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Self-confirming Equilibrium
In game theory, self-confirming equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is the most commonly used solution concept for non-cooperative games. A Nash equilibrium is a situation where no player could gain by changing their own strategy (holding all other players' strategies fixed) ... for extensive form games, in which players correctly predict the moves their opponents make, but may have misconceptions about what their opponents ''would'' do at information sets that are never reached when the equilibrium is played. Self-confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that if a game is played repeatedly, the players will revise their beliefs about their opponents' play if and only if they ''observe'' these beliefs to be wrong. Consistent self-confirming equilibrium is a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium that further requires that each player correctly predicts play at all information sets that can be reached when the pl ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Rationalizability
Rationalizability is a solution concept in game theory. It is the most permissive possible solution concept that still requires both players to be at least rational, somewhat rational and know the other players are also somewhat rational, i.e. that they do not play dominated strategies. A strategy is rationalizable if there exists some possible set of beliefs both players could have about each other's actions, that would still result in the strategy being played. Rationalizability is a broader concept than a Nash equilibrium. Both require players to respond optimally to some belief about their opponents' actions, but Nash equilibrium requires these beliefs to be correct, while rationalizability does not. Rationalizability was first defined, independently, by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). Definition Starting with a normal-form game, the rationalizable set of actions can be computed as follows: # Start with the full action set for each player. # Remove all Strategic domi ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Nash Equilibrium
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is the most commonly used solution concept for non-cooperative games. A Nash equilibrium is a situation where no player could gain by changing their own strategy (holding all other players' strategies fixed). The idea of Nash equilibrium dates back to the time of Cournot, who in 1838 applied it to his model of competition in an oligopoly. If each player has chosen a strategy an action plan based on what has happened so far in the game and no one can increase one's own expected payoff by changing one's strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices constitutes a Nash equilibrium. If two players Alice and Bob choose strategies A and B, (A, B) is a Nash equilibrium if Alice has no other strategy available that does better than A at maximizing her payoff in response to Bob choosing B, and Bob has no other strategy available that does better than B at maximizing his payoff in response to Alice c ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Drew Fudenberg
Drew Fudenberg (born March 2, 1957) is a professor of economics at MIT. His research spans many aspects of game theory, including equilibrium theory, learning in games, evolutionary game theory, and many applications to other fields. Fudenberg was also one of the first to apply game theoretic analysis in industrial organization, bargaining theory, and contract theory. He has also authored papers on repeated games, reputation effects, and behavioral economics. Biography Fudenberg obtained his A.B. in applied mathematics from Harvard University in 1978, when he went on to obtain his Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After completing his Ph.D. in just three years, he began his assistant professorship at the University of California, Berkeley in 1981. At Berkeley, Fudenberg was tenured at the age of 28. In 1987, he returned to a faculty position at MIT, where he taught for 6 years. In 1993, Fudenberg accepted a faculty position in the Economics de ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
David K
David (; , "beloved one") was a king of ancient Israel and Judah and the third king of the United Monarchy, according to the Hebrew Bible and Old Testament. The Tel Dan stele, an Aramaic-inscribed stone erected by a king of Aram-Damascus in the late 9th/early 8th centuries BCE to commemorate a victory over two enemy kings, contains the phrase (), which is translated as " House of David" by most scholars. The Mesha Stele, erected by King Mesha of Moab in the 9th century BCE, may also refer to the "House of David", although this is disputed. According to Jewish works such as the ''Seder Olam Rabbah'', '' Seder Olam Zutta'', and ''Sefer ha-Qabbalah'' (all written over a thousand years later), David ascended the throne as the king of Judah in 885 BCE. Apart from this, all that is known of David comes from biblical literature, the historicity of which has been extensively challenged,Writing and Rewriting the Story of Solomon in Ancient Israel; by Isaac Kalimi; page 32; Cam ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Extensive-form Game
