambridge School into studying a given idea or concept within "changing contexts in which it had been used; the changing ways in which, and purposes for which, it had been used; and the changing freights of implication, assumption, and other modes of significance that had, from time to time, been attached to it." His conclusion reiterated that the history of ideas, conceptual history, and history of discourses "can be confronted, compared, and combined, but not homogenized."

In response to methodological criticisms of Cambridge School contexts in ''The Machiavellian Moment'', by Bailyn and others, J.G.A. Pocock rejoined that such critique of contextualism precipitated his multivolume ''Barbarism and Religion'' series, published from 1999 to 2015, on historiography drafted during the Enlightenment and its benefaction to the history of political thought. In "Theory in History: Problems in Context and Narrative," Pocock posed the most common question elicited by the application of contextualism: "What exactly are the conditions it specifies, and why does it specify these and not others?" For Pocock, "this question becomes all the more pressing as we enter the realms of practice and history, where the conditions under which, and the contexts in which, we operate can never be defined with finality...the historian has begun to resemble a post-Burkean moderate conservative, reminding us that there is always more going on than we can comprehend at any one moment and convert into either theory or practice. One has become something of a political theorist in one’s own right, advancing, and inviting others to explore, the proposition that political action and political society are always to be understood in a context of historical narrative." Pocock therefore accepted the Bailyn-Wood criticism of contextualist pasts and, in dialogical fashion, proposed that scholars study "historiography as itself a branch of political thought and theory, literature and discourse," casting this methodological criticism as an argument for a given "political theory" over another "political theory" or a variation of the same "political theory." He reflected on historians, past and present, "who study and narrate what goes on in this world; it is possible that there may be a 'political theory' which addresses the same phenomena." Yet Pocock refuted, and refutes, any contention that his primary contribution to the Cambridge School was the dialogical appraisal of historiography as political thought and representations thereof.

See also

* Annales school
* Cambridge School of historiography, which deals with the British Empire and does not overlap with intellectual history
* Conceptual history
* ''The Cambridge History of Political Thought''
* ''The Foundations of Modern Political Thought''

References

{{reflist

Historical schools
History of the University of Cambridge
Intellectual history