Battlefields (альбом Hate Forest)

A battlefield, battleground, or field of battle is the location of a present or historic battle involving ground warfare. It is commonly understood to be limited to the point of contact between opposing forces, though battles may involve troops covering broad geographic areas. Although the term implies that battles are typically fought in a field – an open stretch of level ground – it applies to any type of terrain on which a battle is fought. The term can also have legal significance, and battlefields have substantial historical and cultural value—the battlefield has been described as "a place where ideals and loyalties are put to the test".Veronica Fiorato, Anthea Boylston, Christopher Knüsel, ''Blood Red Roses: The Archaeology of a Mass Grave from the Battle of Towton AD 1461'' (2007), p. 3. Various acts and treaties restrict certain belligerent conduct to an identified battlefield. Other legal regimes promote the preservation of certain battlefields as sites of historic importance.

Modern military theory and doctrine has, with technological advances in warfare, evolved the understanding of a battlefield from one defined by terrain to a more multifaceted perception of all of the factors affecting the conduct of a battle and is conceptualised as the battlespace.

Choice of battlefields

The occurrence of a battle at a particular location may be entirely accidental, if an encounter between hostile forces occurs with neither side having expected the encounter. Typically, however, the location is chosen deliberately, either by agreement of the two sides or, more commonly, by the commander of one side, who attempts to either initiate an attack on terrain favorable to the attack, or position forces on ground favorable to defense, if anticipating an attack.

Agreed battlefields

Although many battlefields arise in the course of military operations, there have been a number of occasions where formal conventions have ordained the nature and site of the battlefield. It has been suggested, on the basis of anthropological research, that ritual warfare involving battles on traditional "fighting grounds", bound by rules to minimise casualties, may have been common among early societies.

In the European Middle Ages, formal pre-arrangement of a battlefield occasionally occurred. The Vikings had the concept of the "hazelled field", where an agreed site was marked out with hazel rods in advance of the battle.

Formal arrangements by armies to meet one another on a certain day and date were a feature of Western Medieval warfare, often related to the conventions of siege warfare. This arrangement was known as a ''journée''. Conventionally, the battlefield had to be considered a fair one, not greatly advantaging one side or the other. Arrangements could be very specific about where the battle should take place. For example, at the siege of Grancey in 1434, it was agreed that the armies would meet at "the place above Guiot Rigoigne's house on the right side towards Sentenorges, where there are two trees".

In a pitched battle, although the battlefield is not formally agreed upon, either side can choose to withdraw rather than engaging in the battle. The occurrence of the battle therefore generally reflects the belief by both sides that the battlefield and other circumstances are advantageous for their side.

Geography and the choice of battlefield

Some locations are chosen for certain features giving advantage to one side or another.

In the 1820s, General Joseph Rogiat, of Napoleon Bonaparte's ''Grande Armée'', spoke at great length of the circumstances that make for a good battlefield. He divided the battlefield in two: one favorable for attack and one for defense, and argued that the greater the benefit of one over the other, the stronger a position was.Joseph Rogniat (général de division), quoted in ''The United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine'' (1829), p. 160. He went on to say that easy movement of troops to the front, and distribution of forces across the front, was also important, since this allowed support and reinforcement as needed. He mentions the high ground as a means of observing the enemy, and concealing friendly forces; while this has been mitigated by aerial reconnaissance, improved communication ( field telephone and radio), and indirect fire, it remains important. (For instance, "hull down" firing positions for tanks were desired well into World War II.)

Rogiat also discussed cover, in reference to exposure to cannon fire; in earlier times, it would have been to slingers (in Ancient Greek and Roman times) or archers (such as the Welsh longbowmen or Mongol horse archers) from ancient times well into the 1400s, while slightly later, it would be to riflemen.)

Rogniat describes a "disadvantageous field of battle" as one:

This may be called an ideal defensive position, however. He then advises that troops should be situated so that the ground they defend is favorable, while the ground through which the enemy must advance is unfavorable:

During World War I, for instance, the An Nafud behind Aqaba seemed impassible, until a force of Arab rebels led by T. E. Lawrence successfully crossed it to capture the town. In World War II, the Pripyat Marsh was an obstacle to vehicles, and the Red Army successfully employed cavalry there specifically because of that, while in North Africa, the Qattara Depression was used as an "anchor" for a defensive line.

The belief that a location is impregnable will lead to it being chosen for a defensive position, but may produce complacency. During the Jewish Rebellion in 70 AD, Masada was thought to be unassailable; determined Roman military engineering showed it was not. In World War I, Aqaba was considered safe. During World War II, ''Monte la Difensa'' was revealed to be vulnerable by the First Special Service Force. (All three instances would later be used in films.)

Crossing obstacles remains a problem. Even a seemingly open field, such as that faced by George Pickett at Gettysburg, was broken by fences which had to be climbed—while his division was constantly exposed to fire from the moment it left the trees. On modern battlefields, introducing obstacles to slow an advance has risen to an art form: everything from anti-tank ditches to barbed wire to dragon's teeth to improvised devices, have been employed, in addition to minefields. The nature of the battlefield influences the tactics used; in Vietnam, heavy jungle favored ambush.

Historically, military forces have sometimes trained using methods suitable for a level battlefield, but not for the terrain in which they were likely to end up fighting. Mardonius illustrated the problem for the Ancient Greeks, whose phalanges were ill-suited for combat except on level ground without trees, watercourses, ditches, or other obstacles that might break up its files,Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, Michael Whitby, ''The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare'' (2007), p. a perfection rarely obtained. Rome had the same preference. By the 20th Century, many military organizations had specialist units, trained to fight in particular geographic areas, like mountains (Alpine units), desert (such as the