In game theory, an extensive-form game is a specification of a game allowing for the explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the (possibly imperfect) information each player has about the other player's moves when they make a decision, and their payoffs for all possible game outcomes. Extensive-form games also allow for the representation of incomplete information in the form of chance events modeled as " moves by nature". Extensive-form representations differ from normal-form in that they provide a more complete description of the game in question, whereas normal-form simply boils down the game into a payoff matrix. Finite extensive-form games Some authors, particularly in introductory textbooks, initially define the extensive-form game as being just a game tree with payoffs (no imperfect or incomplete information), and add the other elements in subsequent chapters as refinements ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Game Theory
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions. It has applications in many fields of social science, and is used extensively in economics, logic, systems science and computer science. Initially, game theory addressed two-person zero-sum games, in which a participant's gains or losses are exactly balanced by the losses and gains of the other participant. In the 1950s, it was extended to the study of non zero-sum games, and was eventually applied to a wide range of Human behavior, behavioral relations. It is now an umbrella term for the science of rational Decision-making, decision making in humans, animals, and computers. Modern game theory began with the idea of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum games and its proof by John von Neumann. Von Neumann's original proof used the Brouwer fixed-point theorem on continuous mappings into compact convex sets, which became a standard method in game theory and mathematical economics. His paper was f ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Extensive Form Game
In game theory, an extensive-form game is a specification of a game allowing for the explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the (possibly imperfect) information each player has about the other player's moves when they make a decision, and their payoffs for all possible game outcomes. Extensive-form games also allow for the representation of incomplete information in the form of chance events modeled as " moves by nature". Extensive-form representations differ from normal-form in that they provide a more complete description of the game in question, whereas normal-form simply boils down the game into a payoff matrix. Finite extensive-form games Some authors, particularly in introductory textbooks, initially define the extensive-form game as being just a game tree with payoffs (no imperfect or incomplete information), and add the other elements in subsequent chapters as refinements ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Information Set (game Theory)
In game theory, an information set is the basis for decision making in a game, which includes the actions available to players and the potential outcomes of each action. It consists of a collection of decision nodes that a player cannot distinguish between when making a move, due to incomplete information about previous actions or the current state of the game. In other words, when a player's turn comes, they may be uncertain about which exact node in the game tree they are currently at, and the information set represents all the possibilities they must consider. Information sets are a fundamental concept particularly important in games with imperfect information. In games with perfect information (such as chess or Go (game), Go), every information set contains exactly one decision node, as each player can observe all previous moves and knows the exact game state. However, in games with imperfect information—such as most Card game, card games like poker or Bridge (card game), bri ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Solution Concept
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. These predictions are called "solutions", and describe which strategies will be adopted by players and, therefore, the result of the game. The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts, most famously Nash equilibrium. Many solution concepts, for many games, will result in more than one solution. This puts any one of the solutions in doubt, so a game theorist may apply a refinement to narrow down the solutions. Each successive solution concept presented in the following improves on its predecessor by eliminating implausible equilibria in richer games. Formal definition Let \Gamma be the class of all games and, for each game G \in \Gamma, let S_G be the set of strategy profiles of G. A ''solution concept'' is an element of the direct product \Pi_2^; ''i.e''., a function F: \Gamma \rightarrow \bigcup\nolimits_ 2^ such that F(G) \subseteq S_G for all G \in \Gamma. Rati ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
Econometrica
''Econometrica'' is a peer-reviewed academic journal of economics, publishing articles in many areas of economics, especially econometrics. It is published by Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Econometric Society. The current editor-in-chief is Guido Imbens. History ''Econometrica'' was established in 1933. Its first editor was Ragnar Frisch, recipient of the first Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1969, who served as an editor from 1933 to 1954. Although ''Econometrica'' is currently published entirely in English, the first few issues also contained scientific articles written in French. Indexing and abstracting ''Econometrica'' is abstracted and indexed in: * Scopus * EconLit * Social Sciences Citation Index According to the ''Journal Citation Reports'', the journal has a 2020 impact factor The impact factor (IF) or journal impact factor (JIF) of an academic journal is a type of journal ranking. Journals with higher impact factor values are considered mo ... [...More Info...] [...Related Items...] OR: [Wikipedia] [Google] [Baidu] |